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has attempted to analyse the impact of transformation on the role 
the most senior public servant South Africa, the Director General. This required an 
analysis of the Director General's administrative and policy roles within the 
po litic al-administrative interface. 
The aims of the research were firstly to provide a description of the role of the 
Director General in South African public service and thereby provide an insight 
into of the Director Secondly, the aim was to the South 
African public transformation process as well as changes which have taken 
place at Director General leveL A third aim was to provide a normative trame:W()fK 
political in African context, and finally 
to contribute to the of public 
Thus, three research questions were OJ .... ,,' ........ 
1. What role did the Director General play in pre-and post-l 994 South African 
public 
What is administrative and political ,,,,1",<1"""'''' South 
What ought to be the administrative and political interface in South Africa? 
order to answer was and interviews were 











post-1994 eras. An open and closed questionnaire was developed by researcher 
order to gather data, and the research is therefure original work. The research 
incorporated SCllemmc principles of social SCllen(~e and is a study. 
The findings can be as follows. Directors '-'''' ...... '" ... , both pre-&nd 
post-1994, have two basic roles one of which is an administrative role, the otht;'!r, a 
policy administrative role of the Director General has not fundamentally 
changed over the past fifteen years. Directors continue to be responsible for 
human and financial resources within administrative capacity. 
laenmlea in Generals' "n"~1T\'P capacity and need to be 
"'rlrll .... "" .. rl by improving lanaJ2:(~m4ent capacity. The Director General's policy role 
appears to be changing. trend has been identified which indicates that Directors 
Genetal are playing policy role and more ofan administrative It 
appears that poHticalleadership is usurping Director policy role. 
Although a political-administrative dichotomy never existed South Africa, the 












research concludes with recommendations for improving mama:gernelill capacity, 
and developing a more llnCal-a(lmml~Smltn'e ,,.,1-,,,,,,,",,,,,, .. ,, It is that 
this will the South its to , ...... "'·,.."11" the 
management capacity the public order itto deliver quality services to 












"The role assigned to government in the planning and management of national economic 
and social activities has undergone fundamental reassessment in both developt;d and 
developing economies ... " - Kaul1 
Reform ofthe public sector is not a new phenomenon. There have been successive waves 
of public sector retcomlS Britain and f\I1u:rlca in the 
"''''~'''H1''''J to post World War II reforms, then in response to the and "''"''''u'"'''' ofthe 
state. However, 1980's has anunlprececlented wave of public 
sector retiomlS are in (Larson and Coe, 1999:22). According to 
and Coe (ibid) there are four catalysts to this new wave of reforms. Firstly financial 
constraints by many governmep.ts, secondly the decline of public confidence in 
government, thirdly technological change, and finally the global dynamics in economies 
and maldng have required many states to become more competitive (ibid). The 
""~"UE>""E> role of the state therefore prompted many governments to re-assess their 
public in terms ofits capacity to deliver " ... r\l .. ·.~" efficiently and "'+1"."' .... 1-""'" The 
changing role of the stat, and re-assessment of the public service have had many 
implications. research will focus on the implications of public sector _+i" ....... and 
for public QPnl1 .... p manag;ers specifically within the South"" ...... ,.,Tl 
context. 
"From Problem to Solution:' Commonwealth Strategies for Reform: Managing the 










South Africa is no exception in 
transformation of its public "' .... '1.l1C" .. 
ideological racial interference 
effort to re-assess its public "' .... "1"' .. although the 
socio-political imperatives. The political, 
the public apartheid 
a public " ...... ,,"''''' that has seemulgl) insurmountable challenges. In 1992 
9 
Financial Mail predicted that control over the new South Africa would be determined in 
the public service not ne(}es:sani) at the political level. Moreover, unless the public 
"'PT'>.!,C'·" changed concurrently with political and constitutional reform process, South 
Africa would run the risk of the new political dispensation a public service 
structured and staffed according to outdated policies (Financial Mail, 6/311992). This 
prediction has come true as the government realised that the implementation ofits 
transformation and development policies is dependent on the public service. This is a 
public service that is accustomed to the apartheid system of governance, not 
representative of the population at senior decision making levels, and is beset with 
problems from lack of skills and resources to more serious problems of corruption. 
the next millennium and second era as a democratic state, 
the emphasis now lies improving service delivery 
Africans. 
quality oflife for all 
The South African on',' .. ?'1" ...... ''''fl1" realised that public servIce, institution res,ponSl 
for implementation of development policies and provision of basic services, needs to 
be transformed. It is the public through senior management effort, which has to 











policies and legislation to eXIJeCI1l:e the transformation ofthe public service. 1996 a 
Presidential Commission was mandated to evaluate the South African public 
Commission published cornlJJ:1erl'e~"n"Sl'T"" H.n..u.HJ:;.:> in 1998 concluded 
that A ,n",." public had 
me:m(~lel1CI4~S and that the efficient of quality ""' .... ,"" •• '" 
much to be aeslrea (1998:17). 
One problems identified by LomnllSS:lOn (1998) is a role 
conflict senior public servants General) and their political 
counterparts (Ministers and Members of Executive Councils) both at national and 
provincial spheres gm/entm(mt. Ministers and Members Councils 
(MEC's) were suspicious of senior public servants from the apartheid era. This mistrust 
hindered an political and administrative intermce. some cases the mistrust of 
public servants who implemented apartheid policies was justified. However, senior public 
servants who were appointed during the post-apartheid era were lacking in skills 
and eX1PeIlerlce It is therefore not surprising that Presidential Commission 
(1998:22) Pyn1rp';:';:I"l1 concern that a we:a.l{jne~;s in """'T<>lrYl of governance South 
Africa is the uncertainty, even confusion, as to responsibilities 
';:Arliu'''public servants. 
and 
This paper attempts to identifY the problems that senior management, more specifically 
Directors '-'''' ...... , ...... in the management of government departments responsible for 











the Director as the most public se.rvant. In doing so, the paper will 
describe the transformation process that taken place the South public 
service and how it has impacted on the role of the Director General. The changing role 
the Director General will be and a critical analysis of the changing 
nature of the political-administrative will provided. The paper will 
provide recommendations as to what the ofthe ought to in the 
South context. 
Organisation of the Research Paper 
The section ofthis paper provides a description ofthe research and 
methodology. The although qualitative, incorporates core principles of social 
.:>VI',,", .. ',,", to ensure validity. The section ofthe provides a 
framework for this ...... "'''''',>'1' terms i'+""...,.r" .. ", review. 
major literature that deals with senior management in public services is designed to 
provide a basis fur understanding this paper. However, it should be noted that most ofthe 
more developed countries' public in the 
area of senior in developing largely first 
chapter ofthis study critically discusses theoretical and conceptual models ofpublic 
administration with particular attention to the nature ofthe political and administrative 
second the changing modem state 
Imlperatrves of change which resulted in a global of the public service. 










some insights into the South African public service transformation initiatives. Chapter 
Three describes apartheid's public service and the institutional heritage which 
an understanding ofthe challenges that the democratic dispensation faces in South 
Africa. Chapter Four provides a chronological description as well as an analysis ofthe 
South African public service transformation process. paper also provides a 
description oftransfurmation initiatives for public servants in South and 
a the analysis of the changing role III 
Five. Ch:aDtc~r a description and oflegislation that has impacted 
12 
'-'''''''''''", .... in South includes the ....,.".,,"'...,' .... 
findings and and attempts to answer the resealrch ....... '"'''''[v'"'". The chapter 
of this paper provides recommendations a "'...., ... "'Tn1" trnlnp1.xJnlri< of what ought 
to be the role of Directors General in terms of the 
Significance of the Research 
Presidential Review Commission consiste4 of national and international public 
administration and was a body constituted to assist South public 
<;!prvl .... 'p transformation This involved a study of the South public " .. r'Vu·' .... 
and recommendations overcoming the challenges and COllsuamrs that it 
Presidential Review Commission, 1998:2). Presidential Review Commission 
(1998:23) made a number of recommendations and argued that the role ofelected 












1. Provide vision and policy direction, 
Oversee and monitor the implementation of po Hcy, 
Secure resources fur their ministries and departments to implement policy ",1'1',,,,,..1".,,,,, 
4. Represent the ministry Cabinet and Parliament, or in provincial council 
and legislature, 
Account the performance ofthe ministry, 
coHective responsibility for Cabinet decisions, and 
7. accountable to the legislature their actions. 
Furthermore, Review Commission (1998:23) also that role 
un:-ecl:ors General should be to: 
1. Inform advise officials accurately, completely and on time, 
Iml:llelrnellt policy and Ministerial effectively efficiently, 
3. fully accountable to Ministers or aLI";,"",.:>. and where "' ... ''',.n ....... to the .v!",1.." .... ""1...,, 
Provide Minister with the oroaoest .... ,.I"" •. ..,.v for policy consideration 
and formulation by utilising various sources, and 
Co-ordinate, control, manage and communicate within their department. 
the Presidential Review Commission roles, the 
n ... ,,, ... ,,,,,,,, that more research needed to undertaken so that more authoritative guidance 
on the and relationships of politicians and administrators could issued by the 
and by Parliament as a foundation fur future governance in South 
Africa (presidential Review 1998:23-24). This paper is an attempt to 











Twenty-eight Ul1:ec1:ors General who occupy most public servant in 
South public at national level. The most common reason 
cited for the turnover is of Ministers to aPl)relclate as 
that Director and a tendency for Ministers to place demands 
on """""u," 1999: 19). "''''Tn''''''the 111"<>"1",..'",,, General are the 
renrea or new appointees, are ............ '"1"> politicians apartheid regIme (most 
acting as line ",." ....... \11 as well as political executives (ibid). On the other hand newly 
appointed Directors readily admit their own lack of experience administering 
and managing a large complex public organisation (ibid). According to Maphai (as cited 
Sunday Times, 24/01/1999) the Director General is at a crucial level of management 
and the lack of stability and quick turnover de1:nnleI1ltall~ alIecrs perfonnance and 
service delivery. Thus, there is clearly a need to develop procedural guidance on role 
of Directors General and political counterparts. This research win therefore attempt 
to develop procedural guidance as to 
po litical-adm inistrative interfuce. 
role of the Directors General within the 
Research at this of the public seldom receives scholarly attention. According 
to Lungu (1998:2) senior management of the public is governed by a convention 
of anonymity and there is a aeever knowledge and IH"'l~UL the 
public servants (ibid). Most importantly, the South African context it is this .... ""I"I",I"n 











assessment. The research intends to provide an insight into the office ofthe Director 
General, and to add to the debate of senior public management, a neglected area 
It is that ~",.:>.", ...... u will provide an the mana~~enal and policy roles 
the South 
provide an insight into the role South Africa. 
will 
researc h will 
also provide an evaluative analysis of transformation in South Africa as well as an 
assessment oftransformation initiatives at senior managerial leveL 
provide a normative framework of what the role of the Director General 
ought to be. 
Research Questions 




public " .. r<J1P .. 
play in Dre:-arJlO post-1994 South 
What is the administrative and political interface South Africa? 
3. What to be the and political in 
Aim of the Research 











1. A description of the role ofthe Director m South African public service 
and thereby provide an insight into the office ofthe Director General. 
of South Africa's public process as wen as the 
manag:emlem in South public 
3. normative framework of the political administrative interface in South 
£U.j.x .. ",u context. 











Apolitical means the non-involvement per.son in partisan politics. 
Pele is the South African government's policy on service delivery to all South 
Africans. It is based on the premise that people's needs are a priority. thereby 
incorporating the notion of the public as customers and introducing private sector 
principles into the public service. 
Career public servants are public servants who are recruited into public 
lower levels ofthe hierarchy and through promotion attain more positions. 
public service is the occupation of the public servant who remains in the public 
service fur his or her entire career. 
Director General is the most ill 
Director is at apex ofthe public ~"'''',\l1rp hierarchy and at 
between politics and administration. 
at 
Elites are peI"SOI1S are distinguished the UHJ''''U''''~ population by virtue oftheir 
17 
access to resources and opportunities, and the use of which provides them with access to 










Executing Authorities are Ministers, the President, the Premier and Members of 
Executive CounciL 
General public service is distinguished from public as do not 
luau":!';", or 
Member of Executive Council is the of a Minister at provincial 
18 
Meritorious appointment or promotion is appointment or promotion of an official to a 
position because of qualifications and expertise to the requirements ofthe 
position. 
Minister is a politician who has by 
executive decision forum, the Cabinet. The 
to most 
are reSDonSlble for a 
portfolio and Ministry, and provide political leadership for that institution. 
New Management is the incorporation of private sector principles, as 
efficiency and into the management and delivery ofthe public 
Partisan to a state of mind of a .... "" .. "',... .... who is a supporter of a political party, 











Patronage refers to the power a person may have the appointment of supporters to 
particular positions where appointee will loyal to the appointing authority. 
and actions are not based on merit or the most rational choice, but based upon 
the loyalty to appointing authority. 




to the appointment ofa person to a position by political 
Political-administrative dichotomy to the distinct separation of roles between the 
political administrative executive. 
Oll.flC(ll-(la1lrlln"!h>rrtl1U) interface to nature of the relationship between the 
political and administrative executive. 















Public or civil servant, official, bureaucrat and administrator 
employed in the public service. 
to a person who is 
Public or civil service is the sector of the economy that serves the public and delivers 
public and goods. 
Reform refers to a process ofimproving and amending an unsatisfactory situation or 
institution. 
Senior public service rerers to the strategic decision making echelon of the public service. 
In South context it would be Directors, Chief Directors, Deputy Directors 
rPl'1rnn: General. 
Spoils system is the 1"P"",.'f1 
political party or politician. 
Transformation 
position, -~--"J in public "", .. """.", by a victorious 
of fundamentally changing the ore,ce:sses. structure, 




























Civil Service Selection Board 
Director General 
Department ofPubHc Service and Administration 
Ecole National Administration 
Forum for South African Directors General 
Joint Management 
Members of Executive Council 
National Council of Provinces 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
National Security Vlatlag.em.em ...:u"t-.,,, ....... 
Office of Management and Budget 





Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission 























Recruitment and ft.:S:Sti:S:SIHtiUl Agency 
Reconstruction and Development Programme 
South African Communist Party 
South Development Institute 
South .... ll~'-' .. kU Qualifications Authority 
Standing Committee of Public [1'-",",Vya"., 
Security Council 
van die StaatsadrninistI 
Total Quality Management 
United States of America 
Paper Public Service 'rainirlg and Education 
White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service 
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The methodology of this research is qualitative, and involved the analysis 
documents and >TH."' .... /l .. """ 
res:ea1:ch T't'l"I"' ..... p.,Q began by analysing relevant llte:rature 
numerous national and international books, and government documents. This 
involved '''''''''Ulc'''' beyond libraries examining on Internet as 
well as obtaining on',,,''' ............ documents that are as unpublished. 
The second phase of the res:eaJ:cn was to consult with various stakeholders the of 
public administration to assess whether this researoh was feasible. In this regard 
Chairpersons ofthe Portfolio and National Council of Provinces' Committees Public 
Administration were consulted, as well as the Public Service Commission, the 
Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). During this process, these 
legislative, statutory 
undertaking. 
The third of the was upon 
their support for 
Directors at 
national level. reason for on the ....... va ... ., ... ~n"""'" of government was the 











more intimately involved in national policy making and it is also this level 
management that was am~ctc;~a by transformation. 
However, to provide a more holistic perspective oftransfurmation and the of 
VlI"ect:ors General both current incumbents and retired or released from " .. r-../l,.,·p 
were included in the study. It was decided that Directors General who 1984 
to would reasons for a longitudinal study of 
Directors General 
1. The retorms 
ofthe executive 
1984 to 1999 are as follows: 
man~:emlent began in the 1980's with the commencement 
Africa and the new ........ ,.""'lUUl.VH of Director 
A longitudinal study provides a wealth .nT,,.. ..... ""1"'.-.n about role ofthe Director 
South Africa during apartheid and in the Om;l-a1Darme'IQ 
3. longitudinal study would address the research questions. 
Research Sample 
In to the reSt;:lar<m population for Directors J 984 to 1999, 
resear'cn(~rhad to review annual report for government 
for each year from 1984 as no record of this nature was kept or maintained by any 
government department. Thus, reviewing each annual was the only option for 
developing a and previous and the 











consuming task. database was developed cataloguing each Director for each 
in each national gO'vernment department (see Appendix /). However, some portfolios 
and national departments changed, but the database is an accurate account of Directors 
General each year in each department since 
further decided that del)arltme:nts that arose the 
early 1980's to the oresenlt. It was 
nc,IDlc;,ral Parliament as House 
An1~Ac."'nT!:4TnJAC would not included in study. The ll..:amt::rdl "'''<·TA ...... was not 
with any legitimacy by all South Africans and genuine authority 
power. It was into departments after 1994 therefore became 
defunct. 
Once the population was compiled in a database, 111"A"1"".,.,,, General who "''''..,,,'''',, different 
portfolios were counted as one to avoid duplication the total count for the popUlation. 
The total population Directors ....... """ ..... A • .&L from 1984 to 1999 is one hundred and seven 
(107). However, because of practical constraints the entire population could not be 
interviewed and a sample was therefore selected. 
The was also catlegOfn into post-l 994 liw .... t,,,>"<l General. were 
three exceptions to this categorisation, that is Directors General who c",..,,,p,, before 1994 
and then after 1994 as well. They were categorised as Directors General pre-1994 as they 
started their befure the democratic dispensation. The "' ...... ""'''' consisted of pre-
randomly selected Directors General. A list of Directors was 











1. Is a current Director General transformation initiatives such as presidential 
appointments affected them directly, 
.... "'1'''''''' longer than five-year contract, 
Was head of a aelpartmlent for more than one portfolio, and 
4. Resigned or was L"' .............. from a much publicised debacle. 
ofthirty-seven Directors eight of whom 
1994, inclusive twenty-four current 
The sample of Directors were 
excluded from population, and then "' ... ,.'T ....... sample of Directors was 
............. "'1" .. 11 This sample was ranlaOlml" selc~ctf~a Microsoft The random 
sample consisted of sixteen Directors General that served before 1 and Directors 
General that "pr"",,, after 1994. In total sixty-one Directors (jenera! were selected for the 
resew'cn study comprising of twenty-four randomly selected Directors General and thirty-
seven pre-selected Directors General which is inclusive of twenty-four current Directors 
General. Thus 57% of the population was sampled. The following table illustrates the 
sampling of Directors General. 
TabI It hS e 1: esearc ample 




Post-1994 8 I 29* 37* I 
Total 24 37 * 61* 
I 
* mclUSIVe of24 current Drrectors General 
The researcher began the interviews in April of2000 completed the interviews at the 











randomly selected Directors General, and seven of the eight 994 pre-selected 
Directors General. interviews out of a total oftwenty- four of the pre-1994 
Directors General were completed. The researcher completed four interviews with 
Directors General who were randomly selected and """ ... " .. " after 1994, two 
lieJneral who were pre-selected current Ul1"ec1:ors 
"''' .. ' ..... Thus total the n::;s,eal'Cnt:r interviewed lln'~ .. u UU'ectors T""n,,,.~ I that 
after 1994. total number of Directors un,,,, ... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,.. from the 
randomly selected list was twelve and the total "U'lH"''''' .... ,..,rn"'" General were 
'nT."' .... '."''''''''r1 from the pre-selected was eIJ~nteen. ill total Directors General were 
interviewed, is 28% population. The following table illustrates the 
General interviewed category. 
ble2: Ta c ltd I t ompJe e n ervlews 
Random Selection i Pre-Selection Total 
Pte-1994 8 7 15 
Post-1994 4 11 15 
Total 12 18 30 
Contacting Interviewees 
resc;,arc:ner had sample of Directors "' ....... U.L' each had to be contacted. This 
...... nll"''' to a res;emrcn process in itself. The ."'" ..... ',""'11"". contacted department and 
through corporate services attempted to the telephone numbers and mailing 
addresses for the of Directors General. The researcher encountered numerous 
gaining the contact details 











telephonically transferred from one public official to the next and often received little or 
no assistance. The second problem was the large turnover staff after 1994. Many new 
public servants were not aware of who previous Director for that Department 
was. researcher resorted to requesting the name of a public official who was the 
longest serving public servant in the department or corporate services and then requested 
his or her assistance in gaining contact details of the previous ""',,'('.1"1",'" General for 
that department. most cases this proved fruitfuL It should noted that the 
anonymity was not as it was still of a 
Director to ""'lVUI',", in the research. Another problem that was enclounte'red 
was due to privacy COltlC~~m:s. ", ......... "' ... "' .• .,. would not information of 
public servants who had left department. fu this case, the requested that a 
public servant contact the Director 
question and gain permission for his or contact iniiornrlatlion to be released for ""''''''''''''I''r' 
purposes. strategy also proved to be productive. Although it was SUIl:ges,tea that a 
more expedient " ....... "T<>,('rt would be for researcher to use the Pensions Administration 
to the contact details, reseaI'Chl:!r thought it unethical to peruse the personnel and 
lJ'd1"'''';'11 files of Directors "-''''u'''', ...... 
On obtaining the mailing addresses for both past and current Directors General each 
Director General was sent a letter outlining: 
1. 
Nature and r"n ..... ..,." .. of the ""''''''''''"1''i''h 










4. Assurances of confidentiality and anonymity if desired, and 
The request for a personal interview. (see Appendix II). 
response rate was initially slow and the researcher subsequently made follow-up 
telephone The rate the current Directors 
proved to most difficult in seC:UfllnQ 1nt.F'1"V1PUJ'(! It should be iUvUU'U .... , .... that 
31 
some cases researcn(~r had to and re-.sel1IQ many times and numerous 
telephone calls in order to obtain some information as to whether the Director 
had read the letter. The researcher also had to resort to informal channels in order to 
contact Directors General and enlisted assistance of the Public Service Commission 
and Parliament. It should be noted that enlisting assistance of others in making 
contact with Directors General, anonymity I1rP('U\'"" ..... "'An ........ was not 
cOJnplron1is€~d as it was still their prerogative to ..... ".:>"' .. ,' ... study. Once a 
Director General <lCJT'."PI1 to participate the research an appointment was established for 
personal interview to take place at a convenient time and venue for the Director 
Research Instrument 
The researcher chose to conduct personal or face-to-face interviews as opposed to a self. 
completion questionnaire for the following reasons: 
1. The questionnaire not have completed adequately aU, 











The questionnaire would lost in bureaucratic red-tape and correspondence, 
4. Probing and clarification of questions could take place, 
The could develop a rapport that would more at 
ease 
6. The res<~arc)her could nn<:",""", .. .& .. """'.,,""'" In reSDOltlSe to certain questions, 
7. The could nn<:",""", rrrCmnlleIlt such as the office, 
8. Answers to in a self-completion would be closed limited 
as opposed to a ""'''UTn ofinfonnation when answering a lib, and 
9. ""'''',:lV''''''':''''> would not be np< • ....,"." or edited. 
The interviews were non-scheduled, structured nTP·,","'''''~''' The researcher developed a 
questionnaire with open and closed questions to obtain infunnation that would add value 
to the research (see Appendix Ill). first section ofthe questionnaire to 
personal infonnation of the Director General. It was hoped that this section would shed 
light on the social backgrounds of Directors General. The second section with the 
educational background of Directors and the last section related specifically to 
role as General. 
The first draft of the questionnaire was to various authoritative persons the field 
of public administration, polling, "'ULHIJ'JlULiS, interviewing and rosearc] 
persons included academics, journalists such as Mr. R. non-
governmental.sector such as Dr. Robert Mattes the Institute for Democracy South 











National Council of Provinces CCltmmttee for Public Administration and the Public 
'Al"U1C',A Commission. Their feedback was then included the questionnaire design 
the questionnaire was subsequently ,. ... ",,.,,,,,./1 questionnaire was then piloted with 
some public 
revised 
senior managers in Western questionnaire was once 
then given to the researcher's supervisor for approval. 
Interviews 
sealfCtler conducted interview 
AU 
interviewees "'''''',",,,,,,, to the use of a recorder. The resear'che;,r personal 
notes as the interview Dn)Ce'ea,ea. the commencement of the 
researcher informed the interviewee of he nature res,ewen. guidelines answering 
the questionnaire, format of the questionnaire and interviewee's rights 
participating in research (see Appendix At stage interviewees were the 
right to '"''''.,un ......... "', ... and to assert their right to anonymity. stated on 
reeord that they understood the nature research were voluntarily participating 
in the Only in one instance was an interview terminated. After the 
interviewee of his .... "".,j.u ....... to participate in the research. As requested by 
names are not published, reterenc€~s to Un:ec1:ors 











nTP'TVI,P\UlIP\PC;: were also given the right to abstain from <>"<"""'1"1" any question and 
although most completed all the questions, a few preferred not to answer 
certain questions, specifically those questions relating to a Minister's or President's 
leadership/management style. Although the questionnaire was structured the researcher 
allowed interviewees to answer questions at length. However, depending on answers the 
researcher would probe certain issues further. !:'roomUl was limited to certain 
circumstances such as the researcher required clarification, the interviewee did not 
answer the question adequately, the question made the interviewee uncomfortable, or the 
lnT,p\rvlPUJPP raised another that """""'-'1"" exploration. In interviews some 
questions were discarded as they were not appropriate to the circumstances or applicable 
for the Such questions might have inquired about a 
was appointed t're~slOent when 
no knowledge leadership/management style. However, in 
approximately 90% time was 
the Most interviewees completed the 
interviewee completed it approximately forty-five 
took three hours to complete the interview. 
Limitations and Problems 
The personal proved to be 'HU"'-V'U' 
as 
.... "'·hn''' .... < ....... in an hour, one 
while a few interviewees 
expensive. It often 
the researcher to travel to various urban or remote rural areas. Although the researcher 











tickets, accommodation car The res(,arc;ner atte:m01ted to 
l"P'rT,;un destinations. It should 
emclemby 
securing more than one interview be noted on 
a OCI)aslOJlS money was wasted nU,Ar\f1IPUf was scheduled but then cancelled 
just interview was to Some of these "' .. " ...... ,""' ... 1t'ITPl''V1P'Ul<: were 
were not. This ...... r"""'" to a 
frustration was the attempt to contact 'PTIP'N~ I It was 
experience. 4nr,'th<' .. 
to contact past 
""'I"TrU'''' General as there was seldom information on their torwalfdllng 
<:PT'VU'P In terms cOlualmnlg current they :retired from 
researcher would often to use resources to n:-:st::IllU and telephonically attempt 
to gain a response from the office of the Vllrector GeneraL To many 
not responded or replied to 
4nr,'th'''''limitation was the accessibility to 
O ... \1,]p ....... rn';:> ... t records. curnerltatlon was 
documentation and lack of 
lalI11tal111ed or could poorly 
not found. The struggled to gain documents to 
use informal channels to access to documents. 
The often presented a safety to the researcher. It required researcher to 
travel to unmmiliar HJ.V ...... ij'l". U"UU,uUUQi 11'ITl'lnJ'1P","llPI"<: which TU''''<:pnt''''rI concerns 
over In one instance the researcher escaped a car but was robbed of 
personal belongings and some research data (anonymity of subjects was not 












An attempt was made to control biases such as personal, history, test 
l1''I''U~n't'~T1r.n Si;He<mOln and ellilcts in to ensure internal validity. 
However, the resear'chl~rcould not control reactive effects 
nTPTV1,f>Ul,f>P<;: to the being a woman. Dingwall (1980:881) has noted, 
is quite clear that sets of data are made more readily available to nelrsonalcue 
young women.. is always a temptation to such a person, particularly studies 
of older men." this mind the control1ed this by always being 
cautious and being aware of this gender dynamic. Also, this is a South 
cannot that 
validity. However, this researcI in one or another, could and should replicated 
other countries, as the study of senior management in public ""' .... ,,1'.'" deserves attention. 
Another limitation was the lack ofliterature the area of senior public service 
manaJ~en[)eI1lt. Although there are a 
of America and Europe 
publications in area, most focus on 
literature on Permanent :Sej~retarles 
General in developing countries are few. 
Experiential Learning 
United 
When gO'/el1runent it is useful to , .... +,., ........ senior officials 
rf';"I,\ln"(~h and to develop rapport. The reseaI'chc~rtl1Lell~toire informed Office of the 











Public Administration, the Public Service Commission, and the Ministry and Department 
of Public and Administration. This strategy proved useful, as individuals 
v'-F, ..... ..-.' ......... '" would to other individuals interested 
This had a snowball and soon the researcnc;:rdeveloped an m'bomlatllon 
supportive network. network provided the with access to go,,,ennmem 
ltolrm~ltlo'n and support ofthese individuals and 
government institutions also carried weight in secmnm2 interviews. 
second important when conducting research in government is to keep 
a journal of interaction. In other words, every telephone call or letter that is sent should 
be recorded, detailing the date and public official that was spoken to or handling 
correspondence. This is useful in that it holds the support personnel for a Director 
.. "'1'''''1''<>1 accountable as to of the matter and eXloe<1ltc:s "'11'1"1,,,, .. 
or interaction. found it to develop a ~",,,,.nn..t with 
assistants of the Directors General as they are the infOlrmation channel to the Director 
General and managers of the Director General's schedules. However, the research proved 
to extremely difficult as it depended on working with government, which at times was 
not responsive in terms of gathering information or ,,. .. ,, .. , .... .,'ul<. interviews. 
As already mentioned as a woman, mced difficulties ranging from sexism 
to concerns. Scott (1984:169) noted 
research is often overlooked. Scott (1984:165-178) also 
wOimem in social SCllenc:e 
an account of her 










imperative for women conducting fieldwork research or persona] intelViews to ensure 












There have been a fuw published works on role of senior management public 
service, and most of these publications are focused on developed countries. However, 
these books and journal articles did provide a theoretical framework 
comparative understanding of issues and concepts. 
and a 
39 
first m~or research that describes the ntpr+<:.l'p between politicians and bureaucrats, 
and the is Aberbach, u";""' • .,,, ...... (1981) book 
mn{?rnl'.'lP!i: - Aberbach et (1981) Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western 
described interaction 
.... "" ... " ... <>'I'1''''&> or what Aberbach et al (1981) 




chapters, the first describes the nature ofthe relationship between politiCian and 
bureaucrats dichotomous terms, that is politicians make policy and bureaucrats 
implement the policy. second image Aberbach et a1 (1981:6-9) describes isfacts-
interests where both politicians bureaucrats participate in policy formulation, but 
different contributions according to different roles. In other words 
filets, knowledge and technical expertise while politicians values, interests 
and constituency concerns to the formulation of policy (ibid). The fact-interests image 
""'.dlU' .. HI;, balancing and which 
are often diverse nature. third is to as energy-equilibrium 











politics (Aberbach et aI, 1981 :9). However, the distinction is that politicians 
articulate broad, diffuse interests ofunorganised individuals whereas bureaucrats ... "' ............. 
narrow, focused interests of organised individuals (ibid). According to this interpretation, 
the role of politicians is to be partisan, satisfY diverse constituency intcere:sts. idealistic 
and sometimes ideological .. u,~."" • ..., bureaucrats are 1"Ifil£'tH'!'I pragmatic, 
incremental adjustments a demanding environment, and provide policy equilibrium 
(ibid). The last which Aberbach et al (1981: 16-19) to is pure hybrid, which 
bureautcrats Aberbach et al (ibid) is politicians 
as of politics and the politicisation of the bureaucracy. 
to Aberbach et al (ibid) part century has seen virtual 
disappearance of the political-administrative dichotomy and the overlap of roles between 
politicians and bureaucrats. Aberbach al provides of this thesis by analysing 
the of bureaucrats and politicians in various countries. 
In France there is a regular turnover between political and administrative careers. A 
public servant that' is identified as having a bright future may enter the ministerial cabinet 
as a policy or political skills are honed, may enter politics 
(Aberbach et al, 1981: 17). The outcome ofthis career path is that it not only In 
blurring between politicians and bureaucrats but also creates a politiCal-
In most cases the echelons ofthe French public and 
their political form an "old-boys-network" with 
playing by the rules and adhering to a culture ofthe Britain attempted to introduce a 











Review Staff introduced by Minister Heath as evidence of the l"nl1""'ra''<l1r"" 
between politicians and bureaucrats Britain. However, this system was not particularly 
su<~ce:SSI111 and eventually VV"QiJ1..., rI''''ftT'''''~ 1983 1\11 ", ... n~,_1- Thatcher. 
""',V"''''' government showed move towards a hybrid of political-
bureaucratic Although Thatcher could not interfere with the career system of 
the British pubHc service she nonetheless introduced a number of refonns in the British 
bureaucracy. She also made a number of appointments of persons from outside the public 
service as advisors who were sympathetic to her refonns and policies. most notable 
appointment was Rayner and Spencer who was the title of the 
Prime nUj.".;> • ..." Advisor on Efficiency in order to facilitate Thatcher's policy on public 
sector and other partisan Thatcher supporters to Policy Unit. Although it may 
be argued that this is not a hybrid system, Thatcher nonetheless set a precedent and 
refashioned the British public service for more co-operation between the bureaucracy and 
politicians within thJ ",,,,,,,,,,",,"'u 
the of America is substantial ....... dll...,..., for Aberbach et hybrid 
image. A political appoi tment to senior management positions in the public 
maKes for substantial convergence between politicians' and bureaucrats' roles. According 
to Aberbach et al (1981: 19) the po Utical appointments of senior 'U""''''''o'''' results in 
bureaucrats being bound to the political their political patron, the 
President. In other words, nature of political appointments blurs the distinction 











Aside from describing these images or perspectives of the political and administrative 
interface between senior public servants and politicians, Aberbach et al (198 :86-88) also 
describes the that senior public servants play in tenns of policy. Aberbach et 
senior public servants' and politicians' jobs 
1. Technical which on solving policy problems and specialised 
Advocacy aspects which require the representational mt,ere:sts of a social group, class 
or cause, 
3. Brokering aspects which focus on mediation and the resolution of conflicts which 
an or political conflict, 
4. Facilitator !'I<1l'\P"'T<1 which 
constituency, 
on ...... r.i-""r.h ... 'fi the mtere:sts or 
P",,, .. I .. ,£,,,,, "'" .. ,.,.".1'" which require en~~agement 
particular the politics of the ruling party, 
the environment and in 
6. Policymaker aspects where 
policy fonnulation, 
enior public servant and politicians are involved in 
" .. , .. ,,,,,,,1',, which on the ret,re!,enum 
8. Legalist aspects which require a 
of the position, and/or 
on the 
ofinterests ofthe public in upn,pr!'l 
responsibilities and requirements 
Ombudsman ",,,,,...,,,,,..'t,, 
interests of the public 
the undertaking 











",,,, .. 1",,,,,,1'1 et al (1981 :87-88) roles are not mutually and According to 
res:eaJrcn discovered some senior servants politicians displayed one or 
more IS to note is some ofthese roles may produce 
conflict fur senior public servants within a context for a particular 
example conflict with brokering the trustee 
conflict ,",""T',",<lIr'n et al (1981) used analysis to 
em:::OCle the roles between and are 
43 
to relationship. first is the politics/technics dlIlrleIiLSlCm where 
pOJ.mcaarlS are involved advocacy, jJ ....... "'UJ politics the 
nH'~J."""'" "" • .,.H"'''public servants behaved a more technical (Aberbach et 
1981 :88). This dimension sharply roles ... .,.TUl ... ~" politician and 
This dimension resembles Aberbach et (ibid). The 
dimension Aberbach et al (ibid) ........ ~."'J.J.u, .... .> is 
which resembles the energy-equilibrium image. other words both politician and 
public servant broker conflict, formulate policy, and have concerns for interests of the 
public (ibid). This dimension does not distinctly distinguish the roles between politicians 
and bureaucrats. The third dimension is passive/active role and is even less clear on the 
role between politicians (ibid). and 
according to dimension may either play an or passive with regards to 
above-mentioned 
Although it is not intention of the author of this paper to replicate the Aberbach et al 











whether political-administrative in South Africa fullows the policy-
administrative,jacts-interests, energy-equilibrium, and/or the pure hybrid images. 
this research will provide an analysis and critical roles that 
Ministers and play South Africa and nature of their ,nT<.r<>r'T' 
study commissioned by the Brookings Institution in 1984 also sought to the 
levels of public in order for United to 
assess pelrtolrmiflm)e of senior public servants. The study culminated the publication, 
Higher Service Europe and Canada: lessons jor .the United States edited 
Smith. a",~n1'rhTl,rrto Smith (1984:5) the assessment 
performance to some unifurm standard measllfelrnell1t is 
public servant 
This is due to the 
actions of public servants who are too embedded in the institutional context, and 
policies, programs and administrative ag«:mcaes vary (ibid). Moreover, Smith (1984:8-9) 
states that it is difficult to conduct a comparative analysis because national 
and political nature of appointments to senior public service, the generalist 
and specialist .. v?, .. 1'Ir .. , .. of senior officials, and training and education. example, in 
!.lriit .. in there is a strong 
before the bureaucratic state 
prurllam(mt.ary authority came 
in public servants assisting Ministers in 
with Parliament (ibid). The policy. submitted to Parliament is held up to scrutiny, and 
public scope of authority is limited because of consensus building between 
I1TlL"<U'" and the order to the acceptance of the 
policy (ibid). Likewise the United there is a strong legislature, but other political 












public servants on pOlITICal neutrality, VJh,F'T'pj;j~ in the United 
have been political aPl)OlntJ1nerlts, resulting in ........ ..: .. 'U' .. between career 
public servants political appointees (Smith, 1984:9). In mct the United States the 
most political appointments out of all countries that participated in the study as 
Table 3: Comparative Political Appointments, 
United States United Kingdom Canada 





Assoc. Deputy Minister 
Assist Deputy Minister 
Director General 
Director 
(below line --- are career officials) 
(Source: Smith, 1984:9) 
nVJr'VPT Smith (1984 :7) puts propositions 
public servants: 









are common to all senior 
anaCKs on the public have ..... , ... .1.l."'"'"' .. ..", .. , which invite 
quality of service. 
2. The quality of people at the senior public service and the performance of public 
servants throughout OPT1,"'''''' ranks, are improved public servants 
positions ofhigher or political power, appointed or ,"l~'''''~'"'.l, and 
level policy making routinely involves senior public servants . 











4. The complete political of senior servants is fiction and strict 
to nl1oT111on clouds 
study examines the senior public service in a number of countries, that is 
Canada, Germany and with some concluding leSS0I1S for the ......... , .. "' .... States. The 
main arguments of this study each of these countries will be summarised 
following paragraphs. 
The British public has two main characteristics, that is (1) it is a time 
career occupation, (2) most have generalist skills and are involved in all as{)ects 
policy (plowden, 1984:20). Parliament does not have authority in public service, 
and recruitment and promotion are based as defined the Civil 
'-'VHLLlU""'VH (plowden, 1984:21). Entral1ce to the public service requires the successful 
completion 
(plowden, 
university _~,.,,_~ a Written examination and subsequent interviews 
After ofthe ... ,....t+"'" examination and interviews, 
interview ... VJ" ....... ..., ... , ... by a selection board which consists of two 
senior two non-public "","",,",," members the head of the Civil Service 
Commission (ibid). The public servant is then ,..."""'1",,,'; ""n" ............ '"t with a vacant post 
and the public servant's skins are needed (ibid). regulating public ""1""", .. 
centrally determined, but implementation is delegated to departments (plowden, 
1984:23), The servant rln1'UHl the course or her career may be seconded to 
the ...... u<>""" sector, the most remains within public " .. ..,.J ... , .. (ibid). 











an mt~erdepl:trtlnelltaI discussion between other l'ermanel1t 1..:,"'''l''",t",,.''' who provide 
recommendations to Prime Minister. appointment is made in consultation with the 
head service the Ministerial head of the i'lPl",Q1"tm""nt (plowden, 1984:24). 
public servants receive their tl"Q,nnn through Civil Service College (ibid). A 
report early 1980's summarised necessary for public servants as 
planning and management, advising on policy p ..... u.", ... o and implementation for the 
i'HUl""'..... and mana~~enal skills includes management De()DI,e. money and other 
resources (plowden, 1 There are mandatory requirements to complete celrtaln 
courses, including induction training, a public servant can be promoted to another 
position (ibid). According to Plowden (1984:28) skills are prominent policy 
formulation because public servants provide to generalists, but it is 
generalists who advise the Minister. However, Plowden (J 984:29) the British 
public service for elitism u!;;""au~.1;i of a middle-class and educational bias towards 
Oxford and Cambridge graduates. (ibid) argues that the British public service is 
not representative and is out with the public (ibid), public servants have an 
education humanities 
Fulton criticised 
subsequently have skills, and as early as The 
generalist public servant as in with the 
u .. ,' ............ world (plowden, 1984:30). 
1'1'l'\1"£'I'Tl0 to Campbell (1984:53) the Canadian public ""'''''"1'''13 model borrows from 
States The Canadian system has the British system 
go'vernaIlce but the United States """'./-"' ..... 











Liberal dominance and continuity in this '"""1,'"11.'" (.lV(.l1tPn'I of governance (ibid). 
time Ministers have worked closely at one time or another with a diverse array of 
senior public servants (Campbell, 1984:44). Many have become trusted, loyal 
public servants who served a Minister in another department, developing 
personal loyalties over (Campbell, 1984:44). The Canadian public ."" .... T1F''''' is a 
highly structured of government by committees to the federal nature 
governance (Campbell, 1984:44-45). Ministers cannot attend all committee meetings 
subsequently deputise to attend meetings or bring public servants along in 
attendance (Campbell, 1984:45). results not merely representation, but access to 
the highest decision AU,",Allll5 committees, and public servants therefore participate 
in policy process (Campbell, 1984:45). Subsequently is a high degree 
personalisation and elitism hetwel~n senior V111,"".""" and the political elite (CampbeH, 
1984:46). 
As in United ~"'LLJF."""'J" the career officials advise Prime on 
appointments of chairs to a committee of peers that review senior personnel policies and 
nominations top (Campbell,1984:47). public servants had 
exposure to the private sector an appointment to a senior position (Campbell, 
1984:48). According to Campbell (ibid) most officials who changed 
out of the to senior 
positions. However, most """," .. a,uUl officials the public C;:Pl''\IU''P as a means 
advancement work within the public service to acquire knowledge system 











officials senior public servants more motivated by .... "' .. "'''' ..... 
public servants their first :from 
McGill Toronto while others at Oxford 
on .. u.'v .... ~,C> Scholarships 1984:51). public servants 
homogenous backgrounds, but are a few with L· __ ._~ .. socio-cultural h", .. 11"O(1,'" (ibid). 
A does allow for ministerial political appointments as members 
advisory 
~PT'\ll{,'P after completing 
are allowed to apply senior positions the public 
"-'U1LI"""'La<L public years service L.:arnO[leu. 1984:52). 
can be characterised by an erosion 
responsibilities and poor recruitment. 
service neutrality, a tra:gmen1tatIon 
Germany, because of the federal constitutional arrangement, is formulated at the 
or federal level with the implementation of the policy states within 
Federation 1984:55). The political executive thp'T'pt,nT'P relies upon 
an .rn,nl'\1r't",,.,I'''' on higher public to ensure the 
with implementation (Mayntz, 1 
senior public servants being "outsiders" or lateral entrants 
public servants 
must 
a generalist education in law and after 
that provides 
....... , .. v .. of policy is 
with only a 
1984:57). 
academic 
with both the 
theoretical and on training course is introductory 
nature, providing +->, .... , .... ,.,. for the few nOII-le:l!al officials (ibid). training 
economics, planning, decision making, organisation, personnel management 











(ibid). Promotion is based on periodic written evaluations and promotion to 
positions is on length of service which can be interdepartmental (Mayntz. 
1984:60). Gennan public is characterised by: 
1. Senior public servants an important role in making, power 
own ri&ht and not functioning as temporary aides to the political executive but 
rather as tenured advisors (Mayntz, 1984:67). This tum provides continuity, but 
2. 
continuity senior public servants creates a power bloc (ibid). 
senior public service is trained and experienced 1984:68). 
political executive can therefore choose from a large pool oftalent, but are in some 
sense limited because they cannot select "outsiders" or those that do not meet the 
educational and promotional requirements fur senior position (ibid). 
3. Although the public servants are well the is generalist and lacks 
specialised knowledge for policy fonnulation (ibid). 
4. Although both officials and the political executive are involved policy making, the 
difference role conception maintains a functional differentiation restricts the 
(ibid). 
French system is also somewhat complex with its vast nationalised servIce 
rules extra-legal (Gournay, 1984:69). Most senior positions are 
occupied career most politicians have had experience the public 
""'~11"''''' as a career (Gournay, 1984:70). do and """1'"1,>"''' 
career officials is sometimes about the content ofthe and often the 











to-face Ul;)\.IU,);:)l\Yl1;:) most interaction is co-operative with efficacy 
(Goumay, 1984:71). The reason for relationship of conflict and co-operation is that 
senior public servants and politicians have origins the public 
(ibid). Appointments to senior public servant positions are made after Cabinet Ministers 
propose candidates from the higher public service the candidate is accepted by the 
Prime Minister and u"., .... ",u.(Goumay, 1984:72). AU servants have ongms 
and are recruited from the National School of Administration (Ecole Nationale d' 
Administration) (ibid). loyalty not depend on political party patronage, 
rather nA'I"Cnn """''J, ...... '".'-'. friendships and departmental contact, develop an 
same institution to familiarity (Goumay, 1984:73). 
Nominations to 
personal contact as 
public ",~"","'nT pmntlC)fl are achieved not on but on 
(Goumay, 1984:76). The U\.I(Ul\;'l1 and training that 
servants at the national school is 0"'''''''''''' but in I1"",T""1'1TY1,,,,n1"c public servants 
'1",,","',,","'''' specialist training through in-service training and experience (Goumay, 1984:79). 
The French senior public service can be described as elitist due to public servants' social 
educational backgrounds which create personal bonds of friendship and also co-
operatum (ibid). 
Stanley (1984:93-104) concludes the 
French senior public service by analysing three 
of British, Canadian, German and 
which United can 
first is the retaUC)flsnm Del[wf:en senior bUlreaUCJllts politicians 
(Stanley, 1984:93). (1984:94) that senior public servants 











Politicians and media should emphasise the positive achievements and difficult tasks of 
senior public servants (ibid). Senior public servants should in make a contribution 
and participate in policy making (ibid). an informal cadre of "public 
careerists" who do serve HJ.'''~'''''''' as advisors, but serve the public as than 
a political are political aPtllom.nmmts (Stanley, 1984:95). HnUfPfVA1" 
there should be a higher U"'l".LV,", public servants than political appointments 
(ibid). is the mo bility and career patterns public servants. 
Incentives and prc)Ce,QUI should established to 11'11",~ ... t1,,,,.'":'1''1"''''''''1'1·T''' mobility 
(Stanley, 1984:97). Also, senior public servants should ""'''''''''1<'' adequate monetary 
compensation, but what is equally important is that senior public servants appear to be 
motivated by appreciation and encouragement from political leadership and the 
recognition of the important public service that they render (Stanley, 1984:99). third 
issue concerns the generalist versus specialist debate. Stanley (1984:98) states that 
generalist public servant Europe and the specialist public servant the United States is 
exaggerated and what is needed is a broad "'v ... '''' ....... '''. some generalist (ibid). 
Therefore what is also needed is senior executive training in order to equip senior public 
servants with skills they are L"",n.LUF. (ibid). Stanley (1984:102-103) the 
senior public <:!AnI1f'P has not received much attention and deserves institutional, political 
financial as wen as recognition. 
Although the Brookings Institution's study of European public service systems is 
insightful and provides a basis of understanding for this paper it is nonetheless dated; the 










been established, Thatcherite public 
technology and globalisation 
more recent COlnpluallve 
reforms have place, and 
Thus, it is 




publication, Elite's Western European States, edited by Edward and 
Vincent Wright (1999) draws the same conclusions as Brookings Institution's 1984 study 
of the European public service. In fact and Wright (1 ) that public 
services' modus operandi is somewhat anachronistic. Page and Wright 
(1999:1) argue that public service institutions are in the nineteenth century. Page 
and Wright (ibid) argue public is being educated at Ecole 
Nationate d' Administration (ENA) which was established the Revolution. 
l.,..,. ..... T1r .... n'r"" the public still follows the of the 
Trevelyan .... '!-,I"IT'nl<, with recruitment still v ...... u .... Oxbridge .!'>laUU<:lW..," (ibid). many 
Western European countries security oftenure and the seniority principle for promotion 
has endured (ibid). and Wright (1999:6) that study of senior public 
servants is an important area in administration, but is an area has been 
___ ._'~ They attempt to redress the lack offocus on 
public political status and 
of the twenty-first century (ibid). and Wright (ibid) 
role of senior public servants 
ill changing ""nl,T1 .. " ............ 'r 
to "political as the 
character of the bureaucratic elite and its position within the machinery of government, 
"political role" .... ic"'_in 
co-ordination of policy 
to Tl11"I"r,,,,n that "",.n""·public servants assume such as 











and Wright (1999) atte:mpt to analyse Ch~tngmg status and of senior public 
selVantsin social, economic and political environment, the of 
special interest groups (possible eroding senior public selVant monopoly on policy 
formulation), the decentralisation and privatisation of government functions, and 
Europeanisation. In to conduct comparative analysis the publication includes a 
critical description of the Greek, Spanish, Italian, French, Austrian, Belgian, German, 
British, Danish and Swedish public Recruitment patterns, social status, 
career structures, internal status differentiation, politicisation and political subordination 
senior public selVants each ofthese countries are described and analysed. 
Recruitment patterns the culture of senior public selVant VA.,u,,",",,,,,, as they emanate 
from a common or predominant education such as law in continental Europe, a grandes 
ecoles education in France, or an Oxbridge InJJ.J' ..... H and Wright, 1999:7-
8). result is that because ofthis education, the social status of French and 
British selVants is than that of other European countries (page Wright, 
1999:8). The career structures of British and public selVants are mobile 
and public selVants as part 
government-wide elite bonds of solidarity between senior public selVants in 
various departments (ibid). Netherlands, Germany and Italy officials tend to remain 
one fur oftheir careers and Inttlrm:m!'ll'Ttn,F'nT!'I1 bonds are 
weak (ibid). Internal status differentiation to a 
Britain a highet status than lower ranking ministries (ibid). politicisation of 















neutrality is en1tre11ctlea in recruit thus it 
culture 
to 
Wright, 1999:270-271). In L"_,_~~ Sweden and y" ....... ", ... ,' appointments 
career 
appointments 
public <:!ATV11',P are 
appointments are 
servants (ibid). In other 
political control (page and >AlMOnT 
influence with not being 
...... " ...... '''' and ..... >.l'..,., ...... senior 
"" ...... ".1"1" (spoils "",,1'PlT"" to securing a 
aellTee of political control over public service (ibid). Italian senior public servant 
posts are reached through and length and are not into 
the political or economic structures and Wright, However, in 
and personal political connections do facilitate promotion to senior 
public servant posts (page and Wright, 1999:8). and Wright (1999:8) 
politicisation of the senior 
the exception of Britain, with most "uC!lt","" falling along a continuum. paper 
m(:0I1001rat(~S elements Page study (1999) describing 
the impact oftransfonnation on the South ,",pn,uu-public service as well as 
......... " ....... vu.fii, recruitment patterns, social and educational backgrounds, career path, 











The Brooking Institution's (1984) study and the Page and Wright (1999) 
European public services. ofthe Page and Wright (1999) study 
the description of these countries' public the on 
countries' public that are to South Africa. public 
"'''''''1£''? will be reviewed, as it is this public that the the South 
African public and has eXI)enlen,~ea ......... "J';"" ......... refonns, which South 
public service will also be described as it 
eXt)enlen,~ea an am.alg,amianjOn, ""Uli ...... to the South public The ;:)p~mls;n 
public service will be included as it an comparative case for the 
South African in light of a military dictatorship during the 1970 's and the that the 
new political dispensation purged public service ofthe old guard. Although the Page 
et al (1999) study provides more contemporary description of the French public 
service than the Brookings Institution's study (1984), it nonetheless arrives at the same 
conclusion that is, French public has not experienced any real change. 
The cn.:lralctensl1CS of the British public C;:Pl''V1("P are it is permanerlt, umneo. non-
political and anonymous (Dargie and Locke, 1999:178) .... ""r'n""" of tenure ensures the 
public permanence which facilitates separation of administration from 
politics (ibid). The public service being non-political that it is not 
dependent on political patronage for (ibid). It is the who accepts 
responsibility the outcome of policy and is accountable to the electorate through 
Parliament thereby anonymity of the public service (ibid). The modern 











This transfonned the service to one that exists along principles of 
pennanence, competitive recruiltffifmt, merit, political neutmlity unity (ibid). 
nU}'p",> .. it is the combination education, socialisation, and structured learning 
and experience that provi4es a set of common that in the British public 
service. Dargie Locke (1999:192) agree with Plowden (1984) that education 
public servants, particularly at senior tends to be with most senior public 
servants graduated from private schools, from Oxford and Most 
senior officials, approximately sixty percent, tend to male, white and middle class. 
Recruitment procedures, tests and personal interviews favour these candidates. 
Social and educational background therefure :favours the cohesion and British 
public service values, which is argued to be incongruent with the populace (Dargie and 
Locke, 1 192-194). 
From 1980's to 1997 British public service, particularly at senior level, came 
under threat (Dargie and Locke, 1999: 179). The Conservative government began to 
unu"",,_ refonns which could be CU\'r"I",,·t1 as foHows: 
1. introduction nnV~lrp sector pnnCllPU~S and 
style (New Public Management), 
2. arKew;auon. that is the introduction of market forces supply of public 












Po liticisation, is breaking down .... f"I",,,,, ....... ,,,,,,, between political and non-partisan 
government (Dargie 1999:179). 
British senior public servant can be described as a public servant that provides policy 
advice to Ministers, 
serves the "''''''' ..... nn-. 
policies, public resources, and 
of the 
public servants are integrity, DO.llnCaI impartiality, objectivity, selection and promotion 
on merit, and accountability through Ministers to Parliament (ibid). Senior public 
servants .. A ......... ""n~ continuity despite a change in government and this is the cornerstone 
of senior public service Britain .......... , .... '" and (1999:182) question ability and 
expectation of senior public servants to change in order to suit a new political 
dispensation when represent continuity. 
In 1 the Oughton Report made recommendations on the career planning 
public servants (Dargie and 1999:183). Report a change 
promotion of senior public servants (ibid). The drew 
practices in other and the private sector (Dargie and 1999:186). 
Traditionally it is the public servant that received a education, as opposed to a 
professional education such as ",n1U"",.., al~countants that uv; .. .LLl ....... ,~'" the 
British public ", .. ,"""Pr> and Locke, 1 84). Nearly two-thirds of the senior 
public service are generalists (ibid). significant number of senior public servants are 
now the stream (ibid). stream to a of 











and promotion (ibid). Graduates are centrally recruited through the Recruitment and 
.f\s:sessmienI Service r1.Z<.'~H,", (RAS). The recruitment process involves rigorous aptitude 
tests, followed by interviews~ and a panel interview with the Civil Selection 
(CSSB) (ibid). outstanding public servants are selected by departments, 
remam the public service throughout their careers and are groomed for senior positions 
(ibid). Appointments to Permanent 
Minister on the advice Head ofthe 
Senior Appointments Selection Committee 
The appointment system relies 
passive, that is the Prime Minister can 
are made centrally by the Prime 
Civil Service who is supported the 
sifts through proposals departments 
L"U"H~"".H who can be proactive or 
rubber-stamp appointment or the 
case Margaret Thatcher remove a public servant Ian Bancroft was removed 
from his position to the posts of Cabinet Secretary and Head ofthe Civil 
Service) and Locke. 1999:185). Although is in the power Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher effectively gained control over senior appointments by 
combining two positions, as the Cabinet Secretary is accountable to the 
nA>-'.u~ .. ",. (ibid). appointment procedures not changed, that the 
Senior Committee must include a woman, an and 
now decides whether an appointment is internal or open to competition (ibid). is an 
attempt to open the 
dominated 
service to more diversity as white male career 
"pnl1l'P (ibid). Only nine percent 
are women (ibid). Hou.rA'VAr most are V"'~/llV'_y advertised, 
mClals have 
public 
servants are recl11ited for contracts and their performance is evaluated ... ",.uu.". set 











was traditionally done by gaining PY"\P1"1pnl'p and moving up the ranks (Dargie 
Locke,1999:189). track public servants learn and train mobility as they are 
moved from position to position to develop a range of ski Us in various policy areas (ibid), 
Fast track public servants are moved horizontally across different departments, vertically 
between central departments and other and is also external mobility 
h",f,'JJP~'n the public and private sector (ibid). mobility or interchange supports 
the over the specialist, incorporates the notion ofmanagerialism, en4~0l1ral~es 
elitism through the creation 
rlnT<'''''''''' skills (ibid). 
",,,,.uu,,,,, .. values, but 
promotion 
facilitate acquisition 
are part of the managerialism 
applied to the JJU'"'''' public ""'.-.,,""" The Oughton Report (1993) reClomlmelldatlOils 
created a leaner, flatter management structure, mobility outstanding 
servants to senior positions, written contracts with a fixed period of notice, and flexible 
pay to reward and retain high performers (Dargie and Locke, 1999: 186). The nature of 
the British public is gradual 1999:200). has 
been an 'evolution revolution' in the British public but this has to a extent 
H"Af'·'tAI"I the manner of service delivery (Dargie and 1999:200-201). change 
brought about by the political will Thatcher has not really am!cu:a 
public (Dargie and Locke, 1999:201). central characteristics of an 
permanent, impartial and nhllPl'iTVP senior public service, which is selected and promoted 











The general transformation Spanish public service and particular the senior 
public service been influenced by a combination of factors including the recent 
transition to democracy, regional decentralisation, European Union membership and a 
long uninterrupted government by Socialist Party 982 to 1996) (Cienfuegos, 
1999:32). 1986 the Spanish government established a for Public 
Administration and in 1 passed two with aim v<.U.a.ul!l~ corruption, 
institutionaJising democracy after 1970's dictatorship, and modernising the public 
service (Cienfuegos, 1999:33). The Spanish government like most European 
(u"""' .. nn1'''' .... ·tc faced challenge of economic austerity, transfonnation nt 1r'l'H"rlr",t" 
technological developments and globalisation (ibid). Spanish responded 
n ..... ,,,,,,·.,. sector principles 
managernent (TQM), namlgenrlent by 
Planning __ ,.,_ ..... ,., Systems), changed 
competitive examinations (ibid). 
Public 
There are fourteen Ministries which are divided into sectoral junior Ministries 
open 
Cl(mnlleJ;l~OS, 1999:34). junior Ministers do not attend the Council but 
assist the Minister (ibid). After level of political assistance is an intermediate 
echelon ofpolitico-administrative elites composed of under secretaries, general 
CAf"l_t",t"I"''' and omictors general (ibid). posts are characterised by political 
aPJ)Ollrltnlents and expertise, most are recruIted. from the 
.. ~_._,..,~_, 1999:35). However, the most senior level of the career public is the 











The Spanish public service is somewhat and young (77% of assistant directors 
general are under 54) (Cienfuegos, 1999:42). This can linked to the "'V~/U"l'" 
government's attempt to modernise the public .,,..r"tw·,.. by public servants 
(ibid), The public <:!Pf"\J1I'P is dominated men 
most a common background (ibid), Most have the same academic 
passed identical examinations belong to the same social class (ibid). Most senior 
public servants originate from Madrid and Castille-Leon which results in a feeling of 
loyalty to the central power (Cienfuegos, 1999:42-43). Senior public servants and the 
general public are not generalists as most hold degrees in law which contributes 
to a legalistic administrative culture (Cienfuegos, 1999:43). is no dominant 
as Oxford or 'VIW.UV< which 
graduates, but rather the recruitment methods provide an elite core ofpublic servants 
(Cienfuegos, 1999: 43-44). The recruitment methods involve examination for which the 
candidates prepare over a period ofthree once candidate passes the 
or she to adlTIlIllstratlVe for (ibid). The career 
is promotion by meritorious competition and appointment (ibid). Since 1984, senior 
management positions are occupied by a specialist core of public servants who have the 
monopoly over the function of departments 1999:47). 
Cienfuegos (1999:49) that 1984 reforms have not challenged the 
culture of the senior public service and that legislation alone will not reform the status 
quo. Cienfuegos (ibid) that legislation as well as political clout will reform the 











period produced in "'AT'I<I1£''''' delivery (ibid). The political appointments 
dIrectors getleral and "'''''''.''''''1"''' .... '''''' g'em!ral led to the replacement of senior 
officials by loyal bureaucrats Ciel1tiJegos, 1999:50). of course involves of 
lack instability with each change of 
and administration. The 
victorious '"''-' ........... party aOl[)OlntS advisors who be career selVants 
Cletl1Uegos. 1999:50-51). the political party appoints these advisors 
to a ofloyalty (ibid). 
(popular Party) victory 1996 has not about 
dismantling of the "'A .... "" .. 
become a power bloc (ibid). 
""' ... ,,"'" (ibid). This is UI;;\.,aU')1;; 
are the political """",,,,rn and senior 
positions political parties, the core executive administration, Parliament and the 
economic system (Cienfuegos, 1 Ciertfuegos (ibid) argues that Spain will 
continue to combine a political process of promotion to senior posts with a 
collusion among politico-administrative elite. The profile between politicians the 
administrative is similar and it is therefore not smprising that reforms have not 
UUI"...,,,,'U substantial 1999:51). for public CP1"I.Jl .... .,. 
transformation continue (ibid). However, over two centuries government has been 
incapable of any real change as it is powerful political-administrative elite that 










Refonns the the political 
servants been a ron .... """,,.l1 
of senior public 
the political-institutional 
64 
context (Goetz, 1999:147). the mid 1980's this context has changed due to increasing 
party politicisation, parliamentarisation, and federalisation of public policy (ibid). This 
had a profuund uU",'"V' on senior public service affecting its relations with the 
political authority, cohesion, career paths, roles and qualifications for admission and 
promotion 1999:148). According to Goetz (1999:148-150) these consequences 
are as fullows: 
1. Politicians have gained importance in policy fonnulation while the role ofsenior 
public servants has declined. Public policy has become more politicised than 
bureaucratised. Thus there has been a gradual shift of policy from 
to the political arena. 
administrative 
2. Political co-ordination units within the Federal government have been strengthened 
which has a dual infonnal differentiation the public service. Political 
control over policy co-,of(lm;aticm now place 
within the principal institution policy political-
administrative co-ordination, has increased it authority over ministries which has 
curtailed departmental autonomy. 
The role of senior servants 
policy initiator to politically "'''''''''HI 
........ "''tn''''''' changed 
policy co-ordinator. 
4. Political craft has therefore become an essential characteristic ofa competent senior 
official. involves the ability to assess the political implications of policy 











...... ru ..... "' ..... to anticipate and influence reactions of actors in the policy formulation 
process, and to (1""".0-... Df()Ce:ss~,s that maximise the realisation ofthe Minister's 
objectives. 
Goetz 999:172) argues that German federal arrangement of government has 
resulted in a duality between the functional elite of senior public servants with immediate 
access to the political executive at the federal level, a decentralised public service 
l:IfU'''''".N to be an unavoidable trend of the of Bonn . 
differentiation between """"""'''''officials with close to the IJVLULV'"L '''.'>fl'''....,'.'' ... 
and those without (Goetz, 1999:1 This o-rr\UJ1in politicisation, and in fact attractiv.e 
aspect ofpublic service, will provide challenges for the German govenunent (ibid). 
et al (1999:267) conclude that recent public management reforms, the attempt to 
mc:re,iSe diversity in workforce (through equity of recruitment 
from other educational institutions) changed neither culture nor the 
the senior public service in Europe. public service is still the preserve ofthe middle 
and elite (ibid). The impact of management reforms appears to be limited in 
as 
authority is relatively 
Italy, France 
et ai, 1 The notion of public authority is 
where senior public service sees itself as part distinctive which enjoy 
duties, privileges as ,,u;;)un,,,. from other "p(":U\1r" most notably private sector 
(page et 1999:272). Two appear to .ULj, ... "', ..... '" the notion of public authority, 











(page et 1999:274). There appears to be a correlation between limited impact 
public management reforms and 
distinct sector beyond 

























and Wright, 1999:274) 
perception ofthe public C".,.V1,..". they are a 
The table illustrates notion of 
en 
et at (1999:278) also there appears to be an increasing political influence 
in senior .... llU ....... " and subsequently a de(~reiase in the public Even 
appointments were """.VU'''' would 
whether senior public servant was "one of us" (ibid). Although the notion 
retj~rre:d to a state of mind rather than political party membership, Page et at 
(1999:278) argues that this nonetheless indicates a growing political influence over the 
public service. It appears that during most transitions government, whether it is 
to electHms or an new political 
politicians to shape to a extent the relationship between politicians 
and the public service in favour politicians (page et aI, 1999:269). Thus changes in 
the public are inevitably linked to much political changes et 
1999:279). et al (1999:278-279) conclude to umlen:;taIld the question 











public as the single most important .L..,,,,tLU.v of change which has resu1ted in 
different reactions from countries Europe. there to an 
isolation and ""'''''''''1U between political and aarmnlsrramle elites (ibid). and 
UertmarK the _~ ....... confidence in traditional pattenlS of public service has produced 
new management structures and greater political sensitivity by senior public servants 
(ibid). In Spain it produced extensive party politicisation ofthe public service, and in 
Sweden and Gennany decreasing confidence in traditional patterns ofpublic service 
subtly served to change the way in which public servants manage their careers (page et 
al, 1999:279). 
A study also follows a "JHllHUi methodology to the Institution (1984) 
et (1999) is the and Wright (2000) study 
core executive in developed countries entitled, Administering the Summit. Although 
Peters et al (2000) once again describe and analyse various countries' public services, 
some interesting argUDlents are made, which are ~lf~VJ.llr1T to this research. According to 
et al (2000:1 public servants in a number of common 
roles; political in order to operate within a political environment, a policy role, a 
technical advisory role and a role of representing a government institution. Senior public 
servants have to contend with two that is (1) hierarchy, 
n1'I',{'''''''' jurisdictional and input-output and (2) democracy, 
responsibility, leadership and accountability (peters et aI, 2000:14). According to Peters 
et al (2000: 14) public service refonns have resulted in an increase institutionalisation, 











Po liticisation a number ofpossiblc dimensions. Firstly, a politician such as a Prime 
Minister or President appoints officials to the public (ibid). Secondly, there are 
appointments of public servants with identifiable party aIDlllaltlOllS (ibid). Thirdly, there is 
a clear subordination of neutral public servants to partisan policies, fourthly a 
mixture of all three in public (ibid). there are three types 
public servants that all that is technical 
",v,,,,,, .. t,,, and personal or political appointments by the political et aI, 
2000: 16). Peters et al (2000: 18) that the manner which senior public servants 
influence policy formulation is dependent on the constitutional and political opportunity 
to influence political leadership, administrative structures, and the institution's own 
opportunity structure et 2000:18). 
constitutional and political opportunity 
political leadership relates to the following: 
1. Constitutional position ofthe ofthe political "'iM,"'''''' 
2. The by head ofthepolitical "'A,"'"",UL.IV 
The nature of appointment of Ministers, 
servants to influence 
over Cabinet, 
4. Whether power is vested a presidential, prime ministerial, bicephalous, collegial 
"",au' HI", or coalition gmlennnc;mt, 
The power ofthe legislature, 
6. The nature of the political system, and 
7. nature ofthe relationship between the head ofthe political executive and senior 











The administmtive structure relates to: 
1. The nature of the channel (formal or informal) between 
the general public service, and 
public "P"'"\lU'P and 
The nature relationship between senior public and the O'PT1IPnlI 
public ""' .. ,,""',," (whether it is Hn'~&'''L''''''', isolated, hierarchical or participative, 
impositional or arg:amea. or confrontational or .... n' .... """'n et 2000:19). 
own structure a of complex fu .... icnll'<! 
1. nature ofthe link between the political " .. ' .......... ., ... ,1-' and administmtive 
2. Alternative sources of support available to the political leader, 
3. The Llj"'''U'~'''' and legitimacy of the institution, 
4. political leader's conception of the of administrative 
quality, and experience of administmtive staff, 
6. The resources available to the institution, 
The nature of the relationship between politicians, technical specialists and 
geIlLeratllst:s, and 
8. degree of internal cohesion (peters et aI, 2000:20-21). 
et al (2000:265) conclude institutional structures have 
of Presidents and Prime Ministers. Whether or not the political executive is considered 
powerful or weak, there has a considerable ofinstitutional support and 











(ibid). Thus, there ",nv,,,,,,,',,,,, to a consolidation of power ofthese institutions and a 
waning of power from other institutions (ibid). This power be formal or informal 
and the actual basis may vary (ibid). These institutions co-ordinate legislative 
initiatives, prepare legislation, monitor and control public expenditure, and perform a 
host of other public functions (peters et aI, 2000:266). The personnel in these institutions 
exploit their power and position to advance the political goals of the executive and 
ultimately their own (ibid). This is true whether recruitment is through 
meritocratic or personal connections (ibid). This ........ "'11'1",,,, the political executive with 
'"tentacles" that extend throughout public service (ibid). 
The Brookings (1984), et al (1999) and et al (2000) """'Ln." all provide a 
comparative description and analysis 
has utility. 
public servants 
ofthese "' .... UH.,"" indicates 
not have while 




are useful and provide a framework for understanding the arguments of this 
paper. 
Another study that "<1~'r"'~<1 mention is by Peter Larson Amanda Coe (1999) Who 
examine the evolving role of top public servants Commonwealth countries. According 
to Larson (1999:1) role ofthe Penmarlent Secretary changed these 
officials are to meet inc:realSil1lg demands ofthe -----.. 0.-.0 world. 











Permanent :Se(:retam~s are at the 
between political power 
(ibid). Moreover, 
of the structure they are reforming and are at the 
public administration (ibid). Permanent 
"':"""<1t'<>1"1''>'' are therefore responsibilities and new demands which 
require continuous skill improvement evolving relationships with staff, 
public and other organisations (Larson and Coe, 1999:2). According to Larson and 
(1999:6) Permanent Secretaries have three basic roles: providing policy advice to a 
Minister, a department of which he or she is the administrative head, and 
71 
participating the collective management ofthe public service. As a policy advisor the 
Permanent Secretary is expected to provide advice on policy issues, on government's 
options to address these issues, and implications of each option (ibid). This role 
requires a complex understanding of technical, managerial, legal and financial issues 
(ibid). This 
plays a central 
and 
important political implications, as it is the Permanent Secretary who 
in recommending a l'<1~t!lin course of action or 
H •• ...,I .......... to support the policy option proposed to 
by gathering 
Minister (ibid). As 
head of a department a t"eImameltlt Secretary must legal, financial and human 
constraints, U'U.H"'~;'" and direct a department of government (Larson and 1999:7). 
to ensure that the department responds to ministerial 
priorities and that the department out the policies ofthe government day 
despite the fuct that the Permanent Secretary may have reservations about a policy (ibid) . 
. As a member ofthe public .. prVlC~p senior management team, Permanent Secretary is 
P,Yl"if>f"h'r! to playa role on behalf of government, which a level 











"''''' .. v .... UJ''',to and Coe (1999: 27) most reIUmIltHU S,eCfetaJnes int" .... ,i,.,.n'''.rI 
agr,eea on basic but due to the changing role of the state, 
roles are oe(~onamg increasingly complicated. The Permanent Secretary, as policy 
advisor, is now required to consult with a wide of groups in civil society and 
government order to assess all options, implications and anticipate likely outcomes 
(ibid). The Permanent Secretary must therefore have a holistic or systems approach 
to policy advice. em~cts of globalisation also require the Permanent Secretary to 
consider policy options not only in a departmental, sectarian and national context, but 
within mt,ernlabomll (Larson and Coe, 1999:28). The role as 
head is complicated as are expected to H"",./UIU<':'" 
the utilisation of limited resources while at same on more ""i'nut" and 
public satisfuction (Larson and Coe, 1999:29). There is more ofa focus on efficiency, 
effectiveness and performance improvements (ibid). fact many countries have placed 
Permanent Se4cretaries on pelrtolrm:mcle contracts (ibid). Permanent ...:""" ... "'t"' ... "''' are 
the:retore required to be exceptional ma:nag;ers inspinitionalleaclers (ibid). According 
to Larson and (1999:33) the Permanent Secretary's role as corpomte manager is 
becoming increasingly onerous. Permanent Secretaries no longer head hiernrchical 
eplfirtlnents that were vertical C011SI(len~a as a separate domain (ibid). 
can no be considered domain department and as a result Permanent 
Secretaries find that have changed from administering a vertical department to 












(1999:37-38) conclude the increased complexities of Penn anent 
:se(~retam!s roles have resulted in Pennanent Secretaries being "stretched" beyond 
and organisational capacities. They recommend that further research to be 
COlrlallCn~Q in this important area of public administration and management (Larson 
Coe, 1999:4041). and (1999 :4041) fo Bowing: 





to re-examined the changing role 
Penn anent :selcretarles need regular feedback and infonnation with to 
improving their job perfonnance, 
Penn anent Secretaries continuous and development on 
leadership, global economy and understanding the sector. 
study that examined the role of senior management developing countries' public 
service is John Montgomery's 1986 1''''''''''''''''''' entitled "Lifo at the apex: the functions 
to 
Permanent Secretaries in nine Southern African countries. "Montgomery's methodology 
was the critical incident approach, which required Pennanent or deputies 
to complete describing over a seven to ten day period took more 
than an hour time. Montgomery's research provided an into the 
function most senior mana~~ers the public more 










Permanent Secretaries spend most of their time as "resource handlers," which refers to 
managing scarce financial and human resources. The importance and tmle-1COJlSUlmJng 
function of resource IDalna:gernellt allocation is not that many of 
countries 
Swaziland, 
i>UlHIJJl'" (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia Zimbabwe) are some of the n",,"'''<'''''T 
74 
world (Montgomery, 1986:2 
time was a "liaison" 
and influence (ibid). >-I'"'''''''''' with donor 
that consumed much ofthese 
focused on information flow 
Ministers, other departments such as 
the finance, staff and organisations civil ';,(\('1 .. 1C'!.1 furmed an intricate of the 
Permanent Secretary's function (Montgomery, 1986:214). Analysis and planning was the 
third important function of Permanent Secretaries, which related more to development 
administration and analysis to improve performance (ibid). The fourth important function 
that Permanent Secretaries ,-,Hl"-"'!','" in is monitoring the performance of those who act on 
behalfofthe department (Montgomery, 1986:215). Another function is of 
spokesperson where Permanent Secretary acts on behalf of the department in order to 
the formally (ibid). An entrepreneurial function 
required Permanent to innovative developing and 
attempting to find additional resources for programmes (Montgomery, 1986:216). 
Montgomery (ibid) also that little time was devoted to negotiation other 
than those involved the liaison, spokesperson or entrelprene1uri:al 












(1986:21 8) study discovered that I:"etmalllelnt Secretaries these 
",,,, •• nT, ... ,,,,.,,, aDll)e~lrto be politically neutral, but are not political eunuchs. According to 
Montgomery (1986:218) the notion of senior servants being "guardians 
administration" , "conservator", and politicians innovators little relevance 
Southern Africa. Montgomery suggests that this due to 
countries are developing changing, and that both politicians public 
servants an (ibid). Thus, the lJi,",''-'i'' ... differentiation n""rUl~''''n 
politician and may not for the A111.CIlIll context, but the 
sharing of concerns not functional ..... ~ ... ,,' ..... v .. ,",Pl"n1O"""" aCl1nUllst:rallon 
politics (ibid). However, Montgomery (ibid) does mention that there were incidences 
when politicians became involved in administrative iua .. "'L"', but there was no overt 
pressure of Permanent .... "',,.. .... T"' .. 'p., to become involved in politics or to further the aims 
a political party. 
lontgonlery (1986:220) "'VB • .,' ....... "'" that I:"ennan.el Se(:retari€~s playa largely predictable 
role in sample but that their function and identical to their 
counterparts in Western democracies. The possible reason this discrepancy is that the 
economic and management keeps Secretaries 
close to the 
politicians (ibid). 
thus and policy is left to the 
Although an interesting paper, Montgomery's methodology is problematic as uses a 











Permanent Secretaries to keep a journal of an incident that took more than an 
hour of his or her time over a week. Permanent Secretaries function in a dynamic 
environment, have a demanding role in the of government and may be required 
to make important decisions in than an hour. Thus methodology is not entirely an 
accurate reflection of the role and responsibilities of Permanent .... ""'· .. At''',...'''''' 
Another paper that also focused on Permanent Secretaries in African context is by 
Lungu (1998). According to Lungu (1998:1) the changing state of post-independent 
and public administration en~"ir()lUlnerlt has compounded the role ambiguity of 
the most public position. experience 
considerable 
expectations 
ambiguity and due to conflicting and contradictory 
the political context in which they work (Lungu, 1998:3). 
Lungu (1998: 1 5) is: 
1. Political appointee a neutral role, 
2. Chief executive or Ministerial clerk, and 
Responsible officer or rubber-stamp. 
D ..... IO<. ... (1998:6) aTg!ues that political appointments 
have been partisan and with a disregard for merit. According to Lungu (ibid), political 
instability in post-independent Africa has in a variety of regimes interfering with 
the integrity HAl"Vf"'r African public has never been 
a model since colonial and post-independence era saw political, 











the capricious political Idi Arnin more recently the 
Chiluba govemment which .... "'u .. .:>,, .. ' ... Permanent ... "",,, .. ,,,,1-,,, .. ,,, .. ,, and them 
more uc,uu"u,n (ibid) agIlees that the South African t ... g,UVU is more 
complicated. Although democratic elections Director General 
positions were appointments were based on merit, 
the reality was that incumbents were appointed on a partisan basis (ibid). According to 
Lungu (1998: 1 0-11) political appointments contribute to the role ambiguity of Permanent 
Secretaries because their neutrality objective technocratic role ofa Permanent, 
Secretary is compromised as their loyalty is more towards the political party in power. 
most countries Permanent Secretaries are relatively independent. They liase 
with the !Se(;retarv ofthe for purposes are responsible 
to head of the public '"" ..... ,,''''' uncun""" responsibility report to a public 
accounts committee of the '''I".'''" ...... 'v 1998:11 the 
equivalent of the Permanent Secretary, that is the Director '-''''l1\OJL<l.1, reports to the 
M,inister ""'''''''I''rt" to policy and administrative matters and a parliamentary accounts 
re!!:ar(1s to matters (ibid). African countries where 
1J'''~'rn<>n .. ~,t Secretary enjoys relative independence Ministerial the 
Permanent is more like a chief executive working in tandem with the 
Minister. However, in African countries there is political instability or a lack of 
"'h~I"'U"'H'"",U politicians and a skilled Permanent ..".1'-,,, ... ,.,,, the result is a weak 
u .......... , ... working between politicians and 










lack the ability to comprehend public 
rotltInle administrative decision .. L .. lUlL,E;' 
and it to oeC:OITLe involved in 
tend to usurp Permanent 
Secretary's role as as a result 
becomes a HLU''''''''''' clerk 1998:14). 
Due to nature of political appointments and interference by Ministers in 
Df()Ce!(lural matters, in extreme cases Permanent Secretaries merely beC:OITle rubber 
stamps for ministerial .... "' .... ' • .:> .... ,H (Lungu, 1998 :16-17). Lungu (ibid) illustrates his 
78 
by 
citing financial management and accounting in some under-developed African countries 
budgetary matters are a fait accompli and Pennanent Secretaries have or no 
control over financial matters. 
This study analyse various asJ)ects of the <>rou....,."" ... 't" and debates, as reviewed this 
literature, to provide a more substantive debate on the of the Director General, and 
nature of the :relationship between the political and administrative executive South 
Africa. These and debates include: 
1. in the last part ofthe twenty-first century resulted in a in the 
role of the thereby necessitated a in the role of senior public 
servants. 
There has been a convergence between and administration in favour of 
po liticians with role servants be(;OIltlmg more DOJI1U(;lS€~Q and 











ofthe IU"p'''''Tr,r General to the first """-eo," ... "...,,,-n 
the argument to the question of the political-administrative 
interface South Africa. The findings of this paper will attempt to address 












Traditional Models of Public Administration 
"An official who receives a directive which he considers wrong can and is supposed 
to object to it. /fhis superior insists on execution, it is duty and even his honour 
to carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to demonstrate in 
this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference. " - Max 
Webe~ 
The role ofthe Ullrector Geneml the political-administrative ,nt-,,,rn.l'''' and the impact of 
trarlstolrm:atlo,n on that rel:atl()flstllD to traditional 
models of public A Olscm;Slcm of the traditional un'., .... ".:> of public 
administration will provide an understanding ,a,",,,,,...,, .. pub lic sector .. "'+" ........ Moreover. 
the following discussion .... "''''\Jl.lILl''''' the "'Tn"'''O''''"''''' ofthe political-administrative 
dichotomy places the changing role administrative head of government within 
this context. 
The traditional model ofpubUc administration is drawn from the Woodrow Wilson 
theory of political-administrative dichotomy, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and Max 
2 Weber, M. (1947) Jl!J~~ru~Q~MJ!lrL<U~TIQ!~!1!1~~!ill1 










Weber's theory ofthe "ideal type bureaucracy." These models are characterised by the 
idea of political neutrality and impartiality, hie~chicaI control, pelicy implementation 
and administration, careerism and professionalism, and a public as 
opposed to political·nt,,,, .... ,,,t models are COIOSluelreu as _i-£, ....... 1n"h",1'nl~"" in 
nineteenth century were the most of administration in 
sector. ... ",.~""." of public administration the foundation for modern 
8] 
public but De(:arrle IIlcn'llSllDgl) a.""' .. 'U.!.\.HH.' ...... with the ......... ,ul'S,.ul'S role of the state 
In late 1910's. 
Prior to the traditional model of public administration was on 
patronage and loyalty to a monarch or elected official. early forms of 
administration were based on personal relations consequent misuses of public 
personal nepotism, corruption maladministration. In most cases 
administration was not based on competence or professionaJism, but personal 
connections to those in authority. 
most influential model of public administration was of Max Weber's "ideal type 
bureaucracy." Weber (1941:333-334) distinguished lJeI'Wef~n three types of rule; the 
traditional, charismatic and rational-legal types. The traditional type of rule was based 
upon a ruler's to be derived a tribal, or some right 
(ibid). charismatic ruler derived or authority appeal and 
characteristics beHeved to be exceptional by the followers (ibid). The rational-legal type 










which the ruler 
is therefore a 
law or 
ruled must (ibid). The bureaucracy or administration 
rational-legal type (ibid) that of 
is best aalmrl1stere~a by a bureaucracy. According to 
type bureaucracy" is characterised by: 
1. official being on basis of a legal contract, remunerated with a 
and pension for years 
the occupation, 
82 
3. appointment and subsequent promotion on and 
qualifications, 
4. Each ,,'-L."' ..... having a fixed area of jurisdictional "'Vl ... ",.-t, 
official having certain ............... '" ensuring compliance with rule oflaw 
and dispassionately, 
6. official is subject to discipline and control in conduct office and execution of 
The structure of the bureaucracy consisting of positions that clearly 
responsibilities operating within a hierarchical relationship, 
The hierarchical arrangement and levels of authority reflecting an 
ordered of super-and-subordination, 
9. official separated from means and ownership of production, 
10. rule oflaw being maintained through the preservation of written documents that 











Weber (1 that the most efficient form of government was one which 
was based on this normative model of the "ideal type bureaucracy." The incorporation 
merit and technical expertise, as opposed to patronage, was believed to instil 
... professionalism competence in public ",,,, ... ,,ro,,, Weber hoped that 
bureaucracy" would avoid patronage and a politicised public with 
memC:lenlcles. corruption, nel)OIllSm mcompel:enl~e (Savoie, 1994:26). According to 
Weber (1947:333-334) hierarchical arranl~erne]lt with jurisdictional ",,,,,,,,,>"1 ... ,,,,,, of each 
of responsibility and accountability would result 
1994:25-26). The career "U~'TP'T'I ofthe 
bureaucracy" ensured loyalty and continuity, and the avoidance of corruption (Savoie, 
1994:26-27). Continuity was maintained through a career public service as well as the 
preservation of written documents (ibid). "'~"'~_ states that existence of documents 
ensured the v ... ,...,."' ... application of rules, (ibid). Therefore, organisational <>1'1""",1". 
learned following geller.a! rules for whoever occupied a particular position the 
Oleran:my Weber the Ols.tm,ctlon between politicians and bUlreaiUcIats or 
. 
administrators. He believed that administrators would not pertbnm effectively should they 
function as politicians. Weber (1947:337) that, 
(; ... officialdom has been brilliant whenever it had to prove sense of duty, its 
impartiality and mastery of organisational problems the face of official, 
formulated tasks of a specialised nature. But here we are concerned with political, 
not bureaucratic achievements, and the facts themselves provoke the recognition 











was expected to deal with political problems. This is no {U:,':lu,f!rll rather, it would be 
astonishing if capabilities inherently so alien to one another would emerge within the 
same political structures. " 
that administration was a specialised function for which technical 
qualifications and COlrnD'ctfmcles were important for the effective public 
""'T'VU','" Moreover, politics was not realm of administrators the relationship 
between the administrator and politician would be described by Weber as 
(Savoie, 1994:27). Weber (as cited in Savoie, 1994:27) described relationship 
between politicians and administrators as: 
"An offiCial who receives a directive which he considers wrong can and is supposed 
to object to it. Jfhis superior insists on its execution, it is his duty and even his honour 
to carry it out as corresponded to innermost conviction, and to demonstrate 
this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference. " 
Weber believed that administrators served the government of the with political 
impartiaJity (Savoie, 1994:27). The the interests of the 
public through an electoral nmlce!,s and politician would """ .. "" TltT the 
pUblic. policy directives received politicians would therefure be 
implemented as if the were serving any other government. Weber's "ideal type 











government and the administrator 
government ofthe day. 
victorious political that torrnea the 
"f~""~-would have with the Northcote-Trevelyan Report's criticism of the British 
public report was published 1854 and described the British public service 
as inefficient, corrupt and incompetent. Northcote and Trevelyan argued that; 
UAdmission into the civil service is eagerly sought after, but it is for the unambitious, 
and the indolent or incapable that it is highly desired. Those whose abilities do not 
warrant an expectation that they will succeed the open professions, where they 
must encounter the competition contemporaries, and those whom indolence of 
temperament ... are DUlcea in civil ';'''''1'''>1'''0 where they may obtain an honourable 
livelihood with little labour, and with no (as cited in Savoie. 1994 :44-45). 
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (a  cited in Savoie, 1994: 45) proposed the following: 
1. appointment to public should based on open competition and 
2. Appointments and promotion should based upon merit and proper assessment by 
superiors. 
A distinction and specialisation should be between intellectual and mechanical 











recommendation that British public """""'11i",," should be" ... carried out by the 
admission into lower ranks carefully body of young men ... through 
establishment ..... 'V"'''''' system of examination before appointment ... " 
1998:25) 
and adoption 
listlmlent ofthe system in British public service 
meritocracy. the refonns recommended by the Northcote-
Report were met with ......... ,,.". It is reported that the aristocracy, and in fuct 
that opening of the public service to competition would 
open it to commoners without necessary aristocratic breeding would see the 
of republicanism in government (Savoie, 1994:45). It was not until were many 
casualties the war that recognised cost of patronage 
and incompetence (Savoie, 1994:46). Refonns in the British public were 
expedited a concerted was made to educate young men through liberal 
education so as to " ... produce citizens who were morally good and it was that 
would succeed examination" (Savoie, 1994:45). Appointees were recruited from 
institutions such as Cambridge and Oxford universities (Savoie, 1994:46). The Northcote 
and Trevelyan Report sought through education to unifY public by fuvouring 
appointees from the "proper" education and subsequently appointments to senior 
positions would from within public (ibid). Report also 
impetus to the centralisation of decision making. The most senior position, Pennanent 
Secretary, the Treasury was fonnally recognised as the head public 
""" ..... ,."'",, The head public would advise the Minister on who should 
be appointed to senior positions the Minister and 











1994:49). Appointments to the most positions the British public service were 
therefore some sense political, but were based on merit rather than patronage as 
.",,,,uvn was within the public Moreover, appointments by 
Minister were consultation with advisors who are senior administrators (page, 
1985:19). It is/ait aCl~on:lDll who would appointed to next Pelmame]nt Secretary 
position. In 1983 Margaret nal:cm~r rejected advice of senior public servants her 
Middleton as ahead 
for the position (ibid). This marked an increase of political input in the appointments of 
Pel1nanent :setCretarJles. 
By World War I ofthe Northcote-Trevelyan been 
adopted within British public The public 
own. It was highly centralised and hierarchical, values ., ..... ..,"' ... by an education, 
cliquish, with a detachment the implementation of polices emanating from political 
masters. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report also defined the nature ofthe relationship 
between administrators politicians. Political tJ ... ,~'V ...... I",'" was previously the key to 
employment and promotion, but the reforms brought about a public service that was less 
att:aCI1LeO to elected politicians, loyal to the 1994:48). 
partisan and impartial public service was therefore responsible for the implementation 
policy and some advisory capacity by senior administrators in the fOl1nulation ofpolicy, 
it was the elected politician, in this case the Minister, who was ultimately responsible 
and accountable the policy. the notion of ministerial responsibility into 











that ad1niIristrat,ors would prudent their advice and implementation 
of policy ofthe On1J.,.,r;nrnpnT of the 
United of America during 1800's the spoils system defined its public 
""" .... " .... '" The spoils was the custom of appointing persons to public based on 
their to the victorious political party. result was a public service that changed 
the victorious political party, was elitist, corrupt, and lacking in concurrently 
necessary eXl)el1tlse American public during the nineteenth century was 
neither efficient nor effective. "V""V'~'''l'> to Mosher (1982:65) " ... among the 
consequences of the spoils system run rampant, were: periodic chaos which attended 
changes of administration during most nineteenth century; the popular association 
of public administration politics and incompetence; the OTr\\Jll1lT'ta conflicts between 
and legislature over appointments." 
The impetus to reform spoils system was increasing tension "''''''',,'''''~.n the 
A"'M.A~U"''''''''' and the ",v.",,, •• h'll'''' over appointments which led to 1868 impeachment trial 
ofan ."'OJ·." .. ,. ... and then the assassination of President Garfield in 1881 by a 
disappointed office system was eventually with the 
of the Pendleton Act ofl883. The established a bipartisan ..... .,.,,"U1i'·.,. Commission 
which was responsible 
1. all applicants for certain public 











'verseeml!Z an effective probationary the appointment 
pennanent, 
4. states the pubHc service (Hughes, 
1998:26). 
The Pendleton Act of substantially _ .... '''''''01'1 patronage and nepotism the 
American public service. Senior appointments in the public were and still are 
prerogative of the President to ensure a check and balance ofthe ann of 
government. second important consequence of the (1883) was that it 
introduced a pennanent public with of tenure based on merit and 
professionalism. The also attempted to deal with by introducing representivity 
to states and a public service to appointments at various levels of 
a career words uneinc~ln public 
based a public 
career. JrnPlrU".",n public service was a combination ofa career public <::PT"'''''P as well 
as a public service with political appointments at various levels of government. 
American public service therefore has two systems; a career path and political 
pOlntrnerlts. HnU,,,,,'ll"'''' political have become a reward for Do.uncal 
but rather persons the President can trust to deliver on policies and campaign 
promises. The political party has also become less dominant in appointments and it is 
the consultation with advisors who makes appointments based on 
(page, 1985:26). Since 1960's and in 










shared same ideals as presidential mcumbenlts (ibid). 
np1'1!01t"tn'U"'nt in conjunction with 
public servants until 1978. In 1978 the 
Civil Commission 




.... ".OT""',..... .... ,~n't'''',..'t''nn Board was which .. "" .. ",1'1 the principle ofthe 
departmental 
qualifications for 
"' .................. .:> provided the caIIOHltare 
position as defined by two bodies 1985:18). 
An "' ........ nTcritic ofthe spoils systems was Woodrow Wilson who in 1886 
nonnative model the of politicians administrators: 
a 
"Administration outside the proper sphere UV" .. ",.,. Administrative questions 
are questions. Although politics sets task for administration, it should 
not be ~1J1H"n'orJ to manipulate its 
systematic of public 
act 




<70.,01",n/ law is an 
of taxes, 
delivery of the mails, the 
,n'-"IIY""'" the hanging 
and 
recruitment of the army and navy, etc., are all obviously acts of administration, but 
the general laws which things to be-done-are as obviously outside of and 
The of governmental action are not 












Wilson believed the spoils <OW'':l!ATTI fused the political administrative realm of 
government resulting in acting an political manner and thereby 
serving the interests political party as opposed to those of the public. Wilson 
therefore in a set]lar<iltlon of powers the executive and legislature, that is 
between .. "''''~,.''' .... DoJlltl(;mI1S and aciIniI1listJrat()rs, the of powers 
between the .V;::;,.'H"' ....... "' • ...,.,.."' .. ' ..... Wilson believed that there had 
to be a ,,'lTC"'''' ....... of checks and balances ofgovernmentIIlade 
policy and which was set]larate from the a,.uuu.u,,..u,u 
policy and '''''6'''''''''V. ... This as pOJlltl(~al··adlmuustratLve dichotomy 
was 
From 
further rn",.",h,,, such as Goodnow (1900) 
l1Il~;)al·-aaIIlll[llslcraIlve dichotoIIlY developed model of the 
Appleby (1949). 
idea 
administrators advise political leadership on the funnulation, and 
of public policy politically in advisory The 
function of administrators was tnerellore to 
political party was in power resources order to 




also had another mIIlification. Elected politicians were therefore resDolnsl!ble and 
acc:ountable for policy fOfIIlulation impieIIlentation while 
presUIIled to be neutral in 
accountable. 
"""'1J", •• ".u1'F-. of advice, were not to be publicly 
According to the traditional model of public adIIlinistration, in a deIIlocmtic system the 











that the voter will assess the competence o"",.1", ... , ... "",,,"..,t both in a political and 
administrative function, vote the political that the citizen :favours. It is 
....,"' ... UA"' ... that the voter firstly access to information to make an assess,me~nt. secondly 
that the political party some degree of contro lover the bureaucracy. and thirdly that 
actions ofthe bureaucracy could be traced through a political <>uc,tAln of accountability to 
the voter (Hughes, 1998:231). In United Kingdom the public service is accountable 
through hierarchy to the Minister is then accountable to the Cabinet and to 
Parliament and ultimately to the people (ibid). the Minister is responsible for 
the ministry and department under or portfolio. Ministerial responsibility 
according to the British system can be inter alia: 
1. The Minister and are collectively TP",nnn<>, the actions ofthe 
Minister's rI"""", .. h ... ,,"'nt _""'~' .. q to Parliament, but for reasons of 
political expediency Cabinet the burden of responsibility on the Minister, 
2. The Minister is answerable to Parliament on a given issue relating to his or her 
portfolio, ministry and department, 
3. is responsible for policy, in formulation and implementation, 
4. Minister is obliged to resign'ifhe or she, or a public has an error of 
judgement in the execution of duties, 
Should a error be detected a Minister is obliged to inform and fully explain action 
or inaction, 
6. Should a Minister knowingly mislead Parliament or she is obliged to 
The Minister must keep Parliament abreast of developments in or portfolio 











Minister and his or her department are regarded as one entity since 
ninistJrak>r reflect that oftheir political master. The most contentious 
issue is the Minister accepting 
the of public servants or her rI"",,,,,,, .. tn>,,,,,t resignatory 
obligation, known as vicarious r(!sponsibility, to some extent been a myth. reality, 
there a error in uOlil;erneIlt it is Minister that infonns Parliament 
provides assurances that error will be rectified with Minister accepting 
responsibility for the rectification without and Pau , 1999:239). It is 
therefore the responsibility to Parliament lDljDmlea about or 
department and to take necessary corrective action when a serious error occurs (ibid). 
Failure to do so or to blatantly mislead Parliament is grounds for resignation(ibid). The 
Minister British lUV,","'l,U history to accept vicarious responsibility was Lord Peter 
." ..... ,,0'1',," who 1982 for the of public servants 
to provide the nej::leSSaIV ultOJrtmltloln on Pauw, 
1 However the most part, misdemeanours and errors udlii:emlent by public 
servants are dealt with internally through the hierarchical structure ofthe department. 
In the United the SCtmnltioln of powers "' ........ "1"11 to the constitution 
judicial and legislative oversight of the executive branch of government The American 
public servant is therefore accountable to Chief Executive Officer, that is the 
the system the Governor at state level. The American constitution 











which therefore affects the of accountability. Technically, public servant is 
accountable to the President or Governor through the hierarchical structure offederal and 
state structures, but there is another sphere of accountability. Legislative llP,('1"PE'« establish 
an executive functions and funding and aPloro,pnlatlon:s. 
procedures. management could therefore held 
accountable to the Ieg;lsI,ature, through legislative \VP!1"«luht VVJlHU.LL for it actions or 
inaction, any which the legislature .... "''', ...... C' important. public 
"'"'T·U' .... ''"' is in some sense accountable to the judiciary violations in terms 
constitution laws. Thus, accountability ....... ,"' ... .upublic "PT'flC"P is through 
executive, legislature and judiciary. 
The traditional model of public administration attempted to de-politicise the public 
servIce redressing the partisan system. The realm and responsibilities of 
politicians administrators were distinct In distinct fields of study emerged, 
is public administration and political 
traditional model; 
As .....,<.<J' ..... u (1982:81) noted 
"Simply put, politicians should rule; public officials should do their bidding. Political 
offices should competitively in the political arena; bureaucratic offices 
should be filled in arena. Political officials should 
selected on basis of their political C0l1T1netenc,e:' bureaucratic offiCials should be 
selected on the basis of their bureaucratic competence. The separation of political 











concurrent office holding and interchange. Politicians should by the 
electorate or their political peers; officials should be judged by their political 
overseers or their bureaucratic peers. Political should be o/limited tenure and 
subject to frequent elections; bureaucratic office should be unlimited tenure, subject 
to good behaviour. " 
theory of the set)ar~it10In between politicians aOlmnusltrators was int ... cn"" to 
traditional model ofpublic 
according to the traditional 
dichotomy was in reality a myth 
.. ....,,, .... ,,,,, .... their 
the political-administrative 
1998:32). This was particularly true at the 
of the administrative hierarchy, that is between most senior public servant the 
politician responsible the portfolio. The interfuce between the two is often a source of 
tension and problems "":;;"'''.'''', 1998:232). According to "ideal type 
bureaucracy" public servant has a specific role and is accountable to his or 
Issues peJrtO!rID,Bm:e are accounted for through a hierarchical 
structure apex of the the most senior 
public servant confronts the political head responsible for that portfolio of which 
senior public servant is administrative Hughes (1998:233) <1m" .. " that roles, 
responsibilities and of accountability according to the traditional model not 
DOssliOle v ..... 'au,)'" the interaction between politician and 












interaction between politicians and the most senior public servant, 
Secretary or Director General, became increasingly onerous as demands were placed 
upon state. The demands as a result to the modem state placed 
more pressure on politicians and public servants to deliver. Politicians required more 
Pennanent Secretaries or Directors General and the role ofthe most senior public servant 












PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSFORMATION: 
International Perspectives 
"(Today) ... demands 
Osborne and Gaeblef3 
that m't-"" .rn. "..,ti ... "".<, rather than "'-""" ICPJ"ln J'l! 0 them" -
The word "transformation" has been attributed different meanings (Vil-Nkomo, 1999: 
87). According to Vil-Nkomo (1999:87-88) transformation is not a once-off process or an 
end to a country's public service problems. Transformation is a long-term process to 
achieve the best outcomes through approaching issues and problems in fundamentally 
different ways (ibid). ViI-Nkomo (1999:88) argues that order to achieve transformation 
needs to be a COlnIIlitnnerltofpolitical, social and economic resources. Reform is 
incremental """""'l"'''' whjle is a more tuIllGrumenta v ..... u~'" (ibid). Although 
these notions may seem contradictory, reform is integral to transformation (ibid). 
Transformation is the:retore a fundamental change in appearance, structure, function, 
processes and the manner in which "'''Tn,''',,,,,, are undertaken. It is a mz-tenn .... 'lV""''''.''' .. of 











achieve outcome, there may negative outcomes. Reform is the improvement 
or amendment of a condition that is unsatisfuctory. Although 
,',:\ * .. 
6ptcome, It IS 
\ 
IS 
an incrementalist approach rather than a fundamental,",,,,,,,,,.!",,,, measures such as 
affirmative action, H.E;Uo.:>u..'lll.E;, performance management and budgeting, etc. lend 
themselves to incremental changes (Vii-NImmo, 1999:93-94). For example a government 
may rationalise the public service, but the process may not ne(;eSl')anr" change the rn 
which the public service functions. Reforms may lead to transfOrmation, but 
a paradigm in the public service IUnlctH:ms It may 
rnc:relllSlIllg the diversity 
the a COltlSe'QUen()e diversity changes a public org;anlsatllon 
as well as manner which it the organisation a 
twloSlm(mtal '"", ...... 11".'"'. that is transformation. multiplier of reforms may In 
a tratlst()rrl1latI'OI gO'v'eIlrlmem and (ibid). 
Transformation and reform of the public service is not a new phenomenon as many 
countries, in particular the United States of America and Britain, have attempted to align 
public service with the evolving changing role of the state. Whether it is onset 
or end the demands of the 
and crisis ofthe welfure economic imperatives, decentralisation or introduction 
of technology, states fuce the challenge of adapting to these dynamic fuctors. 
According to Massey (1993:2) dynamic mllU~t;s ,",u .. "uu.", ... from technological 











supranational institutions and global economic advances. Hughes (1998: 8-19) 
largely with this analysis as the imperatives that necessitated change in the public 
sector. Technological improved information which enabled global 
trading, the decentralisation of hierarchical organisational a in time 
and resources, and the ability to share information more efficiently (ibid). However, 
government could not abreast of these developments. As Osborne Gaebler 
(1992:12) noted, government does not function well the rapidly information-
knowledge-intensive and of the 1990's. 
Government was for too and wasteful. Many politicians began 
to articulate sentiments in election Carnp~Llgrlsduring 1980's and 1990's. 
criticisms were also 
JVemIneIU activities, 
doing any of these 
not only at the of government also the 
is government was involved in too may activities and not 
particularly (Hughes, 1998:9). methods and 
processes that government used to conduct activities were increasingly being seen as 
inefficient and ineffective. The world was also facing demographic and environmental 
iO\lrenlffilent m country faces dilemma of unlimited needs with limited 
resources. The pressure on the welfare state was fast oe(::onnm an that aDtJeared on 
poHcy agendas. the modem welfare state this pressure was increasing with the poor, 
young the of quality social services, jobs and welfare 
ements. An imperative to was the globalisation of world 
economies. This countries to become more and competitive. According 











national economic perfonnance. It stands to reason that quality of education and 
training, health of a workforce, efficiency administration and the 
environment for "'Tlt"''''''''1''Pt''''"1'<:1 a country's competitiveness on global 
market. Ac<~orolmg to Rockman (1998:22) modern welmre states to realise that 
were deeply mortgaged and there was some mrc;:rv~em!on these states mced 
r'I"""''''~''' which ultimately affected their The uu.} .... ",,,u welfare states 
theret~Dre had to continually find ways of doing more with 
a in SIze bUI-eallCIC1CV the cutting of welmre 
to Dependent Children, ...... '."'1",,<' • .,,'" public 
and geller~lll} transfonning " ... ,'" "".... so it u .... 'aul..., more 
According to Wessels (2000:31 1-312) the broad state public 
servants that resulted in a re-~eXamill1atl[on role state and policies can be 
summarised as 
1. growth of the world VV.J .... 1 .......... 'U especially 
The rapid urbanisation of the population. related to the population will 
the delivery of services. 
3. lu(lus:m,im;atlOn has resulted in amongst other things, environmental degradation. 
oDlments which uu, ........ ,. on jo p "'...,,, ....... and activity. 
5. National economies have become more integrated into global markets with the 
emphasis on competition which has 1...,"" ........ ' .... in unemployment, poverty and changes 
in domestic economic policies. 
4 President William (Bill) Clinton of the United Slates of America during the federal government re-











6. The threat of new epidemics such as 
new methods of health care. 
has compelled arU.lP1'1I"1l'"npnt to adopt 
7. War and social instability continue which impact upon the 
government to find 
According to Wessels (2000:313) indicate enormity 
'Vll"'HE;'_'" that state and public servants. an 
am~ml)t to confront challenges have begun to re-assess the Cal)acrty public 
"''''' .... ,,,,.''' to an llCJ[l;;aSllJgl) ,",V"HU.''''''' en~vmmrneIU movement 
transforming or has to the 
traditional model of public administration. As the demands on the modern state began to 
increase, the traditional model became increasingly anachronistic. The traditional model 
was seen as rule-bound and more concerned with the execution of a function 
according to a rule, which mayor may not be rational, than the outcomes rule. The 
hierarchical arrangement also resulted in impersonal relations, blind obedience to 
authority, a lack of accountability and red tape, diffusion of 
responsibility, and sec:rec:y 
Literature describing the problems of the traditional model of bureaucracy is numerous. 
HP1rnpn Simon 1945 to the generally accepted principles of 
administration. According to Simon (1957 :20-21) these were: 











Administrative ettlcHmcv is increased by arranging the members of the group in a 
hierarchy of authority. 
3. Administrative efficiency is by the span of control at any point 
the hierarchy to a smaller number ofindividuals. 
4. Administrative efficiency is increased by grouping individuals for purpose 
control according to (a) purpose, (b) process, (c) clientele or (d) place. 
102 
Simon 1) "' ..... ,,~.""" ... the administrative principles as contradictory and ambiguous. 
According to Simon (1957 :22) the pnnCIPle that is lJ"'I':>Vll':> are 
according to·their <>v,,,,,, .. ot, second ....... ·n ... '.,.'". of 
unity of command. other words if an of individuals doing 
specialised "",C'",nIA inputs 
which specialist's authority an individual follow? For ""v·,,",,·.,.1 a urn,'.,..", ... that deals 
with machines and certain materials receives these as inputs from other specialised areas 
in organisation, then there a contradiction as is no unity of command 
the worker is commanded by various specialised divisions within the 
organisation (Simon, 1957:22-23). decisions of an individual at any point in 
the administrative hierarchy in more than one area of knowledge 
contradicts the principle of specialisation (Simon, 1957:23). 
The third <:>rI ..... , .. u"'t?<l1-.,,"" of control, 
organisation with a number of interrelations inevitably 
decision among organisational members is ,""'T"""'''' up 
n1"A~AnT~ a dilemma. 
because 











" ... ..,' ..... '1.1. is found (Simon, 1957:28). In other words decisions that are carried up the 
hierarchy will involve several levels of officials making decisions which then have to be 
carried down in the form of orders and instructions (ibid). This cumbersome and 
time-consuming process does not advance the principle of efficiency (ibid). 
The last administrative principle individuals aC(.1ording to (a) (b) 
nro,ces:s. (c) clientele or (d) place to advance is also contradictory (ibid). Simon 
(1957 :30) defines purpose as objective or end for which an activity is out, 
orCtce!;s as a means to accomplish the 1"\11 ..... "" ."' .. ,t ...... is that an 
may a multiplicity of purposes which may not within its area specialisation 
(ibid). For example, a health department's purpose may involve health education to 
prevent diseases, but education is a department of education's specialisation and purpose 
(Simon~ 1 dilemma is that ifboth organisations have same 
purpose then the duplicated which not enhance the principle 
(Simon, 1957:31). In other words ifboth the health and education departments 
duplication, but also another upon health education this would not only 
dilemma of which organisation is best suited to the purpose (Simon, 1957:34). 
dilemma is is within a: particular place then it is 
only the clientele within that geographic area that is served (Simon, 1957:32). The 
dilemma is such that organising according to purpose, and place is at the sacrifice 
of clientele 32). Simon (1 illustrates this by using 
following eJGlmlple a department of health providing medical C'''''''''''l'&'''' to children 











"'PT"\'U"P! within ii particular area, (b) a "clientele" organisation because it is providing 
services to a particular section of society, and a "purpose" and "process" organisation 
were part education department. Simon (1957 :28) theretiore argues that 
"purpose", "process", "clientele" and "place" are inconsistent and competing bases 
organisation, for any advantage 
advantage of the fourth principle. 
to three principles must be sacrificed to 
organisation a CO]lS1~stelt1t "purpose" and 
(1A1"lllAf1 a particular "area" and "clientele" the organisation would be so 
that it would not enhance eIIlcumc:y 
However, Simon (1957:39) that 
the attainment of certain ends with the use 
limitations to administration. An individual 
is the attempt to rationally maximise 
resources, there will 
an organisation has limitations in terms of 
his or her ability to perform and to make correct decisions (ibid). According to Simon 
(1957:39-40) if an organisation can remove these limitations then organisation 
approaches goal of maximum efficiency. However, individuals are always limited in 
terms of skill, values and knowledge (ibid). Therefore, there are always "limits to 
rationality" and the of the of administration 1957:40). 
Knott Miller (1987) also examined dysfunction that occurs bureaucracies. 
'1'\1',(l1n,(1 to Miller (1987:171) bureaucratic dysfunction occurs in two ways; 
that is individual ",,<,nUT'll'" limitations, ratllon,al individuals but irrational structures. 
The first explanation ofcognitive limitations borrows from Simon's theory of "limits to 











ufl()ertamtles and limitations and organisational 
with limitations, will make a which may 
not be the optimal decision. The organisational constraints may be due to limited 
resources or the culture of standard operating that the bureaucrat has become 
accustomed to (Knott and Miller, 1987:172). The standard operating procedures 
determine the ofattention and how the problem is analysed (ibid). culture 
of following operating procedures interacts with the individual's 
incapacity (ibid). The interaction to IUU.UU.!:;", a 
way a new or a a or 
creative way becomes displaced (ibid). The result is displacement where a 
bureaucrat accepts the culture of the organisation and its standard operating procedures, 
and will not rethink the system the bureaucrat's limited rationality and trained 
incapacity (ibid). The organisational culture becomes true the bureaucrat 
and he or she not question system nor capacity to do so. Knott and 
(1987:173) believe the explanation of bureaucratic dysfunction is the culture 
jI<,"UU"'''' the bureaucrat to decisions. These bureaucrats in a sense r"""p'UfP 
training (whether through experience or actual training) which facilitates incapacity and 
encourages uncritical thinking of the problem. Trained incapacity theret~[)re 
bureaucrats' cognitive ability to discern between rational choices. 
Knott Miller's (1987) seClona explanation is that be rational but that 
the organisational structure limits their rationality. other organisational rules 











Miller, 1987:173). The is rational the of his or her goals and works 
within limited organisational system to secure his or interest (Knott and Miller, 
1987:174). The consequence ofthis is that organisational culture creates bureaucratic 
dysfunction the bureaucrat serves his or her self-interest at the expense ofthe 
organisation (ibid). In previous explanation ofbureaucratic dysfunction, the 
bureaucrat would merely follow standard operating procedures because he or she does 
not know any better, whereas the rational bureaucrat win work within the standard 
operating and use the rule-following behaviour to further or her own 
interests. 
According to (1971 most standard nr .. ~r!U1" 
pr()ce:oures to cope with problems it ...... UH_i:> routinely, but become 
an obstacle to change when is defined as .. n'.Tn""" not ..... "" .. "',,'" a problem or 
modus operandi becomes irrelevant to the problem. Bureaucracies tend to 
top echelons of a hierarchy and are more concerned with what is 
eXl)ected of them actually solving the problem (ibid). The preoccupation of 
following orders, rules and procedures displaces bureaucracy from actually defining 
the purpose and the problem 1971:27). va~.", .. ~", .. _" are therefore 
more concerned with fulfilling a rule or policy mandate than actually U .... ~.UVHUj'J:<. the 
merit of the rule or policy decision (ibid). Certainty and adherence is therefore purchased 
at cost of creative (ibid). According to (1 In 











African "' .... ",-.'T ..... ..-. state) a I"Il">r-1'1"1""" is UVJ,u.u •• """ ... and takes the place 
innovation (ibid). 
Internationally, many political leaders won election campaigns on the ticket 
government. Margaret Thatcher's 1979, 1983 and 1987 election sought to 
public service. run up to her 1979 and throughout her 
office consulted '-"H ... vHJ.u .... who published the book Your Disobedient 
Servants 1978 1997:10). Chapman's public service career spanned three 
decades. His book not only demystified the public but also severely 
criticised the government for waste and the inability to deliver services effectively and 
(ibid). The television Yes Minister was partially based on his book 
(ibid). Thatcher together with a dynamic team of academics, political loyalists, 
private and public sector to the Whitehall establishment. 
Stephenson (1980:29-30) described this impact as" ... the that the Civil 
Service had experience living memory ... For a while the whole Whitehall system 
almost visibly juddered.. was a cultural shock." 
In 1987 Margaret Thatcher initiated a watershed programme for un· .... 1"I">,'I.1 .. • ... .,. rrlanagl~mlent 
the British public service. She requested Sir Robin Ibbs, head of the Efficiency Unit, to 
what in terms ofpublic reform and what would be the 
next to in to ensure continual improvement. The llH\.HUl;" were published 
February of] 988 and became known as the 
summarised as follows: 











1. of the public service was delivering services and the 
management were viewed as positive, 
2. Senior management was dominated by policy personnel that had little experience of 
service delivery, 
public servants were ruled by and parliamentary pressures, 
Ministers were overloaded and inexperienced tenns of management, 
5. Departments .LV" ... " .. , ..... on activities rather than <'PT"'''''''''' delivery results, 
6. There were insufficient ,nl"'",n1t"""", to improve oelITOlmfLllCle. and 
7. The public "'''' ..... ,''''''' was too 
1988). 
and ,.,n,,,,,,,,,,,,,, to lUa.Ua.,,;,", effectively (Efficiency Unit, 
Thatcher appointed a H.uUL~'''oi' the Office of the Civil bya 
Pennanent ... "", ... ",t'<>"-1 emlbarJlCea upon Steps Project which would each 
department following questions: 
1. the work or activity need to be done at all? 
Could it be done the private sector? 
Could it be done by the private sector under contract? 
4. If it is to by can it from policy runCll(m 
Is there already a aef,l;ree of autonomy oel;wt::en various functions departments 
order to establish agencies based a particular activity? (Duggett, 1997: 16) 
Positive responses to these indicated whether the rt""",,,, .. tn1,,,n't was viable or not. 











relationship between departments and their ... """ ........... '" (ibid). Thatcher in streamlined 
the ..., ..... .,. .. public according to necessity of function with defined activities. 
Thatcher's was the reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, providing value-for-
money to taxpayers, stemming inflationary public spending, privati sing public services, 
implementing the best experiences from the private sector, and introducing malna;gelne11t 
and into the public service (Duggett, 1997:1 Prime Minister John Major 
continued the Next Step programme and expanded upon the refoIm process by 
introducing a Citizen's Charter in 1991. John Major wanted to increase public service 
accountability to the public. Each agency had to function according to 
a set J<. ... IUUJl~ principles with the chief executive 
with Ministers to meet perfoImance standards. The principles for the 
included: 
contract 
1. Standards that were set in order to monitor and publish what citizens could expect in 
teImS 
2. Openness in order to disclose full and accurate infoImation on how services were 
delivered, how much it would cost, and who was responsible for delivery of services, 
in consultation with those receive the service, 
4. Courtesy and helpfulness to all ....... "'''',,''''' who were to tre13lteo as 
Putting things right where did not meet the standard and apologies for 
and procedures complaints, and 
6. ...... r'""''' in teImS of efficient delivery within affordable resources 










two decades ofpubJic selVice reform in Britain most scholars of public 
administration that the public experienced a change from a 
bureaucratic, rule-bound culture to one that encompasses private sector notions of 
customer responsiveness business-style management and effective 
delivery 
no 
Similarly, in the United States the federal go'/enoroent n1"l,'1"'1"lll.1""n't a chlm~!e m manner 
which it delivered ",..,..,,,,,'.,,, President Clinton his election CarnDitll1lnannounced 
that "the era gm/entnn1ent is over." The election of President Clinton 1992 saw 
lCe-t'l'eS10elnt Gore embal'k a program re-ltnVlentmg the United 
gm/errmumt, Although the problem with the USA 
the main problems were oV1er-:re1!:llUlUC)ll 
govefltnnent appeared manifuld, 
In order to avoid 
maladministration, ....... ,,-.1'.,,'...., and unlawful employment practices were more than 
100 000 pages of personnel and regulations in detail how to hire, promote, 
or federal employees (Gore, 1993:1). The USAgovemment also created procurement 
that required various time-consuming authorisations to ensure that employees 
or private companies did not in corruption (ibid), There was also a large amount 
of regulations that dictated precisely how much could spent, which was meant to 
ensure that tax dollars were used for approved "ft,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (ibid). and local 
L.LA ... ..,". were also regulated in terms of how they could use federal funding even to 











Clinton and Gore borrowed refonnist ideas from David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's 
(1992) book, Reinventing Government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the 
public sector. The main thesis of the book was the possibility the public 
sector from a rule-bound and outmoded bureaucracy to a result-orientated, market-
orientated, mission-focused and COllllpletItlve organisation that responds to the of 
"customers", that is the public. Osborne and Gaebler's definitive book marke:d a new 
paradigm in public administration and management. It was a break from the 
approach of public administration theory, as well as being rlp·o;,"f'.ntl'l.lp and Dn~SCnDtl 
how to ... Ul' .. M ........ sector pelITOlrrmmce. \,,'SO'OITJlC o.~camc a "'En,,,,,, .. to IS 
now known as the National Performance Review HU., ...... the 
first National Perfonnance that " ... to 
within the .. " .... " ... u government, we must the incentives that the 
behaviour. We must create a new set of dynamics through the use of competition, the 
measurement the decentralisation of authority, and the creation of real 
consequences for success 
The USA public sector ret()nn strategy had one goal which was to shift systems that held 
people accountable for process, to systems that held people accountable for results (Gore, 
1993:3). The reinvention of the USA :federal government focused on steps: 
1. budget process by reducing restrictions and waste, 
3. Develop an procurement process, 











Reduce the amount of regulations, and 
6. Empower state and local government (Gore, 1993 
President Clinton embarked upon a budget process that set broad policy and 
then allocated funds to each agency by function. mam of this was to realign 
the budget with policy objectives and function rather than focus the budget on process 
other initiative in te.rms budget was to and 
appropriation to mcilitate planning (Gore, 1993 President 
aelpartm~ents, agencies and 
budget resltnctlOilS (ibid). The aim 
belief that .......... F.' .... 
Manall;ement and Budget (OMB) to HUJ.UUJ""'" 
de~~e11ltra;lIslmg personnel policy stemmed from the 
what skills were 
needed for certain jobs. President Clinton therefore instructed the Office of Personnel 
Management to deregulate the selection and employment of personnel (ibid). also 
requested that Congress pass legislation that would give departments and agencies the 
authority to conduct their own recruitment, selection and '-IA<U"'.HUJl'5 of positions, reduce 
time required to terminate employment as well as simplifY the pay classification 
1993 :6). were allowed to own performance 
management and reward system with the objective ofimproving individual and 
organisational performance (ibid). The Clinton administration streamlined the 
by rewriting regulations from rigid rules to guiding principles, 
;n ... " ....... 'lT"'rI 1Il1!omlatllon technology, the purchase of commercial products mstea,d 
of products designed to government specifications, and updated federal procurement laws 











government President Clinton sought to broaden their role from strictly auditing 
departments and agencies to evaluating the management of goods and services (Gore, 
1993: 1 0). The elimination was to be through an review of 
t I t ' thr Wl'th 50% of the governmen regu a Ions over ee ;I{ 
(ibid). Ag,encnes were also u,.;;;)~U to co-ordinate the reduction of 
unnecessary tape and establish a process by which ag€mC:les could obtain exemptions 
from certain regulations. 
Internationally, the reform and transformation of the public service and the new public 
management paradigm have a number of common principles: 
1. on to complement policy skills, 
shift bureaucratic on rules and inputs to quantifiable output measures 
and perfonnance targets, 
3. The decentralisation of management and development of new systems of reporting 
and monitoring, 
4. A preference fur privatisation, 
5. ", ... ~.", ..... ", structures into more flat 
autonomous divisions, 
6. The incorporation of private sector management practices such as strategic planning, 
u~~.~ .. statements pelrtonn;an(;e contracts, and 











Pollitt (1 argues that there are a number of assumptions surrounding the new 
public management paradigm. The assumption is that there is a proven body of 
evidence that private sector principles can about desirable 
the public sector (ibid). The second assumption is in terms of the 
output ratio is also a state (ibid). in are other 
to as equity and u .. '......... "',... or unintended outcomes. The third 
"'1"1<""".,.,<>.,,,,, to the "CUlstomers ....,.,,' ..... 1' ••. ,.J,..,u is that allows 
(pollitt, 1998:54). However, there has been no study on the correlation between 
flexibility and efficiency. In fact, Pollitt (ibid) that the move from rule-bound 
management to more "flexible" management has resulted uncertainty, weaK1emng of 
job tenure and working unsociable hours. Pollitt (ibid) also takes with the frequent 
use of the term "customers" to define members of the public. This once 
incorporates the private sector idea of responsiveness and accountability in order to 
remain competitive. Pollitt (1998:55) argues that supermarket shoppers are not quite the 
same as members of the public who "consume" social security benefits as the public 
sector agency responsible for this function the monopoly in the provision of this 
Pollitt (1998:55) also "quality" which a arp!~tA'" 
emphasis on procedural rather than substantive issues. An example of this point is the 
concern for outputs, is an income-support U",Jj"'.Ll'" claim is dealt with 
a (as opposed to months), than outcome concerns, is whether 











Other countries within the Commonwealth such as Australia and New Zealand have also 
borrowed from the ....... ,rJC" and American experience. However, Africa's public service 
reform process is and has to analysed on a case study but common 
elements are evident. Countries in Africa followed the traditional model of public 
administration. Colonial governments used bureaucratic means to administer often 
subjugate colonies. Bureaucracies often consisted of indigenous public servants at the 
lower levels of the public to interact with the general population, while the "'PTlllor 
the colonial public the domain or public 
servants colonial countries (Hughes, 1998:209). Colonial powers 
form during colonialism. post-colonial the legacy 
colonial administration continued. was partly due to inerti~ no administrative 
alternative and a lack of skills. Public servants who were skilled, were usually trained in 
the former colonial country. the transition to independence most senior public 
servants returned to the colonIal home country, retired from service, some remained, 
and/or lower level public servants trained by the colonial power became public 
servants of the skill vacuum. According to Ankomah (as cited Mokgoro, 
1989:2) the colonial public service system 
because: 
1. Bureaucrats who occupied senior positions in post-colonial Africa were """""'-'t'"'U. 
groomed, socialised and assimilated in the culture ofthe colonial powers, and 
2. Departing colonial governments systematically manipulated the public service to 












post-colonial most adopted an interventionist approach the 
economy to address poverty and the inequalities ofthe colonial legacy. As the World 
Bank (1997:23) argued: 
'The new interventionist credo had its counterpart in the development strategy of the 
day, adopted by many developing countries at independence, which emphasised 
prevalence of market failures and accorded the state a central in correcting them. 
Centralised planning, ,(>£ .. • ... 0,"1"10 i.""tPl'\7P;'I'11 resource allocation, and a heavy 
state hand in infant-industry development were part and parcel of this ",t,.,,.,fn.rn 
In order for the state to play such an interventionist role it needed the bureaucracy to 
implement development and interventionist po1icies.~ureaucracies therefore began to 
an mc:realSH1lgl) active role in post-colonial Africa. The"problem WalS that 
" 
states were trying to ,,,,,",,,,,nT development policies a colonial public 
service system of governance, The pervalSive colonial culture inhibited the 
implementation of development policies. The relationship between bureaucrats and 
politicians WalS matrkc;:d by hostility and a of mutual "..l'.n"'Y'",t·,,,n (Mokgoro, 
1989:1). The problem WalS exa:cerOatC!d alS "' ........ "" ........ were the source of expertise 
and would dominate politicians (Hughes, 1998:210). In addition to this problem, post-
colonial political systems were weak and ill equipped for the role of politicians as policy 
As cited Hughes, 1998 :210) the common -/-",,,.h,.·,,, of post-











political other bodies which could maintain control and accountability of the 
aucracv. The bureaucracy In and importance without political 
public accountability. public accounted for over 
50 npl'l"'Pl,t of non-agricultural jobs in Africa 1986 bill for 
public servants accounted for 50 percent oftotal "'''''I.1v .. , ......... ''' (Hughes, 1998:208). 
independent states the separation of politics and administration was lacking due to the 
under-development of the political system and reliance on the bureaucracy (Hughes, 
1998:210). Hughes (ibid) argues that most independent states were governed by 
bureaucracy. Bureaucracies were the employer of professional "Vl'''1"t<! trained in 
former colonial countries, increasing in and scope to administer interventionist and 
development policies, imposing their expertise policy formulation above a weak 
political system, becoming and a ruling class unto themselves (Hughes, 1998 :21 0-
211). As Smith (as cited in Hughes, 1998:211) argues: 
"Development planning has consequently tended to be highly centralised, 
tPI'.'hJ'ln{,lr'fltu' and of top down variety, where experts at the top make the decisions 
about what the masses need in terms of programmes This feature of 
the bureaucracy reflects the concept of a specially recruited group appointed on the 
of merit to produce rational and efficient methods of working. A system of 
recruitment that admits only those that can demonstrate required level of expertise 
and competence is bound to produce organisations which lay politicians find it 











The was a powerful an dominated the administrative 
system and the '"'vu,,, ....... of corruption, and patronage were 
evident. By the 1980's there was a recognition that ..... development and 
disappointments were now seen not simply as a result of inappropriate policy but 
also because state msnnUHms were nPT'tt'lrm poorly" (World 1997:105). 




~a'-"Y, which were invariably borrowed developed ""'",, .... t .... 
Developed countries' re:k)rm 
many developing countries. (1997) 
public 
ona 
this argument by that many countries have the salient reform 1-",,,,'tn ... , .. , 
of the more developed countries within the Commonwealth. According to Kaul, 
(1997:22-24) Commonwealth public service reform process has a number of common 
............. "', which include: 
1. Redefining the political administrative interface 
3. 
Countries sought to clarifY the between political policy makers and 
administrative policy implementation in order to distinguish between strategic policy 
t'ln'IPf'1rnl~'''' and op~lrational oroc:ess;es. 
of appropriate reform options 
Countries evaluated various options from private sector and other countries to 
select practice. therefore hoped that similar perceived success 
would occur in country. 











nnY'TrI.",,, sought to to public initiating performance 
mt::asll1remt:mt, devolution ' ...... " .. nu'>1'cr monitoring evaluation 
techniques, clarifYing incentives, and ..... E, .... ".6 functions with strategic objectives. 
4. Building nrnrare and public sector partnerships 
Countries incorporated private sector into public sector transformation by 
I"""""",,,, .... from successes, management and responsive culture to customers 
as well as outsourcing and privatising various public sector activities. 
Emphasis on efficiency 
;OumtleS realised that mem(aerlCH~S in a hindrance to 
..... 'Vll .... productivity de'vehJprnerlt. The .... ul.B .. """'" was ",,",,,,1~n ... '" placed on the 
public service to achieve developmental priorities. 
6. Review of traditional personnel policies 
Countries had to review personnel policies to audit the total number of staff: costs 
and skills order to develop and initiate reforms. 
7. to ... ,,><r'B"'·'" 
Although corruption exists in all countries, was a concern that 
corruption was more endemic in African countries and that it was an impediment to 
nv. ....... "' .... + Some cmmtlnes thp'"f".,.t,""'"f"P sought to reduce through various 
8. to change public sector values 
Countries attempted to instil in public servants the value of quality services, 











corruption, and the view that citizens should be regarded as customers of a public 
studies of public serVice reform in both Anglophone and Francophone are 
worth summarising to illustrate complexities of reforms that cmmUl1es in 
Study 1: Public Service Reform Uganda 
Since independence in 1962, Uganda has dramatic chamgl~s civil rule to 
military dictatorships, civil war and aelmocnilCV has 
_ •• ~~.,.., .• ~ as welL Uganda, 
to reform and established the Civil Service 
shown some successes based on ten factors: 
t'ro~~ranlme (CSRP). Uganda has 
need 
L The to which reforms are 'home-grown', that is the involvement of people 
from level identirying public service problems and becoming 
stakeholders in setting the reform agenda. Although this may seem an insurmountable 
established a Public Service and Reorganisation Commission 
which polled thousands of people about their views before ISS'UInll! 
recommendations for public service reform. 
degree to which go~vel1nment is wilHng to take an active part in an innovative and 
adaptive process. Uganda ~l'U'llV"'~"'''' ""ll"'lll=','~;;) and policy Instruments for 











The strength and sustainability of support from top policy makers ...,.1'1",,,,"., the depth of 
commitment of Uganda's political leadership which is crucial to enduring successes 
and initiatives. was a recognition that bottom-up will only work if 
leaders make a concerted effort to take the recommendations seriously and initiate 
appropriate policy instruments. 
extent about the ,-,1<,14''\'" implementation is 
imperative so that Ugandans are not only in agr'eelnelrlt about problems, but also 
solutions. The vision outHned future role of the public service and was developed 
from the specific recommendations made by the PSRRC. 
The extent of synergy refonn programmes is essential for success so that each 
programme compliments the other. required Uganda to co-ordinate public 
""'''''."(,,,,, (lec€mtJralllsaltloll, privatisation, constitutional and eC()flC)mllC ""'-!-ArlTl 
6. The introduction of a minimum living for public servants introduced equity into 
the Ugandan public service, but also helped to communicate the government's 
commitment to improving employment conditions in the public service and improve 
""" .. "",."" delivery. 
Service delivery orientation placed an emphasis on results and the commitment to 
improving through and monitoring the implementation 
programmes. 
8. The ability to enhance ethics, accountability and transparency by estabHshing a 










Programme has been the first step for Uganda achieving a professional public 
service. 
9 _ co-ordination of donor support. 
10. The clarity """' ...... J'1<. the desired role of the state was articulated a vision which 
became policy objectives_ 
(case study source: Langseth, 1995:365-390) 
Case Study 2: Public Service Reform in Cote d'Ivoire 
independence in 1960 Cote d'Ivoire has undertaken a number of changes to its 
122 
public Cote d'Ivoire embarked upon a development strategy in the 1960's to the 
1980's with the introduction nVle-v,earplans and with each plan attempting to improve 
upon development administration past. However were a number of 
l'rU"ICh-"'l11,tc namely the colonial heritage, limitations, cultural poorly 
demographic d'Ivoire's public 
continuous "",.r.,..",."" co-ordination 
not systerrlatlc. Budgetary '"'v •.• " ........ have played a 
role detennining decisions and have overshadowed other dimensions of reform 
as institutional, psychological and delivery considerations (Hibault, 
1996:95). emphasis on COIISl(lenatIcID and is a of 
international donor andior banking institutions' influence on Cote d'Ivoire's reform 
programmes, most notably its five-year plans. example the International Monetary 
Fund 1984 stipulated foHowing: 











treiezltng public sector ., .......... "'." "","v, .. ,,,, .. ',,,> and replacement of retired 
3. Reducing staff, 
4. Conducting a census of the public " ... r",,·p 
has a of a strong political environment to ofthe 
tr~lnp1"'nl'k' for 
vision or sIDateJl:Y for t'P1""l"'I'\"I This has contributed to 
institutions and some ....... "' ..... ,." version 
unilaterally (Hibault, 1996: 1 of public " .. "'11 ..... """"'"', ......... prOlgramnaes and 
Cote to develop a coherent strategy to transform it 
public " .. r",,' .. but numerous show limitations of mode of thinking 
and so adopted" 1996: 102). 
study source: Hibault, 1996: 79-102). 
number of problems arose when transplanting reform initiatives from developed 
countries which were inevitably former colonial powers. Firstly, public sector reforms 
were based on market principles. Developing countries had little market 
principles let alone development of open the reduction 
government (Hughes, 1998:220). Markets are ineffective without the rule oflaw, which 
bureaucrats, the most threatened by ret()tn1lS, were responsible for implementing. 
the saw foreign buying the 
problems ofadministrative incapacity (ibid), Thirdly, the 











Fourthly, the of markets that were under-developed, saw corruption 
becoming endemic (ibid). In short, developing countries are with problems and it 
will more than just the reforms, borrowed from developed countries, to address 
socio·economic problems. 
In evaluating the public sector reform and transformation initiatives of various 
governments over the past fifteen years, Savoie (1998:394) concluded that reforms are 
essentially political and social experiments which makes measurement 
subject to multiple and conflicting Perceptions are largely a 
function or politics. Individuals are h!'llmn,p .. ,,·'; 
are likely to the 
point (Savoie, 1998 :396). Those 'lun,n<:!p mtf~rests (whether political or 
are enhanced, are likely to view as positive (ibid). Even defining what success is 
in proves to be problematic. one success could be by 
implementation of a reform strategy and whether "h"<:.~ .. rn.T met 
(ibid). However, reformers do not ne(~es~)an have a clear idea of reform objectives. 
There are often unintended outcomes of reforms and the intangibility 
government does not lend itselfweU to measurement. Thus it is difficult to 
assess whether there has been improvement in the quality ofthe service. Savoie 
(1998:397) believes successful start by generating action and instilling 
organisational members that the status quo is anachronistic. This may lead to a change 
but retlmnlers to ' .... LOU",,,,, transformation is a 











dependent on political agendas rather than a commitment to transformation will in 
a perception that the are political rhetoric. One of the reasons British and 
ftlJl1CrlC<1n re,tOfJrn success is commitment by and the longevity of both 
Thatcher Clinton's terms of office. The 
u.""",,,,,,,, the measurement 
n,...."Tn,1T'n,,,"1"I1' of reform itself 
;:)u\",","'.);:) difficult. One ret()rm initiative may lead to another or 
spillover effects on other initiatives. On the one hand ...,.t.'-o"""'" may have 
appeared to have fuiled, on the other hand the reform may have impetus to 
another or may have become institutionalised and thus appear to be accepted government 
operations 1998 :399). The other problem of classifYing public sector reform 
successes is that might be successful in one country may not be successful in 
fact this highlights a development of public sector that is countries are 
initiatives that are to successful public 
sector reform without ..... " ... ,v .. uJl'. to develop their own initiatives based on their local 
experiences. South Africa is no exception to shopping for public sector panacea reforms. 
July and October of 1997 the South African Ministry and Department for Public 
Service and Administration tours to Britain, ::Smlga])OI'le, Zealand 
and Australia. What is quite remarkable is that the South White on 
Transformation Delivery (Batho Pele) is identical to Britain's Citizen Charter 
and the new ma.n31gerneIlt tr~1n,PU1,nrlr South public is similar to the 
British and New Zealand model. 
Governments over the past fifteen years have implemented reforms to improve 










effective delivery of quality services within a global eccmom require fundamental 
......... u!","'.." which cannot rapidly 
cultural (The World 
institutional 
nstltutlOll1al trarlstonmltl<lln involves 
126 
in manner which g01"eflnmem and H.U .... "'''' '''''''''U':>. and 
often an overhaul oflong established ''''''I .. n,,, (ibid). It requires formulation 
of good policies capable public institutions to implement the policies 
to (ibid). LOIll1pn:meIlLSI reforms and ultimately transformation 
...... "''' .. a .... '''~ ... v''''' effort political will, and successes may vary from 
country to country. 
Public sector ........ " ..... , .. and traJl1st,ornnatIOn initiatives 
of government in a of ways. Firstly, been an mcrea:se in focus 
on (Larson 1999:23). has a realisation by the public and 
politicians that government can amounts of money without having 
to show for it (ibid). Thus, there is a pressure on government to deliver value for money 
and quality services (ibid). Secondly, power been dispersed by separating policy 
service delivery through the increased use of public-private sector partnerships, 
aPT'''''''' and out (Larson and Coe, 1999:24). As a result 
Permanent Secretary's power dispersed to various levels of government (local, 
provincial or regional), various organisations (private and non-governmental sectors) and 
even to international ag€mC:Ies (donor agencies) (ibid). 
are more interrelated and do not fit within one ar""p""'I1'n,Ant 











betweeri more than one I1P''''U'trrI,;>nT (ibid). Permanent ,p,,,...,.nU'lPi;! must theretlore new 
horizontal ways problems and finding common solutions 
(ibid). Fourthly~ decision making has become globalised which has resulted political 
and practical problems for both politicians and Permanent Secretaries (ibid). International 
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, regional trading. 
blocs, and transnational partnerships are slowly independent options for each . 
country (ibid). This places on Permanent Secretaries to keep abreast of global 
issues and provide policy options within this global context (ibid). Fifthly, government is 
under increased public scrutiny which has placed pressure on l:'eIml.ll1leltlt to 
comply with demands public information, traltls):,ar€mcy and public consultation 
(ibid). an focus on eC(mClm1.C development and 
Coe~ 1999:26). era in which the state was seen as princip~l of economic 
development has yielded to one which the role ofthe state is to create the conditions 
for economic development (ibid). Thus with resources at the state's disposal, the 
state has had to focus on "steering' rather than "rowing" (ibid). The implications for the 
Permanent Secretary is that his or her role as policy advisor has become more 
complicated, and the role as ",U.ULU ".....,U1 .... "'>. on'''P1''1nrnpnt department is more 
complex and onerous (Larson and Coe, 1999:27-34). 
terms of their policy have to take a broader view of issues Permanent :Se(:retaru~s 
facing society with increasing demands and pressures. Permanent Secretaries are now 
obliged to consult more widely with various organisations """1;" ..... formulating policy 











of departments (ibid). This a high ....... "' .... '..., of involvement 
and delegation and the develop staff 
and 1999:33). ~n·~~~~·ntc Pennanent 
Secretaries historically sat at the apex ofthe organisational pyramid with departments 
hierarchical in culture and autonomous from other departments (ibid). Departments were 
vertical "silos," but now problems cannot be contained within one department (ibid) . 
.. au.> ... " ... ,,_ Secretaries are now obliged to develop linkages .... "'r .. "'"'.n departments and co-
ordinate solutions to problems (ibid). 
The mr.,fl'., ...... state is from traditional ,"uu ... "". of public aOlTIUllSlrarlon to 
innovative, efficient and effective ways to deliver quality services in order to compete 
the global market. This resulted in a number of refonns new models of public 
management. result is that senior public servants are expected to change concurrently 
with numerous demands being placed upon 
Lem,em ..... 1-."' ..... ,,, but are also ..... "' ..... , ........ ·t,, 
are now expected to not only 
Coe 
(1999) the role ofthe most senior public servant is embark upon an analysis 
of the role of most senior public servant South Director General, one 
to the that in South African 
for public CPT-..nc·p transfonnation and 
General. 













Apartheid's Public Service 
relationship between South Africa' political and administrative s is signally 
influenced by similarities in their socio-cultural and value characteristics." 
- Robert Schrire5 
A discussion lmtlact of refonns transformation initiatives on the role 
to be lnnp""Tn(',n within apartheid and post-apartheid context. 
Thus, to embark upon an analysis of the impact ofrefurms and transformation on the role 
of the Director General, the culture of the apartheid public service to be 
understood. following chapter therefore provides a context for understanding the role 
of the Director within the apartheid public and political context. This 
chapter also provides an understanding of the institutional culture that the post-apartheid 
dispensation inherited and the need for transformation. The apartheid public service 
.">cnnre R. (1989) HUI'eaucra(;y and the process of Reform" in ~~~~~LLl>?~~~!:!.!. 











of South 1910 there a 
departments and institutions for various reasons. The growth in departments 
was not only due to demographic trends and socio-economic problems, but South 
Africa's attempt to create welfare opportunities for poor whites and deal with race 
relations. The government of 1924 focused on using the public service as a sector to 
provide employment whites. The preference for and indeed the systematic 
employment various sectors known as the labour policies. 
These policies also included a to by providing them 
with for mobility. 1921 there were 4705 unskilled white 
employees in the state's railway enterprise 1996:221) .• -.... "IT""",'>,.. by 1928 the 
number of white employees had increased to 15 878. hl1910 there were national 
departments and by 1984 there were 22 national departments with a further 26 
dealing with Indian, Coloured and (Hanekom, et 
1986:221). 
The National Party's victory in 1948 saw a more rigorous application of excluding blacks 
participating the South African economy and society. Blacks were denied 
access to education thereby excluding them more skilled positions, which ultimately 
,..",,,'h"u''t,,,t1 ..., ............ " to unskilled menial Various draconian policies ensured that blacks 
were a of poverty and denied 'H.U.HUJ.l while whites were 
their socio-economic development. The "colour labour policy, example, included 
various restrictions on public and private sectors in order to ensure the employment and 











a white problem, caught the more educated and pntpTT'I ... <!.n 
"",,,,aru'H5popu]ation and the black labour force (Ottaway, 1993:31). The National 
Party, in addition to blacks from skilled positions the public and private 
"pl'l~n .. " also began to systematically reduce the number of white English-speaking South 
Afiicans from the public service. National Party believed that English-speaking 
South Africans' loyalties were with British Crown and this was not consistent with 
the interests of Afrikaner nationalists (Seegers, 1993:477). Evidence of this policy was 
the early military and police and the mcreasea 
public (ibid). In 1946 only 29% 
were in white-collar employment, 30% were of which many were poor, and 40% 
had blue-collar jobs, but by 1977 Afiikaners in white-collar jobs had increased to 65% 
(Ottaway, 1993 :31). The per capita income among Afrikaners 1946 was than half 
South but by 1976 it had to over two-thirds 
(ibid). By 1988, one-third of the white economically population was employed in 
the public service with Afrikaners constituting the 1<lIY'!l,,,,",,t number of public employees 
(ibid). Thus, according to Ottaway (ibid), the socio-economic advancement of Afrikaners 
can attributed to in the public sector. Welsh (cited in :se(~2ers 
1993:478) expresses a similar view that the growth ofthe Afrikaner middle class was a 
result in the public service. Most Afrikaners who entered the 
commercial or industrial sectors usually had their first opportunity in the 











The most important consequence of the Afrikanerisation ofthe public service was the 
lack of representation ofthe South African population. lack ofrepresentation of all 
South Africans in public would have implications the future. 
public service was the unresponsive to the needs ofthe black population. Secondly, a 
distinct culture of deference and conservatism became entrenched in the public service. 
Thirdly, the lack of diversity resulted in a public service that did not incorporate 
innovative and creative ideas addressing problems. post-apartheid dispensation 
was therefore faced with the challenge ofincreasing diversity the public service as well 
as addressing an Afrikaner institutional culture and value system. 
\nclm(~r consequence of systematically employing Afrikaners public service is that 
public was not necessarily seen as a civic duty of serving community, but 
as an employment opportunity. Understaffing and lack of skills the public 
were outcomes of the rUJ'L,,"':U By 1950 
approximately 15% out ofl06956 
1993:220). By 1978 the number of vacant posts TP'''l..''TVf'll 
were vacant (Hugo, 
continued to 
with a 83% vacancy rate in clerical, 88% in professional and 72% in technical positions 
(ibid). The government's reSDOlrlSe to shortages was various racially and 
ineffectual -TemeOle " 
and promotion requirements, intensive training, employing white women on a contract 
basis, increasing remuneration, raising the retiireInetlt age to 65 years, and increasing 
incentives such as bursary ..,"" •• "'u~"'.., (ibid). of course had spillover 











resources ensuring a racially ",,,, .. "u,,,. public "''''' .. "',,.. The lowering of entry and 
promotion requirements affected the quality of public The post-apartheid 
dispensation mced a dilemma of having to increase diversity ofthe public service 
thereby the staffcomponent to the salary and benefit levels of public servants served 
during apartheid. This would result in an increase the wage bill overall public 
expenditure. post-apartheid dispensation introduced a number 
address this dilemma which will be discussed Chapter 
T""n"'''problem for post-apartheid dispensation was the of homelands. It was 
the of the National the mte of the black population lay 
sell1arate development and and Sell[-gc,vel11l11lg 
tenntolnes. Although an elaborate and development is 
not ...,.I •• ,.,<>,,,i- to noted that for 
dispensation HVJLIlA"'A .... , ..... "" and SeII-2:0VC~mm territ()ri(~S were an 
The belief that Africans of certain ethnic have their "own" territories 
to creation of homelands with their own administrations. This system was part of 
the grand apartheid separate development. The system was enforced upon an 
unwilling was justifiably as Thus, UH •. iV"'l;:;U 
homelands had their own and administration, they did not 
popular support. the 1970's homelands such as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei had become "independent Gazankulu, Kangwane, K waNdbele, 
Lebowa QwaQwa were " were 











apartheid state. Quality of life """T"\IU"P delivery was poor with economy and 
system of governance of these "states" dependent on resources transrerred from apartheid 
South Africa. Most inhabitants lived impoverished conditions. 
By 1993 there were approximately 1 1 600 public servants employed in South Africa 
and these ten "states" (public Service Commission, 1996:5). There were essentially 
dittcI1entadministrations (the South African national public and ten 
SCII-govc;::mmg administration) that had to be ratJIOnalll;;ea into one 
national South 
the rationalisation 
~Pt'V1{'''' This proved to be a mammoth 
... "'>,''<'''''''''''' and 
that 
(public Commission, 1996:3-4). rationalisation process presented a 
challenge for the post-apartheid dispensation as each ofthese states and had its 
own body of statutes and legal prescripts regulating its public service. South Africa alone 
had a multiplicity oflaws, all of which had to be reviewed. territory and state 
had own ?'!o"'?'''''''~'T\'' terms and conditions of service, Public Acts, 
remuneration public commissions, and structure (ibid). The systems 
were also different and the final year leading to the democratic dispensation, grading 
were manipulated to salaries (public 1996:4). 
amalgamation and rationaii:sation required extensllve 
drafting, a comprehensive restructuring of personnel systems, and the establishment of a 











The militarisation of the public ""'''''11'''''' during the 1980's also presented a challenge for 
the democratic dispensation as it had to address a culture authoritarianism. 
militarisation of the public was m to what 
perceived as a total onslaught ""£"I'4"~'''' government was a 
OPl)onem of any cOlnm.uDllsm which it asa to political and 
"'£" ... nr' ..... " .... <;:,,<;:TPrm The state also believed that ascendance of a black 
would be the end white supremacy South 
The South 
Pan Africanist 
go',enrunll':mperceived the African National (ANC), 
nn.,"", '0" (PAC) and South African Communist (SACP) as 
communists supported by "communist" countries where they were exiled and 
sought sanctuary. ANC, PAC and SACP embarked upon a guerrilla war to 
destabilise the apartheid state. South African government responded by embarking 
on a covert war to the north ofits borders to stem the tide of "communism." In 1978 P.W. 
HJ.J:H.L~""'.L of South F1ll.I'l.;a. Botha, the then Minister 
heralded a major refunnulation 
service. 
OJVIA",,,.,, and the militarisation of the public 
The of the public in the National Security Nl~ma.gelne]nt 
,,,.,TPlm (NSMS). The NSMS was a shadow public service system, with a complex and 
elaborate structure of committees. The NSMS developed out of the security concept of 
"total strategy" as a response to what was perceived as the total onslaught on South 
total was a belief that South was confronted by a muIti-











and "communi:sf states north of South Africa's borders. The threat was 
believed to be an attack on South Africa politically, economically and socially. It was 
therefore the conviction of the government that the threat could only be met with a 
counter "total oh-."-ta,,., "The 1977 a White emphasised the interaction and 
the interdependence of the military and the public to counter the total onslaught 
1998:115). The result was a fusion of political, military and public service 
resources in governance. the Defence Force up the ro Ie as a neutral 
guardian of peace and became an active participant policy. policy goal of 
countering the total onslaught and preserving apartheid was therefore to be achieved 
tnrCJU£ln military means in conjunction with the public The NSMS IDel:erore 
organised public service into a ",,,,,,,ULH "'''''"t''' ...... of committees. NSMS had a four-
fold purpose. Its 1"\,,, .... 1',,,'" was to counter the total onslaught, and in order to 
this purpose it had to suppress all opposition, co-opt black agents, and contain political 
resistance (Cape Times, 917/1987). It also co-ordinated a "hearts and minds" campaign to 
improve the social and material conditions in black areas in order to gain legitimacy 
undermine community i.')UIJVUi for opposition ><,cu"u;>aUU'.li.') (ibid). last purpose was to 
act as an early warning system for antlcllpatmg potential problems and dealing them 
on a military and material level before the problem erupted into a revolt (ibid). 
The NSMS formulated as well as uulv'''''U ... ''H.' .... policy the 
public service down to local authorities. The NSMS was answerable only to 
"'",,~nl'·.hl Council, which was at the apex hierarchical NSMS structure. The State 










'-'''''''" .. '". and the President (De 1998:11 16). The State Security '-',,, .. u .... ' .. 
Cabinet military 
at helm ofthe Council (De Klerk, 1998:11 
security personnel with the 
18). Senior public servants of 
138 
government departments worked within the Cabinet Committees ofthe NSMS and Work 
Committee of the State Security Council ] 990:110). Work Committee co-
ordinated the activities ofthe Directors of government departments and chainnen 
of other work committees of Cabinet (ibid). Thirteen Interdepartmental Committees of 
the State Security Council brought representatives of aU government 
departments at lower levels of the NSMS (ibid). At the regional level there were Joint 
Management Centres (JMC) which co-ordinated local strategies to deal with security 
problems (ibid). There were 60 sub-Joint Management Councils, which exerted influence 
on Regional Service Councils (ibid). Regional Services Councils were authorities that 
controlled regional areas encompassing smaller local authorities (ibid). At 
level there were mini-Joint Management Councils wo'rKe:Q at the 
nnolnw:!s (ibid). 
P.W. Botha's style ofgovemance resulted in the militarisation and 
lowest 
oflocal 
centralisation ofthe public service. The formulation of policy was developed at the top 
hierarchy and upon concerns. This a of 
centralised decision making within committees, "A{"rAE'" and a beIiefthat "military things 
are better" (Schrire, 1990:77 and ,"PE'OPN 1990: 11 The committee style of 
management was authoritarian in nature decisions in committees l''.>''''(ITT''-' 











Council were theretlore not were followed with blind 
obedience. The inhibition of :free debate, reverence to security decisions and 
riptpt'P1nl'\p to leadership T'II"'V"" a role obedience to authority. De Klerk (1998:68) 
described P.W. Botha as dictatorial and domineering towards Cabinet and committees. 
P. W. Botha's managerial interventions such as team building exercises resulted in a 
and secretive system ... UH ..... '" governance (De Klerk, 1998 :69-69). 
committee meetings were for the most part secret and lacked tralrlStlan:mcv even to those 
within the bUIeaUlcra The uu ........ nature public <;!PY'VU"P with its top-down 
control and anllge~mlmt limited, 
accountability and """"' ............ "","' .... """,, to "'n""' ......... ...., within the hierarchy of committees. 
The South African public is unique as it experienced systematic political, 
ideological, military and racial interference. consequence was a public service that 
lacked racial representation, was elitist, 
the result was (1) policy fomlUiation was the domain 
male Afrikaners who were sympathetic to the National Party, (2), the political-
administrative interface and scope of policy formulation were elitist, and (3) policy 
was not open to perspectives, but was narrowly defined by Cabinet 
which included the political and administrative 1989:7). the 
separation of powers between legislative and administrative roles ofgovernment, 
hence the distinction between policy formulation and administrative implementation 
",,",,,au,,,, bJlunred Thus, one can argue that in South during the 1980's a political-











scale ofpolicy structure of the public service was 
hierarchicaL chain of command flowed from the top, and under Botha's style 
governance the President, Cabinet and upper echelon ofthe public service exercised 
enormous power over the policy agenda. The hierarchical nature ofthe public service and 
military style of management resulted an authoritarian, rigid and rule-bound 
bureaucracy to senior public officials than the pUblic. In addition to 
this, information the public service was tightly controlled (ibid). The hierarchical and 
sec:retlve nature public therefore a culture 
accountability to the public were culture resulted in considerable 
inefficiencies and extensive corruption. Another factor that contributed to this culture was 
the notion that as long as there was loyalty to the National Party A~"'''JA''''''' and apartheid 
policies, inefficiencies were tolerated. The relative longevity of a public servant's career, 
the comfort of security of tenure, acceptance of meritocracy and political conformity 
a public that lacked ideas, had difficulty adapting to 
v" •. '.HE,'" or even the and was rigid to the that it would 
change. The organisational culture ofthe apartheid public can therefore be 
described as hierarchical, authoritarian, uncritical adherence to rules and procedures, and 
culture a further post-apartheid dispensation 
effort to transform public service into one that was creative, innovative, 












According to Klerk (1998:69), P.W. Botha did much to improve the effectiveness of 
government and departments, albeit draconian DUfuO!;es ..... ,,' .. .1""""' ... the intrusive role 
of the 
Ministers 
""..,,, .. v •• .., • ..,'u"", ... in a source ofirritation for most 
r",",lrnr" ue:neral (ibid). Klerk (ibid) stated that he quietly vowed to 
South system of governance should he ever become 
De Klerk's inauguration as 1989 he to 
era was ma.rkeiO by more civil g01vernaIICe and a desire to _tj-, ........ not only 
nn,,,,,,..,,,",<> ... 1" "1'1-I' .. 'h1 ...... " but also the nature South In the first months 
of his presidency De Klerk began to dismantle the powerful structures of the NSMS and 
attempted to normalise the role of security forces (ibid), On 28 November 1989, Klerk 
announced that the NSMS would dismantled and replaced with more conventional and 
civil-orientated co-ordinating structures. De Klerk thought it imperative political 
good governance that the role of the forces normalised 
authority departments be re-established (ibid). De in fact 
made personal visits to security institutions explaining their new role of impartiality 
and refraining from political involvement (De Klerk, 1998:1 De Klerk received much 
the security ":)UH..,",U not only due to 
Klerk's reform initiatives as well (ibid). De Klerk's style 
""",..,,,,a.,.. role but 
go'verna11ce was more relaxed 
with an emphasis on policy reform and political transformation rather than military 
solutions to South Africa's problems. RoelfMeyer (interview, Cape Town: 15 November 











broke with the past not only terms style, with 
apartheid policies as well. A watershed moment South Africa's history was on the 
February 1990. De Klerk announced the un banning of the PAC and the 
release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, and the government's 
commitment to negotiating with extra-parliamentary opposition for a new political 
142 
dispensation. The negotiations took place the forum as the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Although negotiation process is beyond the 
of this researcn. it is important to note developments 
current public most important of the 
now upon 
""",IV"'" in terms of the 
public service was the 00..'"'''''''''' that all public servants would be CT'""i ..... T~.n of 
tenure for years. This l:lOl'''''PTnpl-.t became known as the "sunset clause." 
importance of this sunset clause cannot understated. negotiations had reached a 
stalemate with many issues unresolved (philip Dexter, interview, Town: 10 August 
2000). October 1992, Slovo wrote an article the African Communist, which 
ugj~ested a CTI''',T'''' .. no~',..", as well as for public 
servants during the transitional period (Philip Dexter, interview, Cape Town: 10 f"l,U,,,, ... ,,. 
2000). proposal the door to continued negotiations and the resolution of 
outstanding (ibid). job years for public servants 
personnel ensured support by white public servants for National Party (De Klerk, 
1998:257). It also ensured continuity and stability of service delivery. However, it was a 











10 2000). Although the sunset paved way a new constitutional 
it nonetheless an apartheid public service. 
Problems with the public internationally were described in the previous chapter. 
These problems, such as and over-regulation, are evident the South African 
public service, but are compounded by the fuct that South African public service is 
reflective of South Africa's history of apartheid and ideological interference. South 
Africa's democratic dispensation therefore inherited not only a public service with the 
of rigidity, and poor but a public ",,,,,,'"'1'-''' 
that is acC:us1tonled to apartheid 
ideology. The nn ... ",,,'!" a public lacks legitimacy, 
pr(lte~;Sl(ma.lISln n;,pn~semaiiOln, a aernO(:ratlC and development and the capacity 
to deliver quality to all South 1 U.J. .",un". "'''''U'';Ul5,'''' for the democratic 
dispensation is to change the culture ofthe public service so that it entrenches 
democratic principles of the Constitution (1996) and instils in public servants the culture 












PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSFORMATION: 
South African Perspective 
should be borne in mind that there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful 
of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state's 
constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old 
order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under 
the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries ... and because 
men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things they have 
them PY1'1PJ"lPJ-U'P "- Niccolo Machiavelli6 
South 1994 marked a watershed moment in the 
country's long history of struggle. However, the post-apartheid dispensation is fraught 
with struggles from delivering essential services with limited resources, addressing 
poverty, promoting development and economic ....... r.urth reconciliation 
among Africa's population, to the institution responsible for 
these functions, the public service. 
Ii Machiavelli, N. (1935) -=-=~-"'== 











Most people that reforms of the South African public """rt""", started 1994. 
..... "'UTA'U"' .. the nrclcelis of public sector .. AT" ...... in South Africa in the 1980's. 
chapter the to 
the public ""''''"1'''' security objectives of the total ~'L"'_> .. J In order to V .. A" ..... "" 
upon such an of security management of the public service, that is the 
National Security Management System (NSMS), Botha had to rationalise public 
service an,d make it more efficient. 
process of rationalisation and reform of the public "' .... '>I,", .. began 1979 and 
culminated the Public Service Act of1984. Rationalisation was described as a 
deliberate of government to ensure efficiency (Heunis, 1980:47). The nrC!Cel:;S 
focused on the internal reorganisation of national government order to achieve 
",H",,,,f'n7A utilisation of government """ .. <11('1'" broader political aims. 
process was aimed at ",?<,'",f',n...,. an effective .a1<m" .. T1 of government for functioning 
the centra] decision authority, that is Cabinet and Cabinet Committees (ibid). 
rationalisation was implemented in phases according to the political and 
constitutional developments of South Africa at (ibid). In 1979 Botha reQues:rea 
that the Commission Administration identifY problem areas and needs the public 
"",?''',,",'''' (Heunis, 1980:48). A Director General who served duriJ)g era recalled 
meeting Oetwf:en Commission the then Minister Botha. 
stated Botha wanted to reC!rg~ml1;;e public in order to it more 











Thus, Botha's objective for public service into an 
one was threefold. Firstly, to ensure that the public could meet 
objectives strategy as mentioned the White Paper (1977). 
Secondly, Botha to the public service into an one by 
private sector principles and curtailing expenditure. Thirdly, to ensure that 
the public was aligned to the constitutional framework 1980's and that 
Botha would able to a Cabinet. 
The White Paper on Rationalisation of the Public Service as tabled in Parliament by 
Minister of Interior on 8 May 1980 summarised the factors that were a catalyst for the 
rationalisation: 
1. The total onslaught which necessitated the prioritisation of government services and 
measures, 
The adaptation to various population groups ("own affairs"), 
lopmems in the international VVllHU.U ...... y such as the ... n,FOro" 
sanctions, requiring an adjustment in government nT'''''!"''·''''''' 
4. The proliferation of government institutions and problems of co-ordination, 
5. recruitment and retention of (white) 
6. volume and complexity oflaws which to be aligned with envisaged 











several discussions between Botha and Commission for A(llmlnl~;tnlltIOin during 
1979, Cabinet decided on August that AOmlltllSlrratlon would 
ImlpJemen the rationalisation according to following 
L ' ..... ," ...... -1".,,,..,,"" of service to the pubJic, 
The , ... 1-,11,.",,,,1"'" oflaw and order, 
Concern for efficiency, 
4. plan should be implemented without disruption to services, and 
Government "P..,lEU'."" would limited to the minimum to ensure efficiency 'LL'~""'U"', 
1980:50). 
The main aims of the rationalisation Drolcel,s included: 
L The reGlrgiIDl:Satlon of national government 
aelpmtmen1ts according to functional reS:Donsl 
The deletion, mnendment absolution of '~l", .. n""""1A 
consolidate the rules regulations g01vernlIllg 
m to and 
service, 
3. systematic improvement public " .... "'.1' ... personnel system order to attract 
and staff, 
4. The improvement of the public service 1980:50-51). 
The rationalisation ofthe public service saw the restructuring integration of 
gove,rnment functions fewer departments. The number of government departments 











reatta(::hnlents were made Administration, ] 980:13 and van Zyl, 
1981: 160). At national the rationalisation .... ...-.... "'.", resulted in twenty-four national 
on,,,,,, ... nrn,prot departments based on principles enlCl€!llC:Y and functional_~"'_J 
(Hanekom, 1986:222). A Director General who served during period that this 
was quite a dn]umliic period for South African public service (interview, George: 1 
2000). Staff'was re-deployed departments, services .... rn,'''' ... t"c were made 
defunct For example, there had always been a rivalry between the Water 
Departments v"' ... 'ay" .... the Department of Water main function was to .,..,1"1'.""" .... '''' 
and maintain South Africa's water the Department of Forestry's function was 
to expand South Africa's wood supply thereby utilising water (ibid). It was purposefully 
decided to combine these two departments into one so that they could deal with 
problems and rivalty internally before it reached Cabinet level (ibid). Other Departments 
such as and were also combined because of functional and to 
meet oDlleCl[lVE~S ofthe campaign of the total strategy. 
Another important the J 980's was the recognition that was 
UIt:UUat:IICyand delivery mainly due to a skills in the public 
VUllll.UH.".UU of Administration, 1980:5). employment ofblacks the national 
public service would counter to the policy of"own as the 
Commission for Administration was to ell(;Ol.llra,,~e the IlS(!lUO,n of women on a 
part-time (Commission of Administration, 1980:7). Inadvertently, the Commission 
of Administration was increasing the diversity of the public service albeit merely to white 











remuneration of public servants was improved (ibid). There were also reform U~H~au 
at Director General such as the increase in remuneration and the introduction of 
five-year contracts. These initiatives will discussed in following ,",uau.",. 
The rationalisation process culminated the Public Service Act (1984), which 
entrenched many reform .HU· ....... 
included: 
The ., ...... "' ... features Public '''' .... 1.(''''' Act (1984) 
1. of departments (Directors General) holding according to a fixed term 
contract, 
Heads of departments authority over personnel and budgets, 
3. powers being assigned to the Commission of Administration in terms of 
6. 
""' .... 'J~Hc.H""'UUj.UJl", remuneration, oelrsunuc:::! procedures improvements the public 
A new of personnel, 
Closer co-operation departments, 
of public servants such as posing a secunt:v 
risk, 
Further reasons for the charge of misconduct, that is, the contravention ofthe 
",,',,"," .... 11V .. ' ... code of conduct, 
8. Procedures with 











rationalisation process "tT ......... rif'",r! to achieve: 
1. Centralisation 
A and more manageab Ie Cabinet, 
Consolidation oflegislation, 
4. More control over the public service, and 
5. An improved system of remuneration to attract and retain public servants. 
The analysis of this rationalisation process reveals a number of paradoxes. The 
paradox is there was no fundamental in the manner in which the public 
QPf'\I1C'.P functioned. The racial staff component remained the same, services were 
delivered in the same manner, and the culture of departments did not change either. In 
fact, the rationalisation process took the furm of amalgamating smaller departments into 
departments. Thus, a Minister and Director had a with 
the CO][lSI;::Q increase nm,ctllcms and responsibilities. 
anlJPrlrlTn,pnt "prVl{'.~"''' and 
rationalisation process 
made gO'venrlmem 
'-' .... ..,ilJ'''' more mana~5eaOle and This aligned with 
envisaged constitutional framework and National Security System (NSMS). The 
consolidation oflegislation as applicable to the public and more effective control 
over the public to the aims of the NSMS. 
second paradox lies in the delegation of functions to Directors General and the 
Commission for Administration. According to the Public "'" .... ",..". Act 984) Directors 











assigned to the Commission Administration provided it with more control over the 
public service. However, the delegation of powers and responsibilities to Directors 
General and the Commission for Administration for more by political 
third paradox lies the a ml1lUIIlanSt state rationalisation. 
The H1V''''Q.:,''' ill , ... ", .. ",1"',,,, ... to retain and attract (white) public servants lies contrary to 
rationalisation ofthe public service, that is reduction in staff component and 
consequently the bilL Related to third paradox is that the rationalisation process 
was a means to an end in terms of streamlining national government to align the 
total strategy accommodate the proliferation of "own affairs" departments and 
personnel. During the period and 1988 number of security personnelul,.,."'g."",u 
21% 1988:276). 
The forth paradox is the rationalisation process borrowed from Thatcher's at 
British public The rationalisation process attempted to incorporate 
,",un"""u'''J and sector principles, but South public service reform 
process had draconian outcomes. In other words, it was problematic to expose the South 
African public service to market principles (which is itselfa difficulty) while 
attempting to maintain a security culture and controL 
fifth paradox of the rationalisation process the early 1980's is that it was a reform 











public service functioning or the crossing of the Rubicon. retlomls were aligned to 
constitutional framework of the There was no extension of services to all South 
Africans and it remained a public that did not represent all South Africans. The 
changes did place were incremental with an improvement in remuneration and 
service conditions public servants, and the rationalisation or rather restructuring 
of the white public service, although there was a proliferation of "own the 
black populace. The situation was from ideal certainly not a transformation 
saw a fundamental change in the way public services were delivered South 
The more fundamental took place the negotiation a constitutional 
South Africa. Among other the ........... ,nrl ....... "":. of the 
pubJic service and role a South Africa. The "''-'j:;'''''" 
CODESA paved an lntlernn Constitution, which included principles 
provisions regarding public Principle Constitution (1993) 
stated that shall be an efficient, 
broadly representative of the South African community, functioning on a basis to 
all members of the public in an unbiased and impartial manner, and shall, in the 
powers in with its loyally execute lawful of the 
government of the day in performance ofits administrative functions." Interim 
Constitution (1993) also established a Public Service Commission for the maintenance of 











principle was retained and developed further the final constitution. set 
values that guide the public service is entrenched in Chapter 10 ofthe final,-,vu".,uu,Llvu 
(1996). included foHowing 111"11"1,('1111 
(a) A of professional must be ..... ",n-t'"',i""'rI and maimtamea. 
(b) htnC:lent eCOlrlOmlC effective use of resources must 
(c) administration must development orientated. 
(d) must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without 
(e) People's needs must be responded and the public must be encouraged to 
participate in policy-making. 
(f) Public administration must accountable. 
(g) Transparency must fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible 
accurate mt~[)mlat]On. 
(h) Good human-resource and career-deve]opment to 
human potential, must be cultivated. 
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative ofthe South African people, 
with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, 
the imbalances of the to achieve broad 
representation(Constitution of South Africa, 1996). 
Section 197 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) further states that: 
(1) Within public administration there is a public service for the Republic, which must 
function, and be terms of national and which must loyally 











tenns and conditions of employment in the public service must be by 
national legislation. Employees are entitled to a fair .... "'." ... nv' .. as ."' .. , ........ "' ... by lU;U,LV1U",1 
legislation. 
(3) No employee ofthe public service may be favoured or prejudiced only because that 
person supports a particular political party or cause. 
The above principles a number of good 
such as impartiality, professionalism, and 
development discourse as efficient and effective use 
development ofhuman potential and in 
democratic values 
as well as 
development ,", .. "~ ... "t~I1",,,rI Chapter 10 ofthe Constitution (1996) 
has to be 
public "''''1'''111''''' 
public service as to a constitutional status and "th"' .... 1"," .... recognises 
an institution of governance. Moreover, all public policy and national legislation 
applicable to the public service must be guided by these principles. Although notion 
of "career -orientated public "'AT""""" in Interim Constitution (1993) was excluded 
from the final constitution, the principles of Chapter 10 of the Constitution (1996) 
",,,U',,,Uh> ofa Weberian bureaucracy such as professionalism. 
The reference to loyally serving the ofthe day, impartiality a non-
partisan public service also entrenches the Woodrow Wilson theory of political-
administrative dichotomy and is in keeping with British tradition of public service. 
Government of National Unity further entrenched principles a policy 










the Public Service (WTPS)(l995) outlined a number of strategic changes 
public service to comply with 
developmental role. The 
10 ofthe Constitution as well as fulfil 
post-apartheid public was that 




representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, etliective accountable and l"PQ'nI'U1QnlP, 
public in line with Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) DflIOn1:Ies 
(WTPS, 1995:14). mission was to transform the public along a development 
course so it would people centred with an emphasis on equity, quality, 
timeousness a strong of ethics (WTPS, 1995:14). In to achieve vision 
mission it was realised that the public had to be, 
1. Restructured rationalised, 
lnS1tltutlOrlS and managemlenr cal)acnv had to improved, 
The to rep'resentatnre of all South Africans, 
Human resource to the transformation <11",","',",,",. 
5. delivery to 
Professionalism had to 'be public and 
7. Labour relations had to enhanced (WTPS, 1995:1 5). 
Rationalisation and Restructuring 
and the rationalisation public ''''' ..... If£''''' had three ""PT'"'''''' The 
of which was the creation unified and integrated public service. This 











administrations, including former homelands, into the new national and 
adlnlIllstmtIOD:s. However, this mteglratlon has been ___ ",. __ with problems. 
mentioned in the chapter the administration offormer homelands and 
governing territories functioned according to different legal prescripts, procedures .and 
Q"QTP1Y\Q organisational culture, and personnel systems (public Service Commission, 
1996:3-4). Thus, in 1994 the new democratic dispensation :faced a multiplicity of laws, 
statutes, regulations and that governed all the territories South 
were lJiVVi,,'Ui3 of organisational rationalisation, the of powers and functions, 
to Presidential Review ,-,,",UHi' .. 
(1998:15)" ... considering the abiding 1"_"'01'<>7"""1' built into these 1"1'''''''''''<''''' administrations, 
. the mere achievement of bringing them together is no mean " The problem of poor 
governance, personnel conflicts, corruption, incompatibility of systems and a low 
capacity to deliver are ofthe of these 
administrations. 
The second objective was the restructuring ofthe senior management echelon. In 1994 
(table 5) then 1997 (table 6) the diversity profile management (Director-











An analysis ofthese tables indicates progress the restructuring of the senior 
management echelon the public service, despite the "sunset clause" of the negotiated 
settlement that secured public servants' positions for years. However, most Directors 
General ofthe previous dispensation have retired. Most have left public service due to 
TnlO"'_",C'!ll" contracts expiring, retiring voluntarily before the end of their contract, or 
.... "".5.uul5. According to the Presidential Review Commission (1998; 16) the 
appointment of new personnel has political in nature with many 
appointees lacking necessary skills and experience. appointments are often 
COlnfalcts which are in terms ofloyalty of service, and stability and 
continuity of South Allica's management echelon (ibid). The Presidential Review 
Commission (ibid) stated that political appointments, while a buf'f:er against unsupportive 
public cannot be a ofthe public service since skiH 
than loyalty to a should the norm. 
authorities, that is Ministers and Members of the Executive Provincial 
Councils (MEC's), employed consultants which rather than reduced the 











problem of political and administrative interfuce. In South Africa there appears to be a 
role conflict between senior public servants and elected political Elected 
officials act as managers, micro-managing departments of their respective portfolio's. 
IS to a suspicion of public servants from the apartheid and homeland 
administrations, a lack offaith the competence of public servants in implementing 
policy as it was andlor the lack of experience on the part ofthe elected officials 
in tenns duties. Senior public servants act as politicians involving tnems,el ill 
political and policy fonnulating process by providing subjective advice. This is firstly 
to the offaith in the competence of the elected official by senior public servants 
who apartheid. It cannot ignored that race plays a dominant in the 
relationship between public servants and The second 
problem is that appointed an 
or history. It cannot ignored ideological 
as political The role of this important ... ..,Le."'H.! ... of the public 
service and in political-administrative is the of this and will 
analysed and discussed in the foHowing chapters. 
The final in and the public is the of a 
leaner more cost-effective service. The goal was to the bill as a 
proportion of the public expenditure over four years and thereby reduce the 
of the public service (WTPS, 1995:45). strategy envisaged to achieve this was 
public allocation of human other resources 











to improve productivity, efficiency and eliminate waste through the introduction of 
improved procedures (ibid). The adjustment of remuneration structures, early retirement, 
retrenchment and redeployment was believed to also produce further savings and achieve 
objective of a cost-effective public service (ibid). However, the of a 
leaner public service was also not without its problems. Staff morale, motivation, 
retention and productivity declined as anxiety and uncertainty increased due to 
announcements redeployments and (presidential Review 
Commission Report, 1998:89). Service was also affected through 
the subsequent of skills and inability to redeploy staff to areas with greater need 
(ibid). The strategy to increase representivity ofthe public service through affirmative 
was as ceilings were placed on new the inability to l"Pln-"nIP 
a of the (ibid), strong trade The 
nature C'1"E',"'T"'''' a number which made Stralte21c 
planning an arduous task (presidential Review Commission Report, 1998:90). In ap11tP~ 
the objective ofa cost-effective public service much public 
servants to a number of vested interests not only in terms of job security but also the 
elimination of corruption (ibid). 
Institution Building and Management 
To the goal of institution building and J1llItIlageInelrlt requires a transformation in 
organisational It was believed that '-'LU'.HaLLIa 










public (WTPS, 1995 :48). It was 
in dmectml! instead offollowing 
that order to 
procedures, managerial 
responsibility had to decentralised and devolved while ensuring accountability for 
160 
their performance specified objectives (ibid). It was therefore proposed that the 
employment of Directors be to the achievement of specific 
performance objectives while at the same giving Directors the flexibility to 
manage human and financial resources to achieve the departmental objectives 
1 
In order to enhance the devolution and decentralisation of managerial responsibility a 
more open, flexible and participative managerial structure at all levels of the public 
service was seen as a necessity (ibid). structures would concentrate on creative 
use of consultation and participation in teams than I'\", .. ""nr'", to rules from 
hierarchy (ibid). A new Quality 
Management (TQM), has been adopted internationally will the 
South African public TQM is a technique designed to improve 




focusing on continually· ..... ''' ....... '''' .... <:!",,,'V1l''''' delivery through {"rP~Tn'''' 
public, as recipients of public "' .... ,""".C' are. "'1" ...... ... ..,u as "customers" with 
the customer's as in private sector. 
TQM therefore requires organisations to define internal and external customer 











dissatisfaction and ensure continuous improvement order to continually and 
meet customers' needs, organisations need to empower employees with the necessary 
enabling "LH""""""'''. clear goals and objectives as well as quantifiable data and 
information in order to problem solve. A team culture is therefore required for 
participative problem solving with .... "' .... ""'T for diversity of opinions multiculturalism. 
TQM is based on .... "U"<lnl (1982) managerial Vc.uau.'E;'" that was implemented 
in the private sector. According to (1992:358) TQM is ill suited for government 
v", .. ,u. .... ,,,, it was designed the pr()CeiSS(~S of manufacturing the 
delivery of public the quantification of service output and 
of the ""' ... ,,"''''' provider difficult to measure (ibid). quantitative 
measurement of public services are complex and sometimes impractical (ibid), issue 
a according to a benchmark also becomes problematic because 
government norms are unclear and legislative mandates are just as unclear. private 
sector can usually define its customers with relative ease because it chooses its own 
market niche and targets its customers (ibid). For many public organisations the 
customer is difficult and politically controversial (ibid). Government often has customers 
with different demands, has an obligation to serve all customers within a democratic 
political culture. Thus, customers could the public as well as immediate 
customers such as students in an education system, the elderly in a welfare system or 
a correctional is a between a public 
organisation's immediate customers and the ultimate customers, for the 











Public organisations serve a wide variety of customers with diverse and contradictory 
needs with a result that public servants often compromise between unlimited and 
limited resources. Quality services are 




tax (Swiss, 1992:359). 
private sector. 
Accountability and responsiveness to customers or the public is therefore not detennined 
by profit, but ideally by political processes and structures as well as a sense of civic duty. 
Political processes such as budgetary constraints and compromise politics inhibits the 
implementation ofTQM. officials ambiguous and policy 
goals. The quantification of outputs establishment oftargets also exposes the elected 
VLL,,,,,,,,, to political opposition. Despite these ofTQM applicability to public 
sector, some public organisations in the United States have had successes. Many local, 
state and federal agencies from the of Phoenix, to the state of Ohio, to the U.S . 
....,"'"L"' ... ~"" implemented TQM. 
change to a more participative style of management such as TQM 
would require training development of human resources, the appreciation of 
diversity, malIla:gernellt ofinfonnation and a continuous learning environment. 
However, as explained in chapter, South public servants are 
more inclined and accustomed to an authoritarian, hierarchical and rule-bound 
organisational culture. Creativity innovative problem solving in teams is a new 











OnlmH)llS in au ............ team-working context generated resistance and in some 
cases personnel conflict. 
Representative Public Service 
An aspect of the transformation process that has met much resistance is the 
implementation of affirmative action to increase the representivity of the public ",,,"",\1""'''' 
The has introduced a White Paper on Affirmative Action the Public 
...... ">i.e'''' (1998) as well as the Employment Equity Act (1998) to provide weight to 
ensure that the public service is non-racist, non-sexist and non-discriminatory. While 
much progress made in some government ep~rrtnlents with regards to 
IUVIVa,"UIJ:,representivity of blacks (African, Asian and Coloured), women and peI'S0I1S 
with been at ofthe public The 
unJ'V""'" is that access or 
opportunity to further their education. there is a lack skilled blacks 
and women for positions the management echelons of the public service. Government 
departments are constrained by financial considerations and an already bloated 
public service. Other VI""I,",U";",':> of affirmative alienation of the previously 
disadvantaged, tokenism and workplace conflict. The challenge is to change the 











Human Resource Development 
Another challenge that the democratic dispensation faces is the lack of skilled public 
servants. The training and education of public servants is viewed as a necessity to 
public servants with the skills, and to deliver 
164 
services and (WTPS, 1995:64). Training development of 
human resources would also the of the public service through 
equipping those public servants who been denied n .... , .... n~1"l in tenns of 
education. As mentioned earlier, public servants in new public management 
paradigms would re-orientate public servants from values acquired during previous 
administrations. development of human resources as envisaged by the WfPS would 
instil public servants a sense of professionalism and responsiveness to the publics' 
Training and human resource is mc:relore seen as a ... "''''r~.u ... 
to this regard WTPS (1995:64) that """,HU"6 would 
1. Strategic and based on needs, 
Linked to institutional transfonnation and building, 
3. Viewed as an interactive Drolce~)s with trainers and practitioners from various sectors 
of society, 
4. Related to recruitment, promotion, career development and remuneration, 
Required to about a ~"" ... ".,~u .. "'-'u ofthe role oftrain~rs, and 
6. to the policy-making nrClce!;s so as to enhance <::TI"!UP,Cf1f' importance 











The importance of human resource development was emphasised in the White on 
Public Training and Education (WPSTE) (1997). The objective of the 
was to provide a policy IT':Il''''''''A'nl~''' for implementation 
improving training In public service. The pUIpose ofthe 
"' .... ,v~'" delpartmenltsto ..... "'.,,"".L and implement """,uU"/'; ""'~""_"V according to their 
at 
is to 
strategic goals and needs. However, the problem in South is that the institution 
responsible for training and education the public the South African 
Management and Development Institute (SAMDI) is not without its problems. SAMDI's 
low capacity to deliver quality human resource training is a legacy of apartheid. 
SAMDl's Public (pS I) had a monopoly over 
training in the public service and conducted In a nrl'\"~l'ntl"p supply...driven 
manner and according to apartheid ideology (presidential Review Commission Report, 
1998: 149). National and provincial administrations have little input as to their training 
needs. This manner of conducting training is still evident in the present public 
is no duplication trallnIt1lg in some deIJartmc:mts. poor 
quality that does not address the needs ofthe delpartmients, and/or ad hoc or 
training instead ofintervention based on strategic goals and (presidential Review 
1998: 150). The Presidential Commission recommended that 
SAMDl's monopoly over ..... JLlU .... resource development the public "'''' .. '''',<',,,. to be 
challenged by ,", .. ,,",V<UQ;!;UJl/,; competition the provision of education and training as 
envisaged by the (ibid). Commission further recommended that be 
restructured. It did not believe that LJF1UVULn. as presently constituted, the to 











to the transformation ofthe public service (ibid). The Presidential Commission 
therefore suggested that future be that of co-ordinator of human resource 
development in public (ibid). The recent appointment of Mr. Job Mokgoro as 
Director General for SAMDI produced some developments such as the Presidential 
Strategic Development Programme which was launched in 2000. This is 
essentially a programme Directors General, an evaluation 
"HnIH"" of the and SAMDI's improving < .... J .... O, ..... caJ)acltV is 
premature. 
Employment LODditiOlllS 
The WTPS proposed a numbetofmeasures to ensure more equitable employment 
conditions in public service. ofwhich was the introduction ofan adequate 
muumumwage (WTPS, 1995:68). The second initiative was the of equal 
pay benefits for work especially with to I". .... il' .... "'i 
(ibid). It was also recommended that there a reduction of differentials pay 
benefits by the pay increases to productivity (ibid). Human resource development 
as~1r"n and education, career-pathing, PfC)mIOUC)n. grading and selection was seen 
as not essential to transtomtlatlon process, an employment 
conditions and employee mClraliC. The WTPS (1995 :69) also proposed a reduction the 
number ofgrades in the public service based on performance appraisals and competency 










conditions under which women 
discriminatory practices (ibid). 
people with disabilities worked by reducing 
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government recognised that order to improve the employment conditions ofthe 
public service it had to take into account the diverse interests of public servants and 
bargain with the trade unions that represents those interests. The Labour Relations Act 
(1995) established a Public Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC), Sectoral 
Bargaining Councils for education and police "' ..... ,,,,,,,.'" as well as Workplace Forums. 
Trade been generally supportive and co-operative in the nn"". ....... 
efforts to transform the public However, there a points of 
disagreement between trade .... L>'vu'"' and government as an employer. For ex~mn:>1e • 
• '"''' ...... ,_~'' .. posts the public servants who affected have been 
placed on a list Should a post within public vacant, 
government is obliged to qualified limits 
on'ilPrll''I1"1'lpnf in terms of selecting nel:SOllS with more appropriate 
diverse backgrounds and incorporating new blood and into the 
government is also limited in terms of wage increases due to fiscal constraints. 
Professionalism and Accountability 
go'"enrnn1enthoped that institution building would enhance internal democracy within 
the public service, and accountability and to the However, 











Service '-'V"U"""""""". Other statutory .... "'1"1> .. '" that are ae~ngrla 
and accountability are Parliamentary Portfolio Committees, national and provincial 
politicians, Ministry for Public Service and Administration and Cabinet. In order to 
ensure that national and provincial administrations establish A1+",,,"',, internal and 
external mechanisms to promote accountability, transparency, professionalism and 
aelmOCnJltlC participation, appropriate performance measures and were developed 
Director-Generals which would held accountable (WTPS, 1995:62). 
, ........ "' ........ ""-"" a code of conduct was developed to further and ent:rerlCh 
professionalism in the public "p""","".,. I-tr\u,rp'''~r despite some of the measures that have 
been introduced, the government become increasingly concerned about the of 
corruption and maladministration the public service. numberofconrerences on 
have been held although has SP3lfke:d debate and initiatives have 
(Ur< .. , ... ".t1 it is the uv"'",u~",,, 
organisational culture of the public service 
Transformation of Service Delivery 
and a sense of civic duty within 
nA'''PT''IlP'I;. the most attention. 
The delivery IS primary function ofthe public service. All of the preceding 
transformation strategies have goal ofimproving delivery of services to all South 
1UllC3.ns. The crnlJPf'1r'U"n,,,.nt ._¥~,., ..... ",,, that the "uv"",.o be on meeting needs 











government that order to efficient 
delivery there needs to be community ~1"T1npT'<:!nl!n<;: with participation and consultation, 
intergovernmental collaboration and co-ordination within budgetary constraints (WTPS, 
1995 :58). order to improve service delivery, it was envisaged that national and 
provincial departments would undertake following: 
1. Develop a mission statement with service guarantees, 
IdentifY groups 
Determine the type, standard and level of services needed with the appropriate 
performance indicators benchmarks, 
4. Establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and structures in order to measure 
orC)!roess and take corrective action, 
Develop plans for staffing, human resource development and organisational capacity 
to match delivery needs, 
Redirect human, other resources to enhance service n"l''','11<:!1£\" 
private nOJn-Q'overni11ltmt,al organisations and the 
community, 
8. Develop a culture of customer satisfaction as well as a sensitivity to issues ofrace, 
gender disability, and 
total rlB<> I1T'U manag;ement (ibid). 
To give further to transforming service delivery the government drafted a White 
Paper as the Batho Pele White Paper. The word Batho Pele means people first, 











White Paper on Transforming Public Delivery (WTPSD) on consultation 
with communities as to the level and quality they are "' .... 1Ttl~'rI to (WTPSD, 
quality 
where 
5). to illliOITIl1ln communities as to the level and 
<:!PTl.,lrf'<:! they could (ibid). The third Batho Pete principle is equality 
are entitled to equitable access to the (ibid). In the delivery 
"""'"""' •• " public servants are expected to be courteous and provide accurate information 
about services (ibid). Another principle is access to information. This requires 
departments to be open and transparent (ibid). Should a promised standard of service not 
be delivered, communities are also entitled to an apology, explanation and an efficient 
is related to notion of customer satlst'lctllon 
lU£"',,",l1,, are entitled to value ...... , ... " .... "'u (ibid). 
The Batho Pete White Paper also outlined steps for improving delivery and 
implementing the principles. The step is to identi:fY customers, establish their needs 
and then determine current level and quality provision 
to (WTPSD, 1997:26 -27). Once the current level 
standards are determined, departments should strive to improve upon service 
delivery as identified by the customers' needs and (ibid). Departments' 
"' .... '[....,11" ... capacity. financial resources should then 
meet needs (ibid). Once these preceding steps have been accomplished, 
departments should announce service standards as benchmarks, making customers 











monitoring the delivery of services against the standards and should these standards not 
be customers are entitled to redress and accountability (ibid). 
The reality is that public service has short ofthe principles entrenched the 
Constitution, White Papers and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). 
LJLJLJ. ... ,...,'u and effective delivery has been hampered by a number of problems. 
Firstly, departments have human resource, financial, technical and Drc,ce~ss constraints. 
Many departments are still undergoing a transfonnation process complicated by other 
initiatives. Some departments are uncoordinated and/or neglectful of the transformation 
process. The South African public service's organisational culture is resistant to change and 
many public servants do not Ulliae]~Ulllla new vision as well as how to ODtemtlOlnallse the 
mission implement for transformation. This lack Un(lerSmnOllng is 
firstly due to a lack of skills and knowledge on to improve delivery. The 
sec:ona reason is that the exact White P$l1"IPl"C! and other documents H ... " ........... '" the 
transformation of public "''''''''l11("'''' are complicated in nature and lack clear 
implementation plans and procedures. 
point of confusion is who or which role-player drives the .....,.''' .. r'...-n'> 
There appears to be a notion that executing authorities and/or senior management should 
drive the transfonnation process while other White Papers call for the community or 
customers in conjunction with the lower echelons of the public service to determine 
South Africa, COlmTIlUflltues have '.UHUHI and have 











hostile to The echelons pubHc themselves have problems 
concerns or creative ideas to more senior management due to the 
hierarchical and authoritarian organisational culture. Senior management invariably does 
not have an adequate understanding ofproblems at grassroots level in communities. 
Executing authorities through a democratic political process may have some understanding 
ofthe of the community, but how to these needs with the co-operation of the 
public service becomes a problem itself. Another problem is inconsistency between 
C01nmmnltle:s' needs and the policy mandate that public servants ........ ' .. ", .. 
authorities. addition to DfCIDIt,m. is the issue 
influence public servants as well as PV'~l"1111Tn authorities and DonnClans. is that 
there is a lower ecraelcm 
senior management and executing authorities. system that reduces this needs to 
established so that elected officials have a clear understanding ofthe needs of the 
community and capacity of the public In United States and Britain both 
countries had strong and C01Dmlltte:C1 elected political figures that advocated the 
transformation ofthe public service in order to meet the needs ofthe community. Vice-
President Gore (United States) and Thatcher (Britain) developed 
goals and and ensured that these reform initiatives were implemented. HA'UlP,,,pr 
in South Africa this role has not been filled from the political scene and even within the 
public a person is lacking. 
major problem with South African transformation is that the exact 











undergoing change and transformation themselves, such as the Department of Public 
and Administration South Management and Development 
Institute (SArvIDI) the Public Service Commission. There to be a of 
coherence and co-ordination 1'\,:>1-...,,,·,:>1"1 .., ... ~.,'V ...... , and " ..... lV ....... and nrr\V1'n"'1 
epartmlents. Within aITltne:nts there are some public servants who 
process. However, 
there are those that are resistant and view transfurmation as a m€~tonc,al .... ,"""'."'."', ... being 
as a reality a necessity, are committed to 
implemented by over-zealous politicians who do not understand the organisational reality 
of the public service. 





O1S~Cu:ssllon. it is u",.., .... ' .... 
... ",,,,lvn of empowering cOlnrnunl 
is to be In 
and servants while 
there is also an effort to limit the ofpublic servants while elected 
officials through the use of performance contracts Chapter The second 
contradiction is that there are a set of principles that is be applied to all levels of 
on~J':>1"1run'F'nt and all then is an that transformation is 
contingent on each department's context to which they should develop their own 
procedures change. :fuet, the Presidential Review Commission's Report, Annexure 
3 (1998 :3) states that lack of clear and unambiguous guidelines for transformation is a 
necessity cites in public service caused by 
voluntary severance packages as attributable to the lack 
ad hoc nature ofoffering 
COltlerent guidelines. 4n,"\1"I"1''''1" 











as to whether transformation orc,ce~;s should or .:> .. ,J ..... u. not driven by nnan(;laJ 
COIlSlClenltlons. For public servants COtlstraJnts are a reality. When public 
servants believe that the delivery of a O;'PT'''" .. · ... can be improved by the introduction of a 
new system or process such as information technology, are curtailed due to a 
lack offinancial resources. The oftmnsformation being a continuous process of 
improvement, and the requirement of clear programs, business plans and targets also 
appear to be confusing public servants. Another frustmtion public servants and a 
cause contmdiction is that the 
tmrlsie,rmaticln O,OCllme:ms state that "''''''>'><>'r\T conditions will be improved, but there is 
no understanding of the to this white 
public servants threatened that affirmative action will their retrenchment 
order to maintain an optimal public bill. Related to the contmdiction 
reduction personnel is that government will to empower public servants so that 
can quality should poor pertofimaltlCe be an the public 
servant will 7'<>"'''''''''' trammg mther than be retrenlchled. A fundatnental ,..n.rlf'r<>,rh is the 
use of private sector techniques in the public sector tmlnsii[)rnlatilon orc,celis 
with no clear understanding or evaluation of how this will impact the South African 
public and the public. Another concern is that South has borrowed 
tmnsformation stmtegies from and other Commonwealth .. uu, .. ",,,, without 
assessing its applicability to South African context. 
has provided an 










refinement and a concerted effort to educate public servants about 
DfC)Ce:ss A commissioner on the Presidential Review Commission described South 
transformation ofthe public " .. r'Il'·'''' in T .S. Elliot's words; "Between 
and .. falls the shadow" (presidential Review 
1998:29). The ..... i.".'U'UU ..... ....,'H process has an enormous impact on the ofthe 
initiatives as as 
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Director General in 
ofthose initiatives. Director as administrative head of a department is 
now over extemlea meletlI1l2. transformation objectives which are often incoherent and 
lacking resources. Director General's role in the political-administrative 
has also been affected by transformation in that they are subject to initiatives such as 
performance agreements. The impact oftransfurmation on the role ofthe Director 












TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICE: 
Changing Role of the Director General 
"/ have gained this by philosophy: that / do without being commanded what others do 
only from fear of the law. n - Aristotle7 
previous provided a uSSlon of public South 
Africa. This focuses on the South African public "''''r''t''1'''''' 
specifically changes that have place at Director General leveL The role ofthe 
Director General is of fundamental importance to public administration and public policy 
because it is at this level that politics, public policy and administration interact. 
SC[)anltlo,n of politics been U!;:)'\,;U;:);:)I;;U a theoretical and 
comparative in Chapter One. The tralnsioI1Joation ini1tiativi;:S at 
General level, the political.and administrative intermce, and the changing role of the most 
position in South African public "'''?'Ull''''' will be discussed in this chapter. 
1 Aristotle as cited in Laertius (1895) !dYru!rul~!ni.Q:!llJll:]:jl!lli~JjJ!!Q§~~ 











The 1980's: Inheriting the Past 
Since commencement of the presidency in South 
mamlllgernellt echelon in the Africam public has numerous chamges. 
Senior managers the public service were constructs oftheir time, believed in the 
political ideology of that period amd served purpose offormulating amd implementing 
the policies of the government ofthe day. mentioned Chapter Three the South 
Africam public "''''''Hl£',," and specifically the senior echelons, shared same political 
aractenstlcs as political ..,,"''''v ..... 
ascendamce ofP.W. Botha to power had enormous implications for the public 
service. consolidation of power the form of am executive President, the adoption.of 
the Constitution 1983 as an attempt to refonn the political arena, and the growing 
security concerns 
objectives. Botha was 
in ammgmg the state apparatus to suit security policy 
1\1hn1<'f""'~to attempt to the public "A~"'""·P. 
albeit for draconiam purposes. nnmeOlllltel upon his ascendamce to power in 1979 he 
begam to rationalise and restructure the public service. In a parliamentary address Botha 
intention to duplication, co.-ordination, 
amd employ personnel amd high calibre senior (Hansard, 19 April 
1979). Botha stated that, " ... South a very good public service. I think that it 
has pride ofthe country years. H'''nlA'llP'' we should """"'4 ... ' ........ machinery 
to to """"'.-Ta" .... u.1n<>,.,.n< .... it cannot be streamlined to 











refonning the public " .... '\Ill" .. can best be described in own words; " ... behind our 
attempt to build up a well organised and well staffed public service, a public service that 
will be able to help government in its struggle. In fact, the public service plays a 
crucial role in every total national strategy" (Hansard, 6 February first attempt 
at public service refonn in South Africa was somewhat paradoxical nature for a 
number of reasons as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
However, the first initiative at refonning management in the public created 
a new """"""""post, that is Director "-""" ..... ~"u and the re-designation of other senior public 
servant The position of Secretary was re-designated as Director General, 
and Chief Director and Director positions remained the same designation (Hansard, 
1980:730). The new post of Director General was a re-definition of the responsibilities 
and change management. The new post effectively Directors General more 
although their 
still included uu".u"ioH':15 a public V"E,<Mu.::>"" •.• VH efficiently and 
a Ofg;arulsatlOn and 
_I"T ...... "" General, twenty-four remained their grade, that 
is :sec;retarv which became ..... '"''' .. p;,LLU .......... as Deputy and no public official 
retired, resigned or was dismissed (Hansard, 1980:730). The new designation of Director 
General was a direct result of the rationalisation process as described in the preceding 
rationalisation amalgamated various 











problem was that bureaucracie~ and organisational resources, with the 
accompanying large budget, required a very senior position, with complementary title 
and salary. In other words if the amalgamation of three departments resulted three 
Secretaries at a senior position then a senior to Secretaries required a different 
designation. According to a Director General (interview, Cape 30 October 2000) 
selection Director General from a Secretarial position was based on seniority and 
merit most Secretaries accepting the rationalisation and prospect of a promotion to 
Director were a disgruntled Secretaries as they in effect had 
to accept a demotion to Deputy Director General, but were compensated with a salary 
111"""''''':0''' (ibid). It was also felt that aside from the seniority issue, the title an 
colonial era and was more description 
within ...:"",...,.t", ... , (ibid). The title of "Director General" was decided 
and was nrnTnl,UP, from other public such as and in had 
to popularity in other sectors South African public service such as 
South African (ibid). to an mc:reru;e responsibility over a 
larger bureaucracy and resources, Directors ;",,,.,,,..,,,1 were given a compensatory 
. In 1981 the incumbent ofthe new designation of Director General earned R39000 while 
(previously position R33 
annum (Hansard, 1981 :534). Prior to 1981 ...:"'" . ...,.1""' ... ,.'" earned R30472 annum (ibid). 
Thus Directors and Deputy Directors General all """"''''n,'''''' salary increases. The 
rationalisation process in fact did not result in savings for the state. The total state 











S • M Table 7: eDior S Ia anagement a try 
Grade Number of Personnel Expenditure 
Secretary 34 R1036080 
. Chief Director .7 R204330 
• Dit\;; ... lUl i 16 R420000 
Total 57 R1660410 
New Grade Number of Personnel Expenditure 
Director General . 18 R702000 
Deputy Director General 39 R1291680 
Chief Director 19 R554610 
Director 18 R191150 
Total ~4. R2739440 
(Source: Hansard, 1981 :534) 
Table 7 illustrates that what had occurred was promotion of Secretaries based on 
meritorious seniority to the new position of Director GeneraL The ... ,',,' .... 1·"' ... ," ... that were 
not selected to the new position became Deputy Director '-''''.n.a ..... ''. Moreover, void 
created by the new position was fined by promoting personnel from lower ranks. The 
new designation therefore created a domino of promotions with subsequent salary 
increases. The new designation therefore did not create savings for the state, but in fact 
the personnel budget. It also did not create a transformed public service as the 
same personnel within the public service were appointed from within the ranks rather 
than outside service. appearance 
or procedures, but just structure. 
"'VL·..,VI..LVH of Directors '-'Vll ...... " ... was from within and always 
based on seniority and Seldom were appointments made from outside the public 
service, and was only contemplated if no suitable candidate from within the public 
"''''T'Ull''''' could be identified. The Commission of Administration was involved in the 











made the recommendations as to the posts. The vacant post was seldom 
advertised. The Commission of Administration would identifY suitable candidates for a 
Director General position, discuss the of candidates with the relevant Minister 
and reach a consensus after an initial selection interview. According to a Director 
(interview, Cape Town: 30 October 2000) on occasion there would be a difference of 
opinion on the suitable candidate, but an agreement would always be reached. The 
"' ..... 'v .... ,."'u.u c:an(lIOate would and in a area, 
as the ne4::essal:V u ...... "'5'~. The 
ipn,f>rRI would then ratified by Cabinet. 
rationalisation process culminated in the Public 
LJU'-''''.'UI General as pre:sc]lb~~d by 
Act of1984, No. 111. The 
Service Act 1984 
section was the efficient and administration of a ep~lrtnlent, including 
the effective utilisation of staff, the maintenance of discipline and the proper use and care 
of state property, and the performance of functions as prescribed. The Act also introduced 
and placed General on year contracts (public Service Act, 1984: section 
11) The renewal contract was subject to review it was the Minister 
Who could decide whether a Director General would be redeployed (ibid). A 
General would only be released from his or her contract once or she had completed 
five of service, or if suspected of inefficiency or misconduct (public Act, 
1984: ·;:""'l"lt1( ...... 11, 18 41). The ml:scOinouct or inefficiency was subject to 
a Presidential inquiry (ibid). introduction '""',-,,";,,,,"" contracts in effect not 











Director General was 
'l,...,''''b ..... 'UVU\-,UU was the ",,,,''v,,,,,, 66. The 
accounting of the 
and Audit of1975, No. 
resnOlnSlble for the 
financial resources and property (t}{Cn,eOl and Audit Act, 
1975: section 15). The Director General as accounting officer was responsible for 
preparing and submitting to the Auditor-General and Treasury an account each budget 
vote in terms of receipts, expenditure, surpluses, and an explanation 
and expenditure ,LJ,"V"V'"' and Audit 1975: section 14). 
powers 1"'",,"""Ul<. in the control over financial administration in 
had 
public 
service, expenditure, the determination offees and 1"1'1<'1"0""" writing off a loss, the 
cancellation of contracts, holding the accounting accountable for state monies, 
authorising or condoning non-compliance of an accounting officer, determining which 
budget vote had to charged, approving remissions, refunds, payments, gifts and the 
disposal of state assets and Audit Act, 31). According to 
of the and Audit Act (1975) the could as it 
determined, any power as mentioned to the accounting officer. This in theory 
could the Director General a certain amount of power the management of 
financial resources. The "-'''''"v.' .... however, was limited certain aspects and had 
to account for his management of financial resources to the Treasury, Auditor-General 
and Parliament. For example, the Director General as accounting officer was responsible 
for unauthorised had to submit a report to Auditor-General 
explaining the nature of expenditure (Exchequer and Audit 1975: section 33). 
According to section 33 of the Exchequer and Audit Act (1975) the accounting officer 










np'~nn responsible the it could be .... " ..... ,""' ...... " 
The aCC:OUlrmrlg officer was also the 




The legislation regulating Directors "", .. >1""""", was consistent with most international 
practices. The South African senior public service during the 1980's can described as 
professional and careerist based on seniority merit. Legally and theoretically 
Directors General were regulated by the above-mentioned statutes, and personnel matters 
were controlled by the legal nreSCl1lnts ae]tme~a 
Director veneral role as responsible manaJgernetlt of financial 
resources within a department. This framework also defined the Director 
General as administrative head of government. the Director General was 
responsIble for administration, and policy advice and implementation while the 
Minister's was politicaL However, this dichotomy did not really exist. Director 
....... 11""«1<> political neutrality has to be questioned the light of the political influence the 
rVhn,C>1-.... had in the selection process. The selection nrc,ce~~s 1'"""",1-.. rI an elitist political-
administrative relationship with Directors General sharing the same socio-cultural and 
political as the political elite. This was in the formulation of policy during 
apartheid where Directors General and Ministers had the same ideological values. 
During the transition period to South Africa's democratic dispensation, the role ofthe 
Director General the political-administrative interface became 
Un-ectors "-'''''J''''''''<U were actively involved in the ..... /<;v ...... 'v 
distinct. Many 











Ministers with policy ona political ",),;"u,",,, and ideology. Other 
who were not actively involved in that they did 
not any from Ministers who were IJAVVV,"'''' 
Directors General had to policy decisions on their own. However, was a 
temporary measure and more a function ofthe turbulent transition period than the usual 
role of Directors General. 
The 1990's: Something Borrowed and Something New 
the post-l 994, the democratic dispensation was faced with a number 
As mentioned in the pn;:cel[Jmg ClnaI)teJrs the democratic dispensation was 
faced with the challenge of transforming the public service in terms of diversity, 
rationalisation, institutional culture, human resource development and capacity to deliver 
ANC's political leadership was mistrusting of public servants who served 
The political leadership to systematically appoint 
qualified persons with shared ideological values to senior within public 
service and to advisory positions. In the case where a Director General from the previous 
dispensation was still completing his contract the appointment of what was 
perceived to be loyalists" resentment. Many General viewed 
" .... ...,lU' .. as usurping their role. These persons were fact Directors General in the 
waiting and once a Director General resigned or retired, many of them became Directors 
General from the apartheid era were perceived as ''National Party 











the ANC to appoint persons to Director '-'''','.,.,''''''. positions who they believed would 
policies. 
this there were a number of policy and legislative interventions beginning 
with the Public Act (1994) and subsequent amendments (1997, 1998 and 1999), 
Public Finance Management Act (1999), the White Paper on the Transformation of 
the Public Service (1995), as weD as the Public Service Regulations (1999). Although in 
the previous an analysis ofthe White Paper on the 
"PT'>,f1I'F' (1995) was provided, specifically related to 
of the Public 
1"P{'1rn~ '-'_,,.,,,.,~ will be 
discussed. a critical analysis ofthe Public Service Act (1994) and amendments 
(1997, 1998 and 1999), Public Finance Management (1999) and Public Service 
Regulations (1999) will also be provided as it describes the contemporary tole of 
The Public Act of 1994, No. 103 to one national public service and 
nine administmtions. This Act provided for the amalgamation of a national 
public the Public Commission, the composition and Orf,l;anllsatlOn 
public service and career incidents of public servants in the new South Public 
Amendment 
it adjusted the 
of 1997, No.4 7 introduced a number of sweeping changes. 
functions of the Public ',,"1"'111',," Commission as 
consistent with the Constitution (1996), but shifted policy matters relating to the public 
service to the Minister Public and Administration thereby increasing his or 











administration and staff matters to departments rather than a central institution. Thirdly, it 
introduced performance management into public service with section 12 specifically 
focusing on senior management and Directors General. Fourthly, it chang~d the role of 
the provincial Director General heads of departments. The Act also introduced 
affirmative action and a code of conduct for the public service. 
According to section 4 Public Service Amendment Act of1998, No. 86, a Director 
General is responsible for efficient management and administration of his or 
department, including the e:fIective utilisation and training of staff, the of 
discipline, the ... ~".1"nr.t, 
... r .. > ... priv and 
of sound labour relations and 
nmlcmons as "'1"<"Ct'M 
proper use 
This reS1Don,Sl 
the responsibilities Director Uener,al as "'~P(!t'M by 
of1984. There is however, an addition to the 
responsibility in promoting labour as with the 
Employment Act (1997) and Labour Relations Act (1995), and the values 
labour alliance. Public Service Act 1994, No.1 03 and the Public 
care 




Amendment Act 1998, No. 86 maintained the five year contractual obligation of 
I1TPl"'Tnr<l GeneraL on performance, could by 
Minister or authority (public Service Amendment Act, 1998: section In 
consultation with the Director General, the Minister could also redeploy the Director 
venera! to another department (ibid). Directors may only be from 
completed their ,,,,,_.,,,,,,, .. contract or rel(~as(~d from their 











legislation anp regulations, ill-health, resignation or retirement Appendix V for 
employment contract and conditions of service). The contract may include any agreement 
that the Minister and Director General enters into, but should include the following: 
1. The particular duties of the Director General, 
2. The specific performance ~rit,~ri~ 
General, 
evaluating the performance ofthe 
grounds procedures upon which the ofthe lrr':'("t(vr General may 
tprmuHltf'ti before completion of his or ",,,,,,n-,,,,.,i- and 
4. Any matter which Minister (Public Service 
Amendment Act, 1997, section 9). 
five-year contracts are given further impetus with performance contracts that are 
intended to hold Directors General accountable for performance. 
process a General involves the advertisement of the vacant 
post as 
three 
by the Minister and an interview a selection .... v ..... ,,, .. ,_'" {',r\T'I"'l<>n of at 
(public The lecll0n ofthe 
candidate is based on the following considerations: 
1. based on valid methods, and instruments that are free from bias, 
2. The training, and knowledge to meet the requifl~m(mts 
of the post, 
3. The needs department, and 











important South ruJ[lcClLnpublic administration is appointment 
ofa l1rP'~ctnl" ueioer:aJ is the authority ofthe (public 
1999: sec:uon 1). This shifts the most senior public echelon from a career to a 
""'''''"'''' ........ appointment system. rationale for the introduction ofpresidential 
appointments of Directors General was to achieve two objectives, that is administrative 
expediency and political clout (Hansard, 1999:2495-2498). The objective of 
administrative expediency was tp: 
1. Expedite transformation of the senior public service terms of representivity and 
of the public service transformation Drc,cel~S 
lncreru5e the of diverse by appointing from outside the 
public service, 
Redeploy Directors General so that their valuable skills would not be lost to the 
public once they served five years or ifthere was a problem between 
111"f"C'U\l" General and Minister, 
Depersonalise the relationship between the Minister and 
the state costs in terms of paying out a Director General who did not complete 
his or contract should the Minister not wish to retain services of a Director 
prior to the completion of his or ......... 'n+>-''' .... 1' and thus the Director 
could be deployed to another department (ibid). 
The Act and SP€'C111C811 the relating to presidential appointments was introduced 
to with that had the political aormnlsrram/e "."1'",1"1,,,,,.,.,,, 











9 June 2000). 1994 no than twenty-eight national Directors 
the public with the old guard way to new (Taylor, 
1999:59). Of the twenty-eight General that the public fifteen _1", .. ",11 
when their five-year contract was completed. However, other Directors 
or opted early retirement. Of particular note is N. Barnard who during the 1980's 
was the head of National Intelligence Service, became Director for the 
Department of Constitutional Development in 1992, and subsequently the department· 
in 1995 after conflicting interests with the ANC Minister Constitutional Development, 
Mr. Mohammed ValIi Moosa (ibid). However, not all Directors General to 
1994 were from old Six Uu:eCl:ors ,-,"'J"""''''' who were appointed 
during the new dispensation had also left service (ibid). According to Taylor 
(1999:59) it has not been a departure of Directors but an acrimonious 
parting between the political and administrative leadership. much-publicised 
Sarafina II debacle caused bitterness between the Minister for Dr. Nkosazana 
Zuma General Health, Dr. Olive Shisana (now Director 
the World Organisation) with blaming other the debacle. Another 
case ofpremature departure was Director for Housing, Mr. Cobbett who also had a 
harmonious with Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele. Public 
Amendment of 1999, No.5 was an attempt to an authoritative per:son 
intervene when there is potential conflict between the administrative and political 
leadership. the President, being the appointing authority, could mediate if a conflict 
arose. conflict could be resolved by deploying Director General to another 











skills were not lost to public However, Act does give the President the 
power to be involved the appointment of Directors General. Given that the majority of 
Cabinet con:;ists of Ministers from same political party and as the 
the same socio-cultural IJV"UV'tu values 
as the political 
adoption of the Public Service Regulations of 1 July 1999 sought to provide a 
coherent and comprehensive framework of rules and procedures for the public In 
general, light of the to the legislation that place. Public 
Service Regulations (1999) introduces a new per10nmwrlce manaJgernellt as well 
as covers the roles, OeJe2.ltlcm authorisations and responsibilities of public servants. It 
regulates organisation and conditions of work from planning, to reporting, to job 
evaluation, compensation, procedures for appointment, promotions and termination, to 
training and education:, labour relations, code of conduct, management. 
aPl)ears to more of a of powers to as opposed to a 
central authority. The regulations allow for the authority to delegate authority 
resDOllSllll1lrv to Directors General or provincial heads 
........... f' ... the department effectively and efficiently (Public Service ......... J"' ..... ""''-''''..,, 1999:7). 
The Director General or provincial head of department is responsible for em;urmg 
implementation strategic plan of the department by promoting efficient, economic 
use to improve the of the and apply 











Regulations, 1999:9). A Director General or provincial head of department the most 
part will responsible the work environment as working hours, emergency or 
overtime work, and health and safety (public Regulations, 1999:20). Director 
General is responsible the development of human resources within 
department by ensuring sufficient funds are available for training education 
granting financial assistance to employees to further their training and education. 
The Public Regulations (1999, Annexure 2 and Appendix the Collective 
Ae;reelmeJrltResoiution 13 of 1998 a newneItorm 
management system for Directors General (see Appendix VI). performance 
management system as described by the Public Service Regulations (1999:31) is a 
process that is " .. .linked to broad and consistent plans staff development and align 
with the department's strategic goals." The process is to develop departmental strategic 
both at national and provincial levels, and following from the strategic plan the 
development of business plans for each (ibid). The attainment 
standards according to the business and Batho will 
part annual performance for each department (ibid), The goals and 
n' ..... T11" .. '" of each department are then articulated into a performance agreement (ibid). 
15 December 1998, Resolution 13 was into by public sector trade unions 
the government in the Public Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). 
purpose ofthe agI-eelrnelrlt was to set a framework for senior managers in the public 
service to to agreements that would determine their 











managers (pay class 13 and to define their responsibilities and priorities in 
order to measure their performance as well as enable authorities and the 
immediate supervisor to assess the senior manager's performance (ibid). The senior 
manager, who is not a head of a department, would therefore enter into a performance 
contract with his or her immediate supervisor, and a head of department would enter into 
a contract with the relevant executing authority. performance agreement includes a 
definition of a senior manager's work according to his or her key duties and 
responsibilities, methods for assessing senior manager's performance in fulfilling 
those responsibilities, dates quarterly assessment, mechanisms resolving disputes 
about assessment, and the increment date (ibid). quarterly assessment would be a 
review of the senior manager's key responsibilities which may lead to m('Oll[lC~UHJ.n in 
responsibilities, method of assessment the progress towards objectives by 
removmg to the uu • ..uUJ5"d The perJtornlanc:)e a,~ree:me:nt 
would l:!erleraH be from 1 July to 30 June (pSCBC, 1998:60). Should a uo ..... " .. .5."" 
enter into an 30 June, he or she would receive an on 
of two quarterly reports and as ofthe 1 nearest to the date of the second as~;es~)mj::mt 
(ibid). The Director General ofthe Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA) or his or her delegate will over that from an agreement 
and should this mediation :fuil, the resolution ........ ,,...,,..rl, relevant co llective 
agreements will used (ibid). In order to ensure that all managers entered into 
performance agreements DPSA agreed to a 5,5% increase backdated to 1 July 1998 if the 
senior signed a agreement before 28 1999, and an 











,",u'c,",n"., would linked to the senior manager's performance as the agreement. 
These ",,,,,,,,,",,,,,,",UL'-' are open to public scrutiny and with DPSA. 
The Director General signs the agreement emphasising his or her commitment to 
achieving ofthe department within a specified time, taking cognisance of available 
resources (public Regulations, 1999:31). The Director General's performance 
will be measured according to the achievement of the agreed goals. The of 
pelrtolrm:mC)e management is good governance and development in terms of the ability of 
departments to improve delivery. The delivery focus is expressed in the 
principle of the performance management system, that is ..... departments shall manage 
pelrtonn:am~e in a consultative, supportive and non-discriminatory manner in to 
'!:;"C"":'UUVl!4;U efficiency and ptt,,,. ... t1'l.,p,np,,,,,, accountability the use 
resources and the vernellt of results" (ibid) 
The senior narlagement the public heads of national to provincial 
departments and administrations are now accountable to 
authority to ensure that performance complies with policy objectives 
government of the day 
agJ'eeJnellt between 
to ensure that seIVices are being delivered. performance 
and senior may include 
following: 
1. The purpose of the managerial position, 
The functions ofthe ... "'H ... ,!; ..... 











4. The duties, responsibilities and accountability ofthe manager, 
Reporting requirements, and 
The performance framework which includes the internal and external core 
responsibilities measured against outputs within given time frames (Department 
ofPubHc Service and Administration, 2000). 
relationship lJellWf~en Director General, Minister and President according to the 
Public Service Act and amendments can, be illustrated as follows: 







lag,em,ent system is to provide an objective measure with 











vellODInelU such as further training promotion. >-In'lXIA'''''''' should 'U""""E.""'" periohm 
poorly, development initiatives such as can place or should a manager 
consistently perl'orm poorly, the agreement can be utilised as an objective measure 
dismissal. The performance management agreement can therefore be viewed as a tool to 
rationalise the public service according to objective measures criteria. second 
aim is to increase accountability and transparency of senior management roles and 
responsibilities, and to determine whether are performing their function effectively 
and efficiently contracts will be open to 
public scrutiny. The third aim is to , .......... ..",,,,,,. political 
between authorities and management the public service so that each is 
aware of his or responsibilities. This also achieves the aim of improving 
communication between executing authorities and management. The aim ofthe 
performance management system is to initiate a paradigm shift in the public service from 
a rule-bound authoritarian bureaucracy to one that focuses on performance outputs and 
outcomes rather than complying with Thus, the most significant aim of the 
new pertonnance system is an <>tt,~"",,!'\t to improve nelrto'nn;an<,e terms of service 
delivery. However, an evaluation of performance management within the public service 
is still as system is currently being implemented. An assessment ,of 
pelrtolrmanc:e contracts at level, as of 1998, has to be tested as no 
Director General has been held accountable or received punitive measures non-
compliance according to a performance contract. The of the performance 











Another 11"1"1"nnlt"t!U'lY .:,. ........... that .. v!';, .... " ........ TPn'''',...A. is the Public 
Management of1999, No.1 which ensures the 111·~.,,1-" .. General is reSDOlnSlOle for 
financial resources of his or her department as the accounting officer. According to 
Public Finance Management Act (1999, section 36) a head rlP1"'1"" .. hn,,,nt must be the 
accounting officer and the employment contract of the head of department must include 
performance standards. The responsibilities of the accounting i.e. head of 
department, include: 
1. Maintaining an and an:m3lrellt LlU ..... V"""'. internal 
capita] evaluation ....... ' .. "'~T 
procedures, 
efficient, economical and tranSJ)aflent utilisation 
department, 
Effective t.:vt.:lrpTn for collecting all financial resources due to the department, 
unauthorised and use 
of wasteful expenditure and resulting 
of capital efficiently and effectively, 
resources, 
...... UHJ'"", .. conduct, 
4. ofliabilities and the safeguarding maintenance of assets, 
Compliance with levy, duty, pension and audit responsibilities, 
6. The settlement of contractual obligations, 
Reporting to the treasury unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure, and also to 











8. undertaking of effective and appropriate disciplinary action against public 
servants who contravene Public Management Act, or undermine the 
financial management ofthe department and/or permit unauthorised expenditure, 
9. the compliance with legislation when transferring financial resources, 
10. into account aU relevant financial considerations such as value for ... ~ .. _ I and 
bringing these considerations to the attention executing authority, 
11. Consulting with and "'''' .... ''LUJ''''- consent 
new entity, and 
the national treasury on the establishment 
12. Complying and ensuring compliance with the Public Finance Management Act 
(public Finance Management Act, 1999: section 38). 
addition to "'-"' ....... ,"'. responsibilities accounting officer responsibilities in 
terms of budgetary control, include: 
1. Ensuring that eXI)en,dlture is in vote the department _""&An""" 
3. Preventing oVI~rslPenldiI 
steps are taken to prevent unauthorised ""V'r'\&A"'" 
and 
4. Reporting to the executing authority and treasury 
shortfalls in revenue 
Finance Management 1999: section 39). 
under-collection of revenue, 
department's vote (public 
accounting officer also has reporting responsibilities, which includes: 
1. Keeping a full and accurate of the financial 











Submitting financial statements within two months of the end ofthe financial to 
the Auditor General and treasury, 
4. UUllULlllla within months ofa ............ u~,._yearto "'A • .,,,,,,.LUll/<- authority 
report, Auditor General's and 
Submitting the annual report, financial statement and Auditor General's within 
one month the u ..... v~ General's report to Parliament (PubHc Finance 
Management Act, 1999: <,or··hro, ... 40). The annual report and financial statements must 
state department its perionmwrlce 
predetenmined 'V".''''''', unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure, 
and any criminal and disciplinary action (ibid). accounting officer must, before 
the beginning of a financial year, provide treasury with the prescribed fonmat per 
month of anticipated revenue and expenditure (ibid). The accounting officer must also 
provide the treasury 
t 
'(a) amonthly of actual revenue expenditure for the p.n:cc:umlg month, and 
(b) a report with m1iomaatllon of financial of that month, projections of 
expected expenditure .......... v,~., and steps to be taken to ensure that revenue and 
expenditure remain within the budget within 15 days of each month (ibid). 
accounting officer also has a responsibility in tenms of managing assets and 
liabilities. Should the accounting officer, that is head of department, be unable to fulfil 
responsibilities, he or she must report to the executing authority and treasury or 
inability to fulfil with the reasons (ibid). Public Financial 











H""UU,t:UU ATT,p'PlnT and ""M",,,""'T'n nnlIDcaal control of public resources. According to 
SeCl[IOn 64 of the Public Finance IvumageIneIlt (1999), example, accounting 
officer is held responsible for unauthorised expenditure. Although it has not been tested 
as to what the penalty for violating the Act would entail, it can assumed a Director 
General could be ,charged with misconduct, dismissed or forced to resign. 
There appears to be more legislation regulating the public service than before with the 
legislation often being cumbersome and frequently is mct 
difficult to and and contradictory. responsibilities of 
1980 to Directors after 1980 to the 
1990's have not fundamentally changed. The basic role ofa Director has 
remained the same in terms ofthe management ofa department's human resources and 
the control of a department's financial resources. In fact the job description Director 
..... ""JU""L't:U a,ccc)ramg to Public Service Act, 1984 is identical to that ofthe Public 
1998. What has naIlge:a IS of the 
political executive with Director 
rather than being Minister's administrative counterpart is made subservient and 
accoufltab,le to Minister terms of performance agreements Public 
Management Act (1999). The Public 'UFo''''''<'",,''' Act of 1999 however, 
made Director General more accountable in terms of financial management ofa 
department, but limited role ofthe Minister to ensure the department complies 
with the which is to on the transactions ofthe to 











(Public Finance Mana~~emlent Act, 1999: sections to 65). Minister's 
nrnXlPt'has also In'''t'p~<:!pn in tenns Public Service 
Commission. According to the Constitution (1996: section 196) the Public ",""""'ll"" 
Commission monitors and evaluates the organisation and administration, 
personnel practices of the public service. The role ofthe Public Service Commission, 
previously the for Administration, changed. The Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA) taken on much ofthe Commission's policy 
is also a contradiction in legislation which for Minister's 
n,.."",,,," .. to as responsibility for inputs, both political and administrative 
increased. However, it is the Director General who is held accountable for administrative 
outputs and outcomes. There is also an overlap in functions between the Minister 
Director ............... " ..... For example, as prescribed by Public ''''''\I1t''.'''" Amendment Act 
(1998) Director is t'P<:!lnnn for "'U.j'VH~':>' other things sound labour 
... "' ..... , .... "'. but it is the Minister who acts on behalf of the state to manage 
u ..... v .. "'. conclude collective agreements and resolve labour (public '","1-"111",,,," 
Regulations, 1999:32). Once again, it is the Minister who is involved administrative 
1'n""tt""rco and the labour dispute involve wage it is legally 
Minister's to the dispute which has implications for the financial 
management of the department, a Director function. Directors also 
",n",,,,",,, .. to be oVler-lregUla,tea which is contradictory to the vision of a transfonned public 
that is away a rule-bound public service. an 











will the following chapter. Much more n"".,,,,,.. 
political '''''''U''''''U''V which is not South 
given to the 
past. The new political 
dispensation, being suspicious ofthe public service, SOJIght to control public service 
order to ensure that policies were implemented. According to Page et al (1999:269) 
the political leadership of countries that experience a political transition, tends to shape 
the relationship the politicians and the public servant favourofthe politicians. 
The 1980's did see retlomlS 
Africa. Ht .... \Up·\!pr 
fifteen 
the structure and ofthe ililrector South 
the same fur the 
_"1,,..,1"<1 Geneml and 
role remained 
appointment DrClce~)s 
consequent increase in diversity ofthe senior management echelon, increase in 
demands placed upon the Director General, and increasing role of the political 
executive, have impacted upon the Director GeneraL However, one has to question 
whether there has been a in core relationship between the political and 
of government. The impact of the aplDOlnrrneIlt DJrocess and 
regulatory framework has not changed the relationship between political 
administrative leadership as still exist an elite sharing the same ideological 
a ideology to the 1980's. The of the regulatory policy 
framework has not fundamentally the ofthe although 
there are more demands placed upon current Directors General. Directors Geneml are 
still administrative heads of departments responsible for the management offinancial 
and human resources, and policy advice, although in an increasingly 













been transformed is questionable, but it would be more accurate to state that their is 
1. What role did the Director 'U,",.uv",,<u play the " ...... ,."'Tll post-1994 South African 
2. What is the aclImnlstratn/e and political Africa? 













RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
"Great minds think alike, Jools seldom differ"- Proverb 
The analysis of the data collected from interviews with Directors General indicate 
that their as administrative head responsible for the management ofhuman 
....... ' ....... ,u.u resources not changed fundamentally over that last However, 
current Directors General do appear to more demands placed upon their role in 
terms traltlS10mnmlg departments, co-ordinating policy implementation and providing 
advice in an increasingly complex world. This finding is consistent with Larson 
and (1 research on changing role of Permanent Secretaries 
Commonwealth countries. also indicates policy is formulated by 
the political and leadership the same ideological values. Thus, the 
nature of the political-administrative interfuce in South has not changed either. 












Social, Educational and Career Backgrounds of Directors General 
political and aarmnlSlfam/e of South Africa are powerful positions to make 
peoples' part 
and values to the political of an elite group which has 
South Africa. Elitism is evident in South political-administrative internee and in 
the fonnulation of policy both in pre-and post-1994 eras. Evidence ofan ideological 
collusion will presented in section on Policy and Directors General. The 
political and administrative leadership of South Africa is not typical people of 
South They are disproportionately drawn from the upper socio-economic strata 
South are highly educated with similar socio-economic backgrounds. What 
distinguishes from the rest of South Africa is that they have had more opportunities 
than others. This is even true for current or post -1 who fonn part 
a political network of persons who were either in 
struggle. 
or involved the aml-al[}arm 
of Director General's education shows that English and Afrikaans feature 
dominantly education. were of 
the state education system. Mathematics ~clemie subjects dominate Directors 
secondary education. many post-1994 Un-ec1:ors General were educated in 
Mathematics and the Sciences as pre-1994 Directors General. Given the apartheid 












than most black South l\IrlCaJ1S with a 
boarding schools. 
one can that Directors General received a better education 
Directors ....... ""LL"'''' ... .... ,n/11'"10 attended missionary 
The who were "'".,"v ........ , are highly educated. 
Doctorates, twenty TtPl·C'.Pl"1t Masters, 
Bachelor degrees (see graph 1). A and 994 comparison percent 
shows that and n 'H,,_.n. 1'"1pr'· ....... of post-1994 Vm;:ct(]lrs 
'-'''''LA'''.''''. obtained Doctorates. JJlIl::ClUrs 
fields of study Forty-three DeI'(~em 
tertiary education is dominated by 
n:>C'J'nrC! General srunpled 
thirty in .... "'."'u~,_". four Del'Cel1t 
a generalist education Lomnlerc~e (see graph 2). Most 
Psychology, Languages, .tC(mOmlC:S. VHLl~':J.l Science, and Sociology. 
it should noted the quite omlln€::nUy in both 
1994 Directors General education thirty-four percent of pre-l and T\)IJI"'nrv_C!,pVf'n 
percent of post-1994 in Sciences. Most vn~eCl:ors 
General, pre-1994, obtained their from the University of Pretoria (28%), 
while most post-1994 Directors General their 
the homelands (14%) such as University of Fort Hare, 
graph It is also to note only one 
universities in 
ranSKea, Venda and Zululand 
Director 'U,","."''''''' 
completed his at a university, while seven of the post-1994 
Directors General srunpled, received degrees from This is 












Both post-1994 They, their 
respective periods, similar socio-economic backgrounds with all receiving a 
education than most South Afiicans. As the data will prove, Directors General were 
recruited academia with many of the appointments having some degree of political 
influence. 994 Directors General, although originating from academia, were first 
employed in middle and senior management positions and then promoted to Director 
General positions. There were only two exceptions from the pre-1994 Directors General 
sampled who· were immediately recruited from academia to Director General positions. 
Most appointments to Director General positions during the pre-1994 era were 
based on promotion, but with the President or u~ ... u.·~. stating their preference. 
However, many post-1994 Directors General were recruited from academia and either 
immediately v",~, ... u.'", a Director or were placed in senior managerial or policy 
advisory positions a relatively short period oftime becoming Director GeneraL 
many UllreCl:ors UellenU, both not only their 
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Graph 4 shows that in the pre-1994 era almost fifty percent of Directors General were 
career public servants while only seven percent of post-1994 Directors General sampled 
were career public servants. Only a and post-l 994 Directors General began their 
careers in the ...... ,,"" . .,. sector. Interestingly many post-1994 ""Vi"""'''' Ulnrl.rPi1 In 
the non-governmental sector before entering public and a few openly stated that 
they were involved in political activity on behalf ofthe ANC while in exile. Most 
........ ,'" .. " General their careers as acalaelm](~S (53%) a number 
in academia, as mana~:ers and later for Director General 
positions. However, in the case of post-1994 Directors "" .... ".-.... , ... they were first academics, 
then shortly after the 1994 democratic ejections were head hunted by the ANC political 











<rtr<.1""l'r<l by the Ministers is understandable given that were 
public managers who served during apartheid, and wanted a senior manajgernetlt 
that was not only qualified, but also more sympathetic to their These appointees 
were placed in positions where they would acquaint UiVIU.:>,,,,1 with the 
of the public "" .... "', .... '1" the position as 
Director were in 
Tn"'T"'Uf"'", who served the apartheid 
senior 
"""'I.&;:O";;U considerable resentment on 
the part of pre-1994 that will A and 
post-1994 comparison shows that of the pre-l 994 Directors ...... ..,J .. .., .. ' .... sampled, two out of 
jjft.~en Directors were headhunted from "''''',:lU"i1HJL", and for Director 
General positions, while ofthe fifteen post-1994 Directors General sampled all were 
head hunted and first placed in senior managerial and advisory positions for a relatively 
short of time before becoming Directors General. 
'nntNI1"V to belief there always been a aell:ree ofpolitical .... ~,~""""'''' in 
"' ..... "' ... ,,'vu of Directors ,,-,"'U,",JlUi. Political influence took "' .... ruT<' forms the Minister 
or President directly recruiting the person in question, or the Minister or 
his preference to the Commission of Administration (pre-l 994 ), or to other 
stating 
.".","tAre< in 
Cabinet (post-1994). Of the Directors sampled, furty-seven percent 
were selected for UrP'l'YI'\T General based on seniority 
with a of po Utical and a further 
while forty 
percent 
were based on the criteria of seniority and political influence. the 











a sCllentmc or standardised is a lack 
application by the Commission 
which was responsible the of Directors ....... "' .. "" ....... the 
1994 era it was a fait accompli who would be next ullrecror if the 
was on sernolntv was a rlP''''<l1''ITn,,,,nt 
influence, his preference was 
President or Minister 
wame:o to have a 
Administration and iY.u"H':'L"'~ or 
known to the vVHU1U""lVH of 
wanted. the post-1994 era is no "'lLL\,in,HL. The "V~'''''''LJ'VH prc,ce~;;s 
who would a 
l ... a'''\,i". the pn:;:terred candidate's .,UlILaUJlll 
the President would appoint the 
mtl[)mled that this IS a 
would be as the Minister 
who they wame:o as Director 
was 
the fonnality. It is usually afait accompli 
President would have already uel;:}ue:u on 
All Director venerat claim that they were qualified nn:'n<l1"ArI for the ... VllHUl ... ., of the 
position. base this on their training and/or their experience the 
It should be noted that pre-1994 Directors General were senior management positions 
longer than theirpost-1994 who served on about a as 
a "''''n'''.,. ... manager Seniority and PYlnpt .. ptll"P is also 
reflected in age when Directors were aDt)Olltlte,a. The ofpre-1994 
Directors General is fifty-one and post-1994 forty-two. Post-1994 Directors are 











oldest. Comparatively, 994 Directors ages from T"rr'U_,'UTn to sixty-
one. IS 
for position lack and leadership 
decision "'_L~~',f5' 
Office of the Director General 
The J1,."'· .... u,,. General 
"'.""'-'LL.'" role that 
involves responsibiHties, demands expectations. It is 
a long stress, "''''',.'''''''" sacrifices, 
dedication which often goes unappreciated. Many Directors both pre post 
1994, that demands placed upon them it difficultto given 
resources lack of capacity. 
Most Ul1:ec1:ors General, both and 1994,uv"v'lu~,utherr as atypical as it 
involves from meetl11gS that last to travel, to meeting staKetlol,ael'S. 
.... """A1'IA .. there are common all Director viAuIJ<.day. Most 
HVr~Tl'IcrA day I)e~pnnmlg at General start between six eight in the moming, with 
seven and the at Tn'''''_T,,.,, ... ru Directors General usually start with correspondence 
administrative matters that their 19l1lahrre. When personal 
arrive are briefed on day's matters me,etlfLgs. Most of the appears to 
occupied with which usually start a manajgernellI meeting. Directors 
These lU ........... J<.'" 












matters ''''''''Ull',o; to the I-'H. ............... '-' ... of pOlicy. Director may 
also meet ,...o,.t"," individual departmental administrative 
V1""''''''. The rest of the day involves meetings with stakeholders or interest 
an hour or whole day depending on Directors which 
particularly stated increasingly 
official forums to co-ordinate policies 




the 111',,·,..tr\r General's day is meetings with politicians, ""''"'''''0>'' it is in a 
committee or ' ........ '''n ...... However, a tn"'p'!""n that takes orecea,el over 
or 
other meenl1J!s IS ministerial meeting. Director General must him or 
herself to Minister and engagements may be suspended for a ministerial 
These tn",p't1, ... may structured or informal from a telephone call any of 
day, to daily or weekly meetings. illustrate the importance of such a meeting a 
Directors stated that have a standing order with their personal to 
the MUUSDer and another Director (jeJne~al 
:seotemlber2000) that starts day by having UH,'~J:.a",. with 
Minister. The with Ministers usually involve a regarding a particular 
request for <In,;""", or a with ""''','''''ri", to a policy or a problem. 
OVl.'ArI'l<;; the ofthe day, is usually around six the evening, the Director 
deal with administrative matters. matters involve 
human resource and the 
Most Directors General stated this was the most burdensome time-consuming 










financial matters. dealing with files early in 
................. ',nn when are fewer ",..-.",,,1',,,, .... , others attempt to deal with administrative 
matters throughout the day, while others with matters at the end day. 
Directors also have to make submissions to the Minister many undertake 
do the submissions at the end of the day a that they 
submissions late at or over the weekend. 
213 
Most Directors only completed their working day late at 





the hours of morning while most complete their day at about lOpm. On average, 
most Directors General have more than a twelve hour working day. if their 
involves travel their working day is usually extended. Another aspect of their job that 
find burdensome is travel between the legislative capital, 
Pretoria, the .... a'n"'''. The notion enjoying 
a jet-set far true as many that them from office 
and occupies most oftheir day which could be more productively. Directors 
are facing many demands which supports and Coe's (1999) finding that 
Directors "",,,,,"""'U1 are being to meet the demands of their position. 
Directors General, post-1994, travel more :frequently abroad than pre-l 994 Directors 
GeneraL percent ofpost-1994 General compared to twenty-seven 
of pre-l 994 Directors stated that they travelled frequently. Sixty percent 











once in a most .",,, ... ,T.,,, visited countries by all l""'I'1"n'"'' General 
were the United States of America countries in European Union. finding is 
consistent with Coe's (1999) argument that Pennanent ...:"'"_t·.,. ..... ",, are 
more frequently as dynamics "' ....... "',.1" upon their job. 
When Directors General were about the "P,:r<'lt""p "",,,,,,,,,,·t,,, of the 
1994 lJn:eCl:ors General complained about bureaucratic culture 
inhibited and perfonnance. of the 
complained about 
time with families. Other ran:ged from 
to too many responsibilities and high expectations, to the ."'t."1'"1"Pn:>" 





ofthe 994 and three ofthe Directors General sampled, political 
."t''''rl~·"",'l''''was a negative aspect ofthe job. The post-l 994 Director Generals' 
complaint centred more on of the in 
departmental matters. Many pre-1994 Directors specifically 
political transition, stated the political and 
undennining ofthe Director General was particularly one 
Director General (interview, Johannesburg: 5 2000) stated that ANC Ministers 
employed without the ...., .. "''''.'v. General, were fact 
department tenns offinancial matters. Although the 
advisors were paid the departmental budget they no sense of accountability and 
lacked discipline (ibid). When Director General complained about advisors' 











who served during the apartheid era were a hindrance to implementation 
developmental policies (ibid). Many Directors '-'''''"'''~''''J who """"'"/"''' during the transition 
that they would have to make more of a contribution, but were viewed 
Another ofpolitical inte:rtelren,~e a few pre-l Directors ...... """"' ..... resented was 
policies that believed were morally correct and administratively possible were 
often because they were not regarded as poHticaHy correct that period. Many 
pre- ] 994 Directors General also resented political interference National 
Management System. a lesser extent pre-1994 Directors .............. <" complained 
about the of personal time, the lack of appreciation and too many responsibilities and 
expectations. 994 Directors General stated that are too responsibilities 
and expectations, bureaucratic culture of non-performance and the lack of staff 

























All Oirectors General stated unanimously that a positive aspect ofthe job is 
contribution one can in the quality of life of South Africans. Many 
stated that the Director General position the opportunity to serve while 
involved in important and often historic decisions. As one Director General (interview, 
Johannesburg: May 2000) stated "a thought could a dltten~nc:e 
powerful position that Directors 
lives. LJl1:-eCl:Ors General, both pre-
hold as the many 
994, appear to have an idealistic HV,.lVH of 
they 
their .... "C"T"·'.,.. where they an opportunity to serve while some aOPiear to 
the that comes the position. All C011S1Clerea. most General 
stated they have job ","" •• "u""u.vu as they have a sense 
contribution. 
percent of pre-1994 Directors '-' ... i ........ '.... all 994 Directors 
that they co-operated other Directors '-' .... ,,, ..... , .... frequently. '-'''', ............ appear 
to co-operate for two reasons, namely for administrative functional support. Most 
Directors stated they frequently co-operated for administrative support with 
Department of Finance when it involved with the of 
Administration (pre-1994) and Department Public Service and Administration (post-
1994). Functional support took place for various reasons, but usuaUy involved the 
collective function or programme such as Department 
a public awareness 1""'''''1''0'' on mleCtlOllS UJI:>"'I<:lJ", the 










Office of the Presidency requiring the a.'>~""'''Wl''''''' from the lpnnrhm.",1t of Foreign 
;oneCllOnal ,",,"''''711'''''''' and Public for Presidential U"""'"",u tours, or Department 
217 
Works co-operating the prison. However, most of the co-operation 
that does is administrative functional with little left for 
Directors ""'VJ .. """U to develop real innovative delivery , .... "t"'.1·uu'·" 
Post-1994 Directors General are more opportunities to co-operate official 
forums such as the Forum South African Directors ...... "', .. "' ...... (FOSAD) and Clusters. 
FOSAD was initially established for the co-ordination of policy implementation and is a 
forum to ensure co-ordination ofthe transfonnation of the public service. In 
words if a Department had a particular implementation programme then other 
ICpanJmems which would benefit the programme would pool resources towards 
implementation of the goal. For example the programme of computer generated 
identification cards was a co-ordinated effort between Departments of Finance, 
... "''''''". FOSAD is Inn"" .. to meet on a quarterly basis, but during 
Mandela was just 
ofFOSAD were ad hoc. However, since 
General stated that they more frequently and 




Clusters and it 
appears that the ofFOSAD as a co-ordination for implementation 
is being stated although are not 
to co-operate, they are fact obliged to participate in Clusters, which two Directors 
General were just more meetings that had to attend. The issue of Clusters will 











formal lines of communication and the occasional telephone conversation, Directors 
'-''''''11''''''<''' stated that they do not really have time to co-operate and develop co-ordinated 
service delivery initiatives. 
In the pre-1994 era there were two forums in which Directors General co-operated and 
communicated. The was caned Top Amptenare van die Staatsadministrasie 
(T ASO) which English translated to the Officials of the State Administration. 
T ASO convened once a month under the auspices of the Commission of Administration 
which provided an opportunity all Directors General to discuss personnel or human 
resource mSIlla;gernellt issues administrative matters of common interest with the 
Commission of Administration. The second forum was an annual retreat which was a 
strStteglC planning co-ordination ill 
At retreats Directors '\.J ..... Uv.L,'U 
'troY'''"'''' eventually dlssmated by 1 as 
gm'ernmenrs policy 
gO\l'ernilllent's policy 
government V .... ~'U.Hlv more 
preoccupied negotiati9ns transition to a aelmocnmc South Africa. When 
Directors General were asked the , ..... 'vu ..... Security Management System (NSMS) 
many Directors General would not comment on the functioning of the system, but those 
did answer the relating to NSMS stated it was an eruclent ,,,,,,,tPtn 
for co-operation and co-ordination in the public "'''' .... " .. '''' but did not like undue 
influence of senior security personnel on the civilian public service. Responses relating to 
aueSllOI1S about National Security Management System ranged from " ... hated "to 











was too much security and <:!PC':1'PC:V "to" .. .it was a good system of dealing with 
problems at the " 
With of two Directors General, most pre-l that 
they were never or told to with other Uu"Cc1tors '-''''.u'''.' ... two 
related more to u .. ,."'''l'5 too hasty a decision and 
other 1 ...... 1'1","'"" '-" ... ,t .......... who were att(~cte'd by decision. The were 
to that area. 
Most pre-1994 Directors General stated that other, but was 
usually at official or when they were in for parliamentary sessions. 
Most 
do not have 
lines while a 
Directors General that they do socialise with Directors 
that due to constraints the pressures of work, they 
to socialise at all. Most to be along functional 
Directors admitted that they with many other 











anti-apartheid struggle and exile. One General (interview, Johannesburg: 8 
June 2000) stated that post-1994 Directors General " ... are people that came out 
struggle, so its people 
them out ofthe 
you the black 
I've known, including Ministers, its people that I 
T","",,'P'" not 
IS 
but 'tho'"' .. ,,, part of my family. 





,","'JeI"''''''u.< relationship to 
their involvement in the anti-apartheid and politics, socio-political backgrounds, 
the policy and service delivery challenges that they and/or their relative youth. 
However, it does that, like in the pre-l 994 era, current Directors General are part 
of an elite who share similar ideological values as political elite. 
addition to ministerial and parliamentary demands, General a number of 
demands. Sixty 994 General stated that they :frequently 
<''''' .. n1''\,'''''''',-'''''' with community 
percent stated they 




another twenty percent stated they hardly ever co-operated. percent of 
Directors state that interaction CBO's and interest groups 
were co-operative, twenty Del~CeJrn accommodative, 'th11r1""'~'n Dercent ""''-''''''" ......... 
another thirteen percent stated that their relationship with CBO's and interest groups 











Ul1:-ecl:ors General who .,,,,..,,,,,,11 during the .....". .... "',1'1 period and immediately after the 1994 
elections they were frequently 'nT''''''''~T1''''T with CBO's 
This is understandable given that many South Africans, particularly black South 
Africans, were alienated from government policy formulation and the democratisation of 
government provided opportunities those previously marginalised to articulate 
interests in formulation of policy. In comparison, post-1994 Directors General are 
interacting with CBO's and interest groups to a extent (47%) and for most part 
the interaction with CBO's and interest groups is co-operative and consultative. The 
possible reasons the current decline in interaction with and interests groups is 
that many of the leadership of these organisations been employed by government 
because of their expertise, the democratic process is consolidated where CBO's and 
interest groups can lobby politicians, there may community apathy, or a beliefthat 
needs are Although the data is inconclusive, Directors General are 
and interest groups on a :frequent Another 
external 
their interaction with the 
..".".,.,."",,"" from Directors 
was co-operative while ten np1'{"Pt'\t 
was confrontational, and thilrtp~'n percent accommodative. 
Director General as Manager 
Most General, both pre- post-1994, describe their managerial as 
participative and orientated towards people. is not surprising that the 













Directors are preoccupied with the management of people 
their making. They neglect the 
attempt to 
department 
and displace the objectives of delivering Only twenty-seven thirty-three 
and post-1994 Directors General, respectively, that their 
mallla,gernellt style was orientated. are merits both styles, is the 
and task orientation. 
The IV,","'U'''' orientated mana1;enleIllt, that is incorporating employees in a 
participative .... ""v.""'vu making Df()Cess. allows employees to empowered part of a 
", ...... f'''''''''' where they a sense of ownership and commitment to objectives ... ""'''" ..... ,,' ... 
upon. gIVen bureaucracies are usually the participative style is time-
consuming and inevitably it is semor malllaJgernellt that is in the 
un .......... 'l"> process with implementation of decisions flowing down hierarchy. 
task onen1tatlon style involves senior management deciding upon objectives and ensuring 
these are met. task·()rientated 
as where have to l'nl"r'1"',lv 
of management has been 
",,,.aUJd."','''''' objectives that 
decided upon by senior laglem1ent Although an ~nl'IIV"l" ml2l111aJgernel11 theories and 
definitions is beyond the scope ofthis paper, concept ofthe Managerial Grid 
""'t''''''';'U by Blake and Mouton (1964) deserves mention as it has to the 
and orientation Blake 
Mouton (1 :8-9) lQentllleQ two basic "'W'"''6,''''' ... .uU""''''''.'VH,'', that is concern for 
production and concern people. and Mouton (1964:10-11) their 











perspective, that is concern for production and people. Less effective m~magelrs are those 
who have a high concern people and a low concern production, or those that 
a high concern production and low concern for people (ibid). 
needed during period in the African public is a 
combination of people and orientation, that is a between a concern for 
people production. This will explored the following "h<>n1-•• .,. 
uu-ect:ors General 
Most and 
face the challenge 
994 Directors 
lack of staff capacity, and 
mama,geInelrn capacity in 
1'\" ..... "' ... resource 
personnel conflicts were 
pub Hc "''''1'''I.11£'''''' 
such as 
continue to 
present a problem graph 6). Three Directors General stated that the problem is to 
attract and retain the best caHbre employees, and of the best performing _''',''-'''1 
are to the private sector which can offer better A pre-1994 Director General 
(interview, Pretoria: 6 July 2000) complained that the mana,gement capacity in the public 
(!P~,\l1{"P is a problem with mana,gers lacking the ability to make effective decisions, 
innovatively problems. to the problem of human resources is 
the lack of performance. Non-performance by public servants either took the 
services at or the lack of quality service delivery, or goal displacement by 
complying with rules and regulations than achieving departmental goals. Other 
problems Directors had to deal with included the of financial resources 
in order to objectives, mana,gement of the tranS1:onnatIOi 
Problems related to the tmnsformation ofthe public included the constant 











<lmalgamali(HI prol'c''', and roli I ieal "c' n,ili" 1)' n;~ uin;d J unng I his pro<'cs,. On.' Oi reClOr 
(ienerBI (intervkw. Pnotori", (, June 2000) st.lled th"t [,uhlic s.crva11lS expenenl'cQ 
lmn,li>rlllalion fatil;u~ with many iniliuti,~ > I,,-,inl; implcmC11lcd "ithout puhlie ,crv~nts 
und~rstand i ng lb.' proces, lx' fore more chang.', wen.: in trod uced wb ic 11 cre.llcd confusion 
and lInccl1ainty lor public 'CJ"\'atll>. Olhcr prohkms lhm Din.'clors General mentioned 
were bho ur re 1m ions and ncgotiatio ns wi lh trade unions d wing thc lmnslilnllalion 
Gmph Ii 






DireClors Gen~r~1 d~seri hed ncgativc mftnagcmcnt inc idcnts, and ~lthough the resean; her 
carlilol provide lh~ specifks ofcach CBSC a~ it \\ould cOIll[,f(lmisc thc al1(lI1ymity ofthc 











especially post-1994 Directors General. The following are examples 
explained in general which post-1994 Directors General described as negative 
management incidents8: 
II Director General believed should have provided a clearer vision and more 
leadership during transformation process in department. 
II A Director General that there were many personnel conflicts mistrust 
during the transformation un.!'"",,,,,.,,, that had to constantly manage. 
II Another Director General stated that the lack of co-ordination and a holistic 
perspective planning caused many management problems. 
II few l""'I"'~n'''''' General stated that constant crisis management is a 
problem. 
0) One General described a case where an over-reliance on rules and 
regulations hampered the resolution ofa personnel conflict. 
.. Another Director ...... """'"' ..... provided a case he was reluctant to dismiss a non-
performing public servant because the Director "<>r""",,1 had to politically sensitive. 
II Another Ullrector General believed that dismissal of a public servant could have 
handled a more "n'n"~1"1u·~n.,,,, manner. 
Some of the "'''''''<>~1''U:' incidents described pre-1994 Directors General include9: 
II ComnmrnCl:ltlon problems employees. 
.. The of diverse personnel during the tralnst,orrl[lallOn 
.. inadequate co-ordinating financial resources and 
8 The examp les are drawn from various interviews conducted with Directors General. 











.. The COIltraCtOrs to on behalf ofthe 
department. 
.. of organisational skills in the mama:gelnelrlt transformation. 
"...,."+"', .... General did describe positive management incidents. Interestingly both pre-
and post-1994 Directors General described the management of the transformation process 
as illustrations of positive management incidents. For many 994 Directors General, 
those that served during the transition, the resolution the 
management of the amalgamation process, retiunmg the commitment of personnel, and 
involved the negotiation nT''''''''''''' were not positive incidents, highlights 
careers. 
delivery initiatives 
of the pre-l 994 Directors General described innovative """T'",T"P 
they as .... n.,'T','UP management incidents (description 
service UiLtiaU will compromise the Director Generals' anonymity), but 
Int,ere:stlngJlynone of the 1",,,.,,+.,,"- General ""l!~TU,n" m 
delivery as 
incidents 
of positive maLna;geInelrlt n,I",n",n"<' 
Directors General UUtuA>""" man~~enlenlt, leadership, 
and organisational 
were wish or wished could 
to departments. Six Directors General and thirteen post-l 994 Directors 
General that they wanted to improve diversity, management capacity 
department (see graph 7). ofthe pre-l 994 Directors General stated that 











image of the department, two the perfonnance, and another two the planning and co-
ordination of objectives. A further two stated that they wanted to improve the role of 
policy advisors, and four stated that they would have liked to improve upon the 
management of the transfonnation process. Three ofthe post-l 994 Directors General 
would also like to ensure more financial resources for the department so that they can 
improve staff capacity and service delivery, two would like to improve the image of the 
department, seven would like to improve the perfonnance of the department in tenns of 
quality service delivery and responsiveness, and three would like to improve the 
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Directors General were asked about the issues that occupy most of their time which 
appeared to be once again the management of human resources (see graph 8). Human 
resource issues ranged from personnel conflicts, labour relations, staff complaints, 











which is related to human resource issues, is the problem of non-performance. The 
management of the transformation also appears to occupy many Director Generals' time 
as does financial management, policy formulation and planning. Only one Director 
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Almost all Directors General stated that their responsibilities included the management of 
financial and human resources, as specified by legislation. Almost all Directors General 
understood their role. Other responsibilities which Directors General included were 
leadership, policy advice and implementation, service delivery, co-ordination, and two 











responsibility. Only one Director General, post-l 994, included information technology as 
his responsibility. 
The following table and graph illustrates the qualities which Directors General believed 
were necessary for the position as Director General: 
Table 8: Director General Qualities 
Qualities Pre-1994 Post-1994 
Ethical Conduct 1 0 
Financial Management 6 5 
Human Resource Management 6 5 
Information Technology Skills 0 1 
Interpersonal Skills 6 5 
(e.g. communications) 
Leadershlp (e.g. ability to make decisions, 8 I 1 
give direction, vision) 
Organisational Skills 1 2 
Political Sensitivity 1 8 
Service Delivery 1 2 
Specialist Knowledge 8 1 
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comparison between and post-1994 "",('it"..., Geneml shows there is relative 
agreement on the qualities a Director Geneml ought to have such as leadership, 
interpersonal, financial and human resource management skills. However, an analysis of 
qualities shows that there is a difference of opinion with .. """,,, .. ,1,, to political sensitivity 
and ;':>I.J\;;''''i<:ICU3L knowledge of a rI"'?,,, .... Tn'" runlcuon. It 1994 
General view understanding and sensitive to the p litical environment and political 
leadership as being an important quality. This indicates hat the role of Directors Geneml 
is becoming more politicised with Directors becoming more of the 
po Htical dynamics and environment that they to operate Pre-1994 Directors 
General placed more of an emphasis on specialised knowledge (for example you need to 
a doctor in to be or an ord~r to the 
Director Public Works) as a qualification for the position of 
Therefore, the question to ask are TPl"TrU"IO General ... "" ..... rn'n, 0 more 
generalist public administmtors specialist advisors? answer to this 
question is somewhat complex and will be addressed in the following pamgraphs, that is 
the Politics, Policy and Directors General, Commentary on Transformation. 
Politics, Policy and Directors General 
In order to answer this question one needs to examine the nature of policy making 
h",Y,'l.l"'~·n Directors and and Presidential 
administmtive interfuce. Directors venetal administrative roles of 












responsibility as their domain'. However, policy formulation appears to be the area where 
. there is not only confusion about the respective roles of Directors General and Ministers, 
also where the boundaries between the political and administrative interface 
blurred. 
Pre-1994 UU'ectors General app1ear to more specialist in their functionary fields 
terms of policy formulation. Although a dichotomy between the political and 
administrative leadership did not during "' .. H.rt .... ' .. 'rI there was more of a dichotomy 
than the current political-administrative interface. When pre-1994 Directors General, 
especiaUy during the Botha presidency were involved in policy it was more at a specialist 
and technical advisory level. They were cognisant ofthe political dynamics, but seldom 
involved themselves in the political domain. administrative-political interface during 
this period was more a function ofP.W. Botha's pre$lOlen1ual style, and the ..... VIU .. " ..... role 
that President Botha and his Ministers played in formulation of policy. P.W. 
presidential style is described by many Directors General as efficient and "hands on." 
Some referred to President Botha's style as autocratic, authoritarian, and militaristic. but 
organised. A few Directors General described President Botha as difficult, lacking in 
interpersonal skins and often not honest communication from 
advisors, Ministers and Directors General. However. most Directors General agreed that 
President Botha was meticulous, could analyse volumous reports and could submerge 
himselfin the details of policy Ii,,,,,..,,,,,. A who served during Botha 
presidency stated that for the time, proper minutes of Cabinet meetings were 











George: 1 June 2000). President Botha was described as more ofa manager than a leader 
by being involved in daily operations of the public service ensuring that 
were being implemented through various committees such as that of the NSMS. 
Although President Botha surrounded himself with decisive Ministers in their own right1 
they were agreeable to his and Directors General were relegated to more of an 
administrative role than a proactive policy formulation role. 1. .. .u ... ",....,. mandated by 
Cabinet decisions would request Directors General to make policy submissions this 
regard. Most Directors General during this period stated that the policy formulation 
process would typically involve the Minister providing policy direction~ a discussion 
would follow with the Minister~ the Director General would be requested to develop 
the policy further. The Director General, after consultation with the senior management 
of the department would develop policy, which would then submitted to the 
LT."""""",, had the final decision and it was considered unprofessional to 
the Minister the policy Director 
would responsible for its 
It was seldom that Directors General became involved in political decision making even 
the NSMS. It that implemented by political leadership 
and committee chairs. Another factor that impacted upon the between the 
political and administrative leadership during Botha presidency, is that the training 
that public servants received was in Westminster tradition and those who were 











borne in mind that 111"",£'1"n"", ....... '''' .. ,,, ..... did share similar ideological values to the 
and tneretore did not have to challenge political decisions or 
contradict the Minister in their advisory capacity. Thus, Directors General during 
Botha presidency were complacent in administrative and policy implementation role. 
fact, when Directors 
implementation 
The transition period, 
many Directors 
.LV.LJ'UULULJLVU of policy 
were their responsibilities more Directors 
<lI""'u,,,, ... ,,,rI that were reSipOnSlltl for policy 
IS 1990's, proved to be an administrative 
this period became more invo Ived in the 
political domain. This was not only to negotiation 
process 
President 
required more President ".LU'~UL1U' style. 
was more as a "hands manager leader. 
that President De 
approru~n than "'""","',,,. He welcome:a dltte:reIlt npl" .. ~np,£'tl'vP<:! 
and peI'SOllaO.le 
ideas, and was 
as a good However, a few his 
providing policy direction to Directors General focusing more on the CODESA 
negotiations. A Director General who served during the presidency stated that; 
1I .... he (DeKlerk) didn't check whether Cabinet ae(:ISl~[)nSWere implemented was a 
nice person to work with and could ''''''''''''l''.'''''''' him that. .. (b ut) 
most danClllI period anything to happen was last year before the '94 elections 
because the total Cabinet just focused on various negotiations, summit negotiations, 










us General) a way v"' ......... ,'v the was totally political" 
(interview, Pretoria: April 2000). Some General had more scope 
and involved in political while had to develop more co-
operative reJii:llUmS with the IP~('Ip.",n, .... of the 
appeared to a positive view of this period by oel;OrmUII:?: 
the fonnulation of new and most stated that felt 
Directors """VJll .. "' ... 
involved 
were making a 
contribution to a democratic Africa. Many were involved in advising Ministers 
during the negotiation period, others were involved new developmental policies 
through a more inclusive consultative processes, and others contributed to the 
development of new national symbols and ideas. Most Directors General described 
period as exciting and "' ... U ... ll .... IL.O • 
235 
However, during this period and particularly after 1994 democratic elections some 
Directors General also had a difficult time coming to tenns with the increasing 
po liticisation of senior managerial positions in public service the marginalisation 
of their role. During the period 1994 to 1 the political leadership democratic 
dispensation to appoint and who """","v,,, ..,U"UU4. 
ideological values. is not at all surprising that many Ministers were somewhat 
suspicious of Directors who served before 1994. advisors and senior 
mal1af.!:ers were Directors General the '''''''''''"''',0' accountable to the Minister and not to 
Director General. senior became 
Directors ............ "v" ... 
interference and res.en1tea 
who 1994 this as political 











in working with some Ministers who did not "-.11:<>1",,1",,, .. ,11 their _",,,,,,,,'1"n,,., roles. A few 
Directors (jenera! stated that sOltnetUIles became directly involved in 
administration of the department. 
Thus. during the 1980's policy role of Directors General followed more ofa political-
administrative "dichotomy" with Directors General providing specialist input during the 
formulation of policy and leaving politics to the Minister. was more of a function of 
President Botha's style of management and governance """U""" However, the period 
during the transition and following the 1 elections the ofthe Director ...., .. '",,"''" .... 
became more politicised with Directors General providing specialised 
advice during consolidation of democracy. 
saw an increasing politicisation ofthe Director ..... "']" .... 1.;U role, and 
U.ULU"" ...... " and advisors. 
political 
1994 
Since 1996 the nature ofthe political and administrative interface becomes somewhat 
complicated. Most Directors General when asked how they would typically formulate 
policy that the Minister policy direction a with 
Director General ~'''~''U''f"> advisory inputs. The Director General a participative 
consultative process with relevant departmental senior management and 
the policy. is submitted the Minister who may 
approve policy or may The may redrafted 
Minister approves of the policy. The between policy formulation process 











Director with joint ...... n~ .. '-' .. ....... ~ .. ;"". although the Minister 
the "V""',,'",,,,. The policy fimnulation nrn"""'''' <>nT''''''<>''''' to more 
to 
-or,enitnre with Directors 
of political OVIlarrJllCS 
intellectual astuteness 
administrative 
not providing sne:Cl8Jlst advice, but 
needs 
the political 
political This is 
",nll1n1"U that nn,"'?'<>T"'''' among the IJV~H'''''''' 
The policy furmulation process cannot generalised for all Ministers and Un:ec1:ors 
General. There are different scenarios in which policy is formulated between Minister 
and Director General. The following typology describes Ministers and Directors General 
as either or "strong." This does not imply that Ministers and Directors 
are personally, politically or administratively or "strong." The retl~rellce to the 
terms "weak" and "strong" relates to relative relationship between Director 
Lielnerai and Minister. For example, a Director General may be more decisive and have 
more specialised knowledge than Minister who trusts the Director General in 
formulation of policy. This also implies that Director General is aware ofthe policy 
political and ofthe political 
a Minister and Director General may have strong views on a policy and neither of 
whom to compromise their in policy formulation. scenario is 
where a General not a particular portfolio the Minister 
may be more preoccupied with the political consolidation his or her 
responsible portfolio. A scenario may also exist where a Minister is quite dominant and 











sometimes Im1Pleme:nUlt1(]ln of policy making, taking on some ofthe responsibilities ofthe 
Director Director General is "weak" 
Minister "SlllOn-g." The policy .LV~.[ll"' . .La'J'VH process extent to which 
General is involved in the formulation of policy is theretore dependent on nature of 
the relationship between the h1"~'''1't'1'' General and Minister, other words the poIitical-
aOltIllIUsl:rallve interface. An illustration ofthe different or typology which 
policy is formulated is as follows: 






The policy formulation process between a strong Director General and weak can 
be """'I" ....... "" .... as follows. policy and discusses it with 
the Minister who provides the ",,,,,,,,,,,,',v General with to policy 
further. Minister and Director General would .... l""'U<;'" the policy and Minister 
would approve the policy on advice of the Director General. In other words the 
Director ueJneral IS gIVen to playa dominant role in the formulation of policy 
either to mct that is preoccupied politics, is apathetic, 
or relies the Director 'U",Jl1"'~'''l specialised and The 
Director knowledge of political dynamics the 
same .~,..,._._. values as leadership. other scenario strong 
Minister Director "-''''''.'''''''1 is when the not only 














some policy fonnulation and sometimes implementation 
responsibilities. The iJllrector General is ~U'_"'1 weak generally provides advice that 
supports the U'.u'll~"""''' challenge Minister an advisory 
a Minister is relatively "T .. r' .... cr and Director 
General also to a situation of conflict. example of 
is for Olive ~m.sarla and Minister 
LJ,-,"'lU". The scenario weak Minister weak Director result 
ofthis political-administrative IS the fonnulation of policy is ofa 
quality administrative capacity is lacking. exa,mple ofthis is the 
Tn ........ " ... L"n.,""" . .H General of Home Affairs, Albert Mokoena l".ulU~IL"'.l Buthelezi. 
The are not a desirable state of affairs nor should policy .lV.l.lULUal,...,y in 
manner. The manner in which policy ought to fonnulated be SUlzge:sted In 
following 
However, gm/ellament in late 1999 developed an integrated <> ......... n,,,' 
and ementatlclfl of policy. impacted the way policy is fonnulated but 
does not fundamentally the ''In'~TI"1'Ii' which exists between Minister and Director 
integrated approach to policy I1p,~prvp(: attention as it involves Directors 
are relating to social, economic, governance 
administration, justice prevention, investment and 
international relations sectors. Social Clusters comprise Arts and ......... ,,. ...... ' ... , Education, 
Health, Sport and Recreation, Water Affairs and Fn1"pc;:nt"l.l and Welfare 










C.ommunicati.on, Environmental rlLLLu,Ul>" 
Industry, 
v .... 'cx".,". Finance, Minemls and 
Departments .of Provincial 
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Affuirs, Public and Administmti.on, and Public W.orks f.orm the G.overnance and 
",Yr"T1".n Cluster. The Investment and Empl.oyment '-' .... ., .. ~. c.onsists .ofthe 
Departments .ofLab.our, Public tmltenms:es. and Trade and Industry. Departments .of 
C.orrecti.onal "'Pl"'"'~P" Affairs, Intelligence, Defence and Safety and 
Security the Justice and Crime Prevention Cluster. The Cluster.on Internati.onal 
Relati.ons comprises .of the Departments verence. and Intelligence. 
There are a number .ofDirect.ors Geneml wh.o may be part of one or m.ore Clusters. 
n.oti.on .of Clusters is derived fr.om a desire to c.o-.ordinate the implementati.on and 
m.onit.oring .ofp.olicy. The aim .of Clusters appears t.o 
", .. au ...... and Cabinet are adequately inf.ormed 
threef.old. that the 
related t.o the achievement 
p.olicy .objectives. Sec.ondly, that there is a .of c.o-.ordinati.on between am.ongthe 
Office .of the Presidency, C.ommittees, and Clusters. Thirdly, t.o ensure thatthe 
Im1Pleme:nUlUOln .ofp.olicy d.oes in take place. 
int,"'O"T"",t".rI p.olicy decisi.on pr.ocess 
initiati.on, analysis, decisi.on and ad.opti.on, 
Mem.orandum, 1999: 1). planning phase 
five .. " ........ "''''. namely planning, p.olicy 
implementati.on and m.onit.oring (Cabinet 
n'u,.".~", the devel.opment .ofan integmted 
p.olicy plan which is based .on p.olicy prOlgralIllllaeS .of all Ministries submitted 
t.o Cabinet Office the Office The is determined 
nati.onal pri.orities set Cabinet President (Cabinet Mem.orandum, 1999: 2). It is 











with the Department that ... vu"."",,, policy programmes in of these priorities which 
is submitted to the Cabinet for assimilation into a national annual policy The 
plan is submitted to Cabinet which ensures that individual Ministerial policies are 
consistent with national priorities (ibid). policy flows from the 
needs identified within national framework is cmDrrmnlcated to the 
Office, and Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services by 
Ministry or Department (ibid). A draft Cabinet memorandum is 
initiating 
""'-'IIJ"'''' by 
Ministry or and once approved by is then 
analysed by relevant General Cluster, Policy and LU",',,,,,,,,, .. ·U 
technical teams from the public Memorandum, 1999: 
The public such as the General a rn"" .......... , ... '.n 
stakeholders' inputs COIISI<ler.aU{)ll by the uU'''ULU'5 Minister (ibid). 
Once the Minister has approved memorandum it is then submitted to the relevant 
"-,,,,vu.t'" Committee which mirrors Director General Clusters, but consists of Ministers 
Deputy HUJ,Lh,...",' (ibid). The ........... Ju.,.,. discusses recommendations made by the 
relevant Cabinet Committee and makes a decision (ibid). Once the policy is adopted, the 
Minister the to Ministry and (ibid). 
Cabinet communicates decision to relevant Director General Cluster with a view 
to integrating implementation of the policy (ibid). Thus the Director General 












The integrated policy process in theory shows that is more co-ordination among 
Directors General. is consistent with Larson and Coe's (1 finding that policy is 
becoming more co-ordinated Directors General to develop linkages across 
departments. The Minister or Director General, in light of national ontC)fltles set by 
Cabinet, may initiate policy. The IC:O;Ci::1I.l.j could not accurately determine the extent to 
which Ministers or Directors General are initiators of po licy. As mentioned earlier this 
depends on "weak/strong" interface between Minister and General. The 
development ofnational priorities the formulation of policy within :framework 
also the formulation of policy in South tends to be elitist. 
of advisors and III u.u~~~ .. ~~u of po Hcy also np.~p1"'VP<;! 
discussion. The of pre-1994 Directors ,-,,,,,, .. ,,, .. ,u used the senior management 
within the department as advisors seldom employed external advisors or consultants. 
In the period prior to and 1994, Directors General were obligec;l to be more 
in the formulation ofpoIicy by more participative and consultative with 
interest groups, stakeholders Ministerial advisors. Current Directors General do not 
only consult with senior management from the department, but external advisors as welL 
Although this should be welcomed as an in policy 
perspectives and an increase democratic participation, there should be a balance. 
Intere~t groups may limit the expediency of the formulation process, or for other 
IlltlentlOflS may also inhibit process together. could a paralysis in 
policy formulation. A (interview, Town: 19 June 2000) '-'AIVIU.UU .. ' .... 











five and now me to implement government policy I must have mini-
eleClUJnS with all NGO's (non-governmental organisations) ... stakeholders cannot 
overrule the "' .... ,"' .... 'u Parliament ... the U,,",,",'L",", whom we have elected by of 
democracy should give instructions." Although interest groups or stakeholders have 
the right to democratically participate in formulation of policy, it should not result 
a paralysis of governance and policy process. participation of interest groups in 
formulation of policy should a balanced process. Their participation in the policy 
formulation process should be limited to consultation as they are advisors representing a 
particular constituency. 
following table is a comparison between pre-and post-l 994 Directors when 
asked questions that related to the degree to they provide specialised and technical 
advice, whether they represented a particular cause or group, whether they had to mediate 
between various interests, and whether Director were or are involved in partisan 
Table Poliey Formulation Variables 
Variable Pre-1994 Post-1994 
No 
Technical advice 87% 13% 100% 
67%' 33% 67% 
100% 0% 87% 
47% 53% 73% 
0% 100% 0% 
Most Directors provide V'o""UII",",U knowledge or input in the policy 












Uil"Cc1:ors General having limited input because they had "strong" Ministers who had 
specialist in the area as well. fOund most Directors 
were qualified the specialist area of their respective departments and are qualified to 
provide specialised knowledge in the formulation Those Directors General, 
during the pre-l 994 period, who stated that they represented a particular cause during the 
formulation of policy, either represented cause of service delivery, people of 
South Africa, the disadvantaged, or the objectives of government. Similarly, post-1994 
Directors General that they represented the cause of the department, the people ot 
South Africa, and a majority they represented the 
disadvantaged and the This was a similar response to question relating to 
representing a group. Most Directors pre-and post-1994, who responded 
positively to question stated that they often represented the interests of the poor and 
disadvantaged during policy formulation. Although Directors stated that they 
never became involved in partisan politics, three Directors stated that 
they were frequently"" ... "" ...... and four ofthe post-1994 Directors General stated that they 
were asked, and one post-1994 Director '-'''''JU'''' ...... admitted that because of his ideological 
background is sympathetic to a party. 
There appears to an ideological collusion of minds between Directors General and 
in formulation of policies and as in the past, most Directors General do not 
policy although they enter into a discussion the oU1Dm;e the nature 
Minister as to the content and is ",nrunt' .. factor 












President Mbeki. Directors Geneml describe ."""", ... ""', .. Mbeki as more of a manager than 
his Dre:oel~es:sor ."""'" ........ c .. Mandela is described as a good leader, personable and is 
respected by every Director GenemL Hn'UP'\!pr President Mandela is described as more 
of a "hands off' manager and more of a leader than a manager. fact, during 
Mandela presidency Thabo Mbeki was managing government conducting Cabinet 
H ... ',,",UHJ:;". President Mbeki is described as much a "hands on" prt:'SIUC::lll who is 
efficient, intelligent, well read, knowledgeable about issues, and has ability to 
analyse detail. President Mbeki is apparently very much involved in the formulation of 
policy through a staffofadvisors in Office of the Presidency (an Office that continues 
to in staff component) and through feedback received from Cabinet and its 
committees. This is the same description in fact the same terms used by pre-1994 
Directors Geneml to describe Botha's presidential style. It is certainly not the 
intention of the to President and PresidentMbeki as they 
Oltren;,nt ideologies and policy goals are different. However, it is that 
they do share similar presidential styles of management. are of course 
this presidential style. President Mbeki may be inclined to become involved in too 
many issues he not have knowledge This 
may to making unqualified statements such as his recent comments about the causes 
ofIDV / AIDS, or may become a "jack of all trades and a master of none." A president 
should be a leader providing the country with a and his Cabinet political and 
policy direction. This is why ''''~'''''''~H' Mandela was an .. n,"'i"T.u .. as not 
had the interpersonal skills to be leader, he 
of reconciliation and development. President has 
Africa with the vision 












and will only do so once he relinquishes his presidential style of"hands on" management 
and leaves the technical advice during policy formulation, and the administration and 
implementation of policy to the specialists, Directors political-
administrative interface and the role ofthe Director General as policy advisor be 








,,," .... "',1"'''" in a 
positive light with some General, who during the period, 
that wished they could have done more to diversify staff component of 
their departments. Directors were asked about transformation initiatives as 
fixed term and performance contracts, and presidential appointments. Although 994 
Directors General had no experience with performance agreements as agreements 
. were only introduced 1998, many were nonetheless willing to provide an opinion. 
Ninety-three percent of Directors both and post-1994, are supportive of 
term contracts. Ninety-three percent of pre-1994 and one hundred of post-
1994 11J .. ~ ... t.n._ General are supportive of performance contracts . ..... O'U/E'''.IP .. 
few TI","P1"\Ij;JT1t'\11," from both post-1994 Directors 
are a 
initiatives. 
Most Directors General are supportive of fixed term contracts as it enhances 











General who is not performing. However, there is the danger that with every five years 
there is an election which could in a turnover of Directors General who not 
share the same ideological as the political leadership. This turnover can be counter 
productive as recent changes in administrative leadership that and 
instability departments resulted in poor performance and low morale. term 
contracts is also a useful tool to increase diversity, creativity and as it 
avoids stagnation ensures blood" at the most ofthe public 
problem is rPC'1rn1'"<:! General who are aware they only be in 
the position for years may not have a Innr"-T'~"""'" vision. and policy 
is therefore short neglecting initiatives may be more AHA"1"nl~ but are 
beyond their tenure. The term contracts may result in a of competent 
Directors ...... VALV" ..... Directors ...... """"'.' ..... may have contracts renewed for "' .... ,1"1' ...... 
five but given the pace of work and extent oftheir responsibilities most 
years and are duly employed the private sector with better remuneration. Also, 
given relative youth of the current Directors General there is a possibility that they 
will find more lucrative careers in sectors. HnUlf"\lf'1'" most Directors General 
support idea term contracts are no less than five Most state that it 
a year to acquaint oneself with a particular department, another year to ,-,u.", .. ".", 
policies and another three to implement. Also, the administration of transformation 
initiatives changes administrative leadership 
results in new tralostlornllatllon initiatives, which in part contributes to a of 











It has lnn''''''''''~'rI that Directors General enter into three-year contracts. 
reasoning is that Directors General should fonn part of a management team at the 
disposalofthe which can redeploy any Director General to another portfolio. It is 
argued that Directors General should fonnulate their three 
should then be rotated so that are new initiatives the rple:menta1tlOn of 
" .... , .... ,,·u IS there1iore avoided. contracts are problematic. 
the constant turnover will Secondly. Directors General 
may receive better employment from other sectors, both locally and 
internationally, and their skills will be lost to the public selVice. South Africa is in 
competition in a global market for scarce skills, particularly at this senior managerial 
leveL Thirdly, it is a dubious assumption years of policy funnulation 
Directors General may become complacent. In mct it may be the case that a Director 
"",..,:U,,",iU. will about feasibility a policy ifhe 
or will not I" ....... ., .... "' ... "" ... nor will 
consider outcomes ofthe policy. If the Director is involved in the 
fonnulation of a policy and implements it as wen, then it follows that he or wil1 
ensure that policy is implemented as it was intended and evaluate it making 
adjustments as nec;essarv. nrpP_v'pl'Ir contracts assumes is a vast of 
persons qualified to assume position of Director General, but the reality is that there is 
a lack of skills South Africa and it considerable time and effurt to fiU position 
""'\.I.U,",""'. The redeployment of Directors General assumes 
General department despite lacking 











administrative leaders of a department employed "'1-""""'''''''''''.<1.1 for their "'V1'\",rl·i..,,,, in a 
particular area and thereby able to provide specialist adviqe to a Minister, tum 
provides a department political leadership and support, it is the who 
can deployed to any 
has also a suggestion the role of the Director as adlrnlIustrat~C)r 
policy advisor should be separated. A Director (interview, Johannesburg: 9 
2000) explained the future of Directors General as follows; Minister calls 
the DG ofthe Department and sits down the DG and says, 'This is my policy. I want 
you to implement this. it possible? How much do we for it?' And so on. Then 
to Parliament, for money, contracts you as a Department to on 
that policy. And then when deliver, that policy unit of the m or 
office monitors your delivery. That's why it easier when criticise the 
Department for to do things. It's not like you are attacking Minister 
.l.UJ.JlUJ~;, it's the And the can stand out from that Department or 
she is rP!..,nnnC:l and it it fails to implement or policies, and 
hold the DG accountable. our system is not like role of the policy 
advisor is linked into one, and therefore Ministers tend to defend nonsense an 
on their Department's perfurmance is an attack on them as because the 
around and a decision around implementation same 
people, the Minister and probably one that has to 











both the policy advisor and manager of his Department you are bound to 
confiicts .. .there's a whole document which was given to Mbeki ... " 
The is a proposal that should divorce 
themselves from the political responsibility of a portfolio and that accountability 
policy should the responsibility ofa department, the Director GeneraL 
in effect allows a Minister to absolve him or herself from policy accountability and 
to "pass the buck." Secondly, quote illustrates that Directors General are becoming 
subservient to political ",,,,,,,,,,,i-,,,,,, with Directors General playing less of a in 
policy formulation. Thirdly, the quote shows that is a growing trend of employing 
managers for government departments divorcing Directors ....... " ......... . 
their specialist advisory role. Should this come to fruition the ofthe Director 
'U"J .. ..,~'c.u win to public while policy and 
will be concentrated the Office ofthe searchc~r has 
identified these trends already taking place as some Directors General, without specialist 
expertise are deployed to various departments. There is also the increasing use 
advisors the Office ofthe Presidency, and concentration of policy formulation in 
and to answer the posed are 
General becoming more public administrators than specialist policy advisors? 
The analysis of current trends indicates that Directors General are becoming more 
m<:magelrs with some 
co-ordinated through the Office of the 
the formulation is being 
Although co-ordination of policy is 










of policy should not be margulallsea 
explored in the following chapter. 
argument 
Most Un:eCl:ors General "" .. · ..... "n the ....""l"1-n,I't'fl·Olnr·", a,greeI1llenES as it not only 
pelrtol1TIfmce. but structures the he1wf~en Minister and Director 
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General 
and cannot be 
Director General knows his or her respective responsibility and roles, 
SmlISS(;:a for arbitrary reasons. Directors General therefore not only view 
Delt101rm:Bl1(~e aJiZ;reemlenl[S as a tool for "' .... 'l1 .. ' .... cr performance, but as an insurance against 
political whims and the:retore adds an objectivity to political-administrative interface. 
However, some General although in agreement with performance agreements 
have certain reservations. performance Director General is firstly intangible and 
difficult to measure. According to one Director General there are too many variables, for 
example the performance of other public servants and contractors, is not controllable. 
Furtherrnore, the ilature of the public service is such that the measure of service delivery 
is difficult given that there is no bottom line or benchmark as the private sector where 
profit is measurable. In fact, many Directors General recognised performance contracts as 
a private sector initiative which is not really feasible the ch~mgm public sector 
environment (see Chapter 2). According to another Director General (interview, 
Town: 14 September 2000) the difficulty lies measuring performance according to 
!.au ...... J, ...... ,"' ... measures sector en'vmmrneIlt is that are 
many variables, which constantly change outcomes across sectors (ibid). One 
Director General (interview, Pretoria: 6 July 2000) stated that although it is a useful tool 











resources which often inhibits performance. Many General that 
agreements are inadequate are not really taken seriously. skills are 
demand and there is an intrinsic awareness of the lack and financial 
resources which inhibits performance. Another Director General (interview, Cape Town: 
14 September 2000) stated that performance contain too and 
not enough substance with performance criteria being too /"; ...... "'.' .. 11.:."'U nature of 
the political environment is such that is more on political 
horse-trading than policy outcomes (ibid). A Director General also stated one cannot 
held accountable non-performance when outcome of a policy and its 
implementation in the domain of provinces and other role-players, and is dependent 
on human capacity which may be beyond the control Director General (interview, 
Cape Town: 14 September 2000). Director General argued that if a decided 
that the pelrtolrm;afl(~e measure was the development of policies, the Director General 
policies as Minister would like and 
measures 
not achievable, he believed would fuil his capacity the v .... v'v' ... (ibid), 
Performance contracts have strengths and weaknesses, but linked to the fixed term 
contracts it could a useful instrument to enhance performance. However, the 
should not punitive, provide General with to 
perform. other words, dismissal should a last resort a more constructive "f-r<.~.,.(',,, 











This would require a 
following chapter. 
of the selection orclce!!;s which will be discussed 
Another transfonnation initiative is the change to presidential appointments of Directors 
General which was introduced 1999. This has been widely misunderstood as it is not 
the President alone who appoints Directors General. As mentioned earlier. the short list 
of candidates for the Director General position are interviewed by a panel of three 
Ministers and after the selection interview the candidate is discussed at level 
t're:slOent being appointing authority after Cabinet approves the candidacy. 
as also already it is accompli who is appointed to 
the Director General position it is usually decided at a level who Director 
General would The extent to which the decides who should be appointed is 
unknown. Political influence has always been a reality. The present role of the President 
in the appointment of Directors General has strengths and weaknesses. The first and 
obvious danger is that the President will appoint loyalists who support his or her ideology 
and would thus inhibit the articulation of alternative ideas in decision making. Thus, the 
Director would agreeable to any made political leadership. 
Secondly, a more extreme danger could be the appointment of Directors General who are 
not loyal tenns ofideology but also rewarded for their patronage. Another danger 
is also nepotism and which could become a reality ifthere are no and 











However, as more and more countries around the world have discovered, there are merits 
to the President being the appointing authority of senior management in public 
Firstly, it the with the opportunity to diversity at 
senior management level in public service tenns of race, ,,;"'lli .... '''i 
increase diversity of Directors General is particularly given the racial and 
gender distortions South Africa. It also the President the opportunity to appoint 
1"I"' • ...,n1'\c not only 
relevant in South 
public 
where 
suitably qualified for the position 
sectors as well. This is also 
"' .... ", .... ,"' ... '" of skilled black persons who are 
the 
opportunity to persons from a 
it the:re:liore 
skills pool. 
Secondly, the appointment of Directors General by the allows for an 
intennediary when it comes to a conflict between the Director General and the Minister. 
Should a conflict develop between the Director General and Minister, the President as the 
appointing authority can intervene to resolve the conflict or could redeploy the Director 
General to another department without the public service a skilled person. This 
"''''~'':-",n,,,,,n was the introducing of the Public Act 5 of1999. There 
had been conflict situations between Ministers and Directors General such as the much 
publicised conflict between Minister and Shisana. Many ofthese Directors 
General resigned their skills were lost to the public Legislation was therefore 
introduced so that could appoint and could therefore 
mediate between the Director General and Minister should a conflict develop. Although 











place to have a conflict situation between Minister and Director GeneraL The 
redeployment of Directors General should a last resort as the turnover of 
administrative leadership does a negative on performance of departments. 
This turnover would not only affect one department but at least two as are spillover 
em:c[s to the redeployment of Directors General. also assumes that 
Directors General are more generalists specialists can be redeployed to any 
portfolio. This also supports beliefthat is an increasing generalisation of the 
Director role. 
In conclusion some findings can be summarised as follows. The General 
in South Africa has an administrative and a policy advisory Since the 
Director General's administrative has not fundamentally changed. They continue to 
administratively responsible for financial and human resource management ofa 
emlrtt1nerlt. However the present incumbents do appear to more demands and 
than their are responsible the transformation 
;>n<.rln"l;>n,t" with the problems result from rapid change. Directors 
General are activities across 
Directors "-'wJl1 ...... ,,'" in various forums. They have to ensure delivery of services in 
a socio-economic environment with various constraints and are now held 











The Director General's policy advisory role within the political-administrative .nt, .. 1'TIlo 
aDt)ea:rs to be Although there has never been a political-administrative 
"dichotomy" between Directors General and Ministers over the past years, the 
policy role of the Director General is becoming more poIiticised. The poIitical-
administrative interfuce in South African tends towards what Aberbach et al (1981) 
termed the "pure hybrid "PoHcy roles have converged between the 
Ministers. The bureaucratisation ofpolitics was especially evident during the 
Botha presidency with policy being formulated in committees. President MbekPs style of 
policy formulation in committees, which co-ordinate the decisions and activities of 
politicians and senior bureaucrats, once again converges the roles ofpoliticians and 
There appears to be an ebb and flow between the political or administrative leadership's 
involvement in the polity. During the KJetk and Mandela presidencies, the 
administrative played a more dominant role formulation of policy. This 
was a function ofthe political with transition 
and consolidation of democracy. This period required technical input from the 
administrative leadership with an ofthe political dynamics of that period. 
However, during the Botha and Mbeki presidencies the political leadership has played a 
more dominant role the polity. The relative dominance of the political leadership in the 
formulation of policy the Mbeki presidency win even to the extent that 
the administrative leadership may be relegated to the task of managing departments rather 











The politicisation of the bureaucracy has also been to various ae'rre~~s over the 
past fifteen years. However, it is more explicit with the presidential appointments 
Directors GeneraL The research also indicates that the policy role of Directors General is 
declining, a more dominate role by Ministers the political-administrative 
interf:3ce. This finding is consistent with arguments made by Page and Wright (1999), 
and Peters, Rhodes and Wright (2000), that policy is becoming more politicised than 
bureaucratised as is a shift of policy from administrative to political 
arena Director General and Minister ought to have an equal partnership 
formulation of policy rather than either dominating The Minister should 
provide policy direction the Director General shou1d advise the HUU." .... '" on policy 
terms ofspecialist irnr"ul .. rllT" and the administrative and financial feasibility of the 
policy. following chapter provides a normative model of what role 














state and the 
explored many issues such as the impemtives to change the modern 
in international public sector refol1D, the change from the apartheid 
state to a democmtic dispensation, and the consequent transfol1Dation of the public sector 
in South Africa. These ""'"., .... ,'''' have impacted upon Director GenemJ to some ",W,.,A __ • 
Directors Geneml face more demands in terms oftheir administmtive role and an 
increasing politicisation of their policy roJe. There is an implicit pamdox that current and 
future Directors General will General are required to managers in their 
administmtive capacity, at the same are required to be leaders their capacity as 
policy They are to meet administrative policy 
demands. Directors are to u,uuUf~'"' human and tm.aD(~lal resources, 
the same time required to keep abreast of policy 
South Africa. 












Management and Leadership 
and Inn ...... " .... are mtllSl'Jer.lsame to other" - John Kennedy 10 
to Korac-Kakabadse et al (2000: 1) leadership a much uu,""' .... u management 
concept which is 
transferable between 
uncontextualised and emphasises individualist traits deemed 
private and public sectors. are as many definitions and 
theories of management as there are ofleadership. Management and leadership are not 
the same either in concept or in practice. Management involves functions activities 
related to planning, and controlling (Gibson, Ivancevich and Donnelly, 1991: 
Leadership the interaction between people where one person modifies the 
behaviour of others through motivation and influence (Gibson et aI, 1991 :364). A 
manager may direct, instruct or command, but unless others follow voluntarily, is 
no (Gibson et 1991 :365). LI"' ...... "'."' .. ,ll-' therefore is function of a ..... rC!n ... 
ntJ1Llenlclllig another to accept his or 
Stephan Covey (1989:101) ............ ..,..,,'" 
without the exertion offorce (ibid). 
the following manner; management is a lower focus with most managers 
concerned with the question of "how best can I accomplish things," while leadership is a 
higher focus with question of "what are the I want to accomplish?" 
Ingstrup and Crookal1 (1998) conducted research with public service organisations that 
were reputed to be the best performing organisations fur at five years. research 
involved senior management responding to open-ended questionnaires with a final 











1">",""''''''',,4> in fuurteen developing and developed countries. 
lngstrup and Crookall (1998) discovered a number ofvariables that influenced the 
effectiveness public service organisation, and although it is beyond the scope ofthis 
paper to adequately each variable, lngstrup and Crookall (1998) identified 
leadership mission statements as two ofthe key 
lngstrup and Crookall (1998:53) believe that leadership involves a leader assisting an 
organisation in the development of a shared mission, that is a unity of pmpose. They 
(ibid) discovered that ett.ectlve 'P<>.('IP7'''''''I7"1 requires ""'~""U"F.. involving 
dispersion, commitment, consistency and leadership beyond borders. Listening involves 
not just hearing what public servants or employees have to say, but actively listening to 
un(ler~starlO what they are which with empathy (Whetton and 
Cameron, 1995:267). Directors "...,'u .... ' ... when .. ""·nn .... t1 to the questions relating 
to communication stated that they do listen to employees concerns and problems, but 
there are often time constraints. 
Involving, delegating a d dispersion refer to leaders involving employees in decision 
....... "w,1"> and and and enabling employees to 
responsibilities and activities (Ingstrup and CrookaH, 1998:55). Most Directors General 
do involve senior In(l!nal~ernI::IU in decision-making, but do not appear to have faith 
delegating responsibilities to man~~ers in departments. This is in their lack 
faith in the capacity of management their departments. Commitment by employees is 











and Crookall (1998:57-58) public servants are 'TI"1"P",<"1"I about what 
want from .... ",1'1"",,,,, iftheyare public servants can respond with 
performance beyond expectations. Exemplary leadership requires more than cajoling 
employees into activities, but involves creating a rewarding environment employees 
(ibid). Directors General do not appear to have this attribute ofleadership. Most 
appear to be crisis managing, setting activities and c~oling public servants rather than 
an environment where public servants reVl/arolea. and will 
to leadership mission of the I'1A''''.,.,..t ...... '''n1" It is theretiore not that many 
public servants are not motivated suffer transformation u .... ,"" ...... 
Consistency is another aspect of effective leadership and a to undertake 
three basic actions. Firstly, the leader must be consistent with and focused on achieving 
the organisational mission (ibid). Secondly, a leader's individual style must be consistent 
with organisation's leadership style, and thirdly a leader must be consistent 
word and deed (ibid). Directors General do not display consistency in terms 
"'''''''''''"l1''',O the addition, because most Directots General have 
been appointed, they are not familiar with the style ofleadership nec::oe:o in the 
department. .... ""'''' .. " General should undertake a concerted to understand the 
lead by exrurnpJe, oWlers are 
not visible and ,",VA",.,,.,,,, .. in their communication. The last important attribute of 
leadership is leadership beyond borders, that is external leaders whose responsibilities 
extc~nabeyond their own and lead in community networks of related 












external leaders as they have opportunity to provide leadership cO.Qrdinated 
forums such as Clusters. Hn'\W""llPr Directors General external leadership is limited by 
mentioned ea1:ner, Directors General do not time to 
emerging develop new delivery .u ....... 
It is seJdollD that one a with manag;emlent abilities ..... '''U''''''/Ar 
given the complex environment in which Directors General function, it is important 
them to leaders rather managers to meet the increasing position. 
They should provide direction towards the achievement of the departmental mission, and 
motivate employees to achieve departmental objectives. They should avoid becoming too 
engrossed personnel problems and mundane management matters. Human resource 
issues do not have a financial implication, be~mrLg in mind Director General is the 
Accounting ""A-".V"''' should be delegated to 
Most Directors General as Jea,aers. always been 
leadership positions and been respected for their leadership abilities these 
jJositions. Directors General who were interviewed said they have potential to be 
IP!>,/'1A1r'<: but because ofthe demands position and 
the lack of management capacity in departments. As discussed earlier, most 
Directors General stated that they have a participative of management as they want 
to involve other levels mana~~enlen in decision making. nUl'''''v~>r it is suggested that 
departments that Directors ..... ""."""A.,... should be leauelrs of a transformation n-rn"""" 











organisational objectives. Thus, a process that lnr'nt'1l'\nl~TI"<;! both a participative 
", ... ", ... '1-0'1-"...-1 approach transformation rtmc:mts and delivery 
quality IS reco111lm(ma 
participative process should include as servants as possible to a 
common value as the u.u" .. uvu. the "''''''''+'''1''1"""t This or(),ce~)s 
In .... '''' ..... a mission statel1netlt should as as possible a participative one where all 
employees uniCleI'Statnathe .. Ai."".,.,i of the rt",.'\", ... ITn,"'ni" Moreover, employees will develop 
a sense of ownership commitment to the mission ofthe t1""",,,, .. t .... ,,,, ... i" It should not a 
strategic the sake planning ... "" ... 'LV •• '... but a COflceltea to 
public servant department decision u. ..... "' .. ,'1">. process 
a common set of values n/" ........ o quality "''''"11''''"' to all South l1TT" ...... , .... " 
117"" .... 1:" .. " General were asked strategic plannltngprocesses departments 
percent that the "' .. ".""'",, usually involved senior matna:gernellt on a retreat 
facilitated by a consultant. Only TUJP'T1TU percent 
planning ........... "PO"" for by all public 
servants to participate in planning The twenty percent of Directors General 
incorporated a more internal process of strategic planning stated that this was 
because had departments thus fewer or they 
incorporated a bottom up of each in a developing a mission 
statement which was finally into one departmental statement. The 












strategic nTo,ces,s. although it be more cumbersome and time-
consuming. 
However, are long term benefits to planning and establishing organisational 
objectives. alternative smLte~~les can be ;::'U~~Jf.v;::'Lv'U. depending on the nature and 
ofthe department, for a more participative strategic planning process. This would 
hopefully in more commitment and mission statements and organisational 
objectives. The option is that department is m and number of 
employees, then it is possible all employees to participate in a ~ ... _._,..,._ planning 
process, employing the services consultant, or the senior manager of corporate 
services or 1-'''''''''''''''5 to facilitate the process. second option is to use managers of 
division to facilitate a planning process for each division and then using 
services of a consultant or collectively all senior managers to assimilate each division's 
mission statement into a departmental mission. The third alternative is to use information 
lec:nn·OWlgy such as for large and dispersed Qet)art:me:nts to incorporate 
the a departmental UU'~"""'U the 
"''''.."" ..... ''' of a consultant or a 11""I'..: ........... ''''n .. developed a 
statement it is important that the exercise be not just an academic one, but one that is 
implemented and adhered to as as possible. In words, the mission statement 
should accepted and and should provide p:; .. 'l .......... "'"'V and a for the 











The ....., .. ...,"'.'U1 General should then adopt a more task-orientated of management for 
the achievement of the decided mission statement. It is Director guided by 
decided upon mission statement that makes mission department by 
establishing objectives ensuring objectives are being met senior 
management. The Director General provides leadership and manages the 
objectives ofthe department through senior management and line This 
strategy Directors General to following: 
1. Understand mission department, 
2. Develop objectives and stnlteJlueS to achieve mission statement ofthe ti", .. ""ri'rn 
by consulting Minister, 
Provide leaael'Shllp to manag:ers in the by nT,n,II" 1TA,'TI(1," and 
........ _", ... in achievement 
oIIJlmlJnIca1:e this £;U1 ..... J."",'" and Urt~CLllon in a consistent unambiguous 
manner, 
5. the implementation and monitoring of objectives to managers 
department, and 
Evaluate achievement of objectives tenns 
This strategy for the achievement of objectives in the of the departmental 
statement will Directors General demands pressure complained 
essentially leaders rather managers, especially 
delegation win reduce long nm.rlr'"O" hours, the .Ln.l,",,",'.Vl 











theret,ore be a and his or her managerial role should be reduced delegating 
certain responsibilities, as the implementation of policy the transformation 
process with consequent pel"SolOm!lproblems, to other levels of management. 
aelelll:lUcm of responsibilities may a review legislation. 
Thus, the l .. ·.,.,..i"r' .. General should provide administrative leadership by ""''"'''«'''''''''5 the 
development of organisational objectives in the context ofthe departmental mission 
statement, plan and policy framework. The implementation of strategic 
objectives should be delegated to senior management and the Director General should 
monitor the achievement of objectives, control financial resources in the 
achievement of these objectives. Thus, the evaluation of the transformation as 
well as information systems and research capacity needs to be improved. 
The lack of management within public service to be addressed as welL 
Training and educating public servants to meet challenges of an ever-changing 
environment and to improve management capacity is essential. and education is 
needed to in the public and although it is a process, 
it is an nv€~SUnellt in human capital, and hopefully the quality of service delivery will 
improve and public sector inefficiencies will be reduced. 
According to White Paper on Public "",,, ... 'u.£> Training .1..<\ ..... "'''' •• '''U (1997: ""'''',.,'''u 
5.5) formulation, implementation evaluation and eallc3ltlOO 











1. All public servants will be have access to VU~"VH'~ and meaningful opportunities for 
education, training personal development, 
service training and education will focus on outcomes and COlmp,etfmc rather 
than and 
Public training education will be promoted in a manner will enable 
public service institutions to become 
development. 
' .... ", ... 1',,'" Four, 
nT'<>n'l"'1" a low ""'M,rU'I1ru 
nUI'P'U"" as mentioned 
of public servants. 
public servants 1999:37). 
institutions capable of continuous 
are problems the ......... "j'5 and education 
national and ..... .,.u, .. ,,,, 
training 
epslrtrrlents have 
failed to utilise their training and in the majority on tT'<liinin 
and education represented less than one percent annual expenditure 
(Westhuizen, 1 Many departments have failed to provide adequate financial and 
human resources available for education and of public servants (ibid). 4nn1't,Pl' 
problem is lack of co-ordination as training are by a of 
providers from local and international public and sectors (ibid). Westhuizen (ibid) 
a transformed approach to the and e01L1CSltlOn of public servants is 
net~Qel[J. which be at ..... "''011 .... public servants with a ne(~QS-D<:Lsel[l. 
outcomes-based and competency-based apl()roacll. 
1995 the African Qualifications Authority was tJ"""""' .... which "''W'',\11'~'''''' for a 











is att~lml)trruz to change the institution-led, le-!lJa5,ea HnJ ..... "".'" of training 
education to a standardised system which reCOg]l1S(!S outcomes competence 
(Westhuizen, 1999:39). It is not the intention paper to the of 
outcomes-based and competency-based education (an often contentious South 
Africa), but it is important to note training education outcomes as 
public servants and The outcomes can summarised as follows: 
1. IdentifY and problems in which responses demonstrate and creative 
Work ef'fectively in a team, group, organisation and community, 
3. Organise and manage activities responsibly and ",tt,:>l'1',,,,,"I1.' 




Communicate effectively using visual, mathematical and/or written presentations, 
science and technology effectively critically. showing responsibility towards 
the environment and health 
Ue:mC)flstra1te an understanding world as a set ...,.1~.'ta.rI systems (macrovision) 
...... "' ....... '..,. and ","".J"""'''' a ,,,;,,"'<>Y,, f strat(~Q:i(lS to more effectively, 
9. Participate as a res:ponSl national global communities, 
11. 
culturaHy aesthetically sensitive across a range of social c011teJl{ts, 
education and career opportunities, and 
Develop ",ni"",,7"""""1"""'1'1 opportunities (South 
""",,,,,,,.,,.2000:318). 1996:20-21, 











Hilliard and Wissink (1999: 11 :u.",,,,.::;:u that an alternative approach or model to the 
training education of public servants needs to developed. They (1999:10) argue 
that there is a need to develop "all-rounders" the public service, which of 
people who are capable of handling change efficiently, and flexible enough to adjust to 
dynamic environments. Plato in suggested an institute be established to 
develop public officials and leaders who would be able to meet challenges 
in suggestion as public officials 
that is mc:re~lSU1lg1) '"''''.UV''''''''" and changing U .... '."""""".".f", challenges to deliver 
It is therefore that schools established in 
nrc, un,,,,,, to train and educate current and future 
who have excelled an _~~. __ ~."'~_'_ degree in fields should 
go'vernatlCe where are educated in the 
public administration, public management and public policy. completing 
necessary courses graduates a postgraduate in Public Administration. The 
schools should based on the Nationale d' Administration), but 
taking cognisance of the African context. Forexamp]e, to avoid potential of 
nine schools of governance be The regIOnal 
representation of public managers national departments will add to the diversity of 
<tltten:mt sectors of South society in government. Students who graduate from the 
schools with above grades should be recruited by national government, but also 











curriculum for the schools of governance should developed in conjunction with 
South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI) and according to UO.l""><'IJ.l"">< 
requirements. 
at least a 
curriculum should ,,",V!.li; .. ;noftheoretical 
period. first should equip students 
practical "'VJUl!J'VH"U".,.over 
the theoretical 
foundations critical skills needed to function within "''''' ... 11,..'''' spe:cl!l,Call)l at 
a management The core theoretical courses should 1 .. ",,1\,n.''''' study of public 
policy, public sector management (public financial human resource mana:gerneIlt), 
project implementation and service delivery, applied research, ethical and regulatory 
leadership and making, and communication. should also be 
during the year to choose an elective course area 
su~~geste:d elective courses could UU,,'!"' .... "" C~[)mmulmt and provincial an'JP1"'1nTnpnT 
mt(~rrultloinal and dlpilornatlc ''',M .... J'''''''. public eCClIllOlmlC " ........ ,"""', and 
studies. The core and ''''''''-nl<' courses should students for 
is an internship. Students 
national 
0(\.,1 ..... "'.,...' .. 1"1+ nOlt1-g0vc~mmenta and statutory 
bodies. the internship, students should men to red a designated ...... "u .. :E>~. 
appropriate organisation. The internship should a meaningful and 
so that students can acquire practical skills and critically apply 
knowledge. It is also the second ofthe pn:lgnlmme 
should complete a research project on the internship. The completion 










with who both the knowledge of public administration, 
policy as well as practical skills. 
Graduates ofthese schools 
man8jgerneIlt and those who 
gmrerrlan4:Je should be placed at levels 
manag;ement should be at the lower 
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tracked into middle manalgernellt positions. Eventually experience further 
training these may promoted to management and Director 
positions. The system offust-tracking and public servants for senior 
managerial positions has met with some success (see page 53-55). Although, fust-
tracking will attract graduates into public and improve diversity at 
managerial level, it is this system should first be conducted on a pilot 
basis, and continually monitored and vall"a~~_u by the South African Management and 
Development Institute 
The training education """......,.."~ public managers should u .... " ... u .. "' ... through 
use .... .,.'rfn' ........ " .... ,..·.,. contracts. The .• _, •. u •• ,.., be 
undertaken by regional schools of governance. Current public managers could opt 
for degree programme of two or enrol for courses would be a 
diploma COInpCmeltlt pro1gI'Glmlne. Public managers at local and provincial levels of 
01'"".,...,' ... ...,.,.111" would be at the respec:tl .. .,."c,,,,,,,,,,, schools and 
at the national level of government could 
Gauteng. 











suggested education and model will hopefully improve the 
calibre of public llH"Uc;q;:i""l;:O at all levels and future General as well. The training 
and education of public managers for Director 'LJ"".U""l,IU positions thereby incorporates a 
more career system to appointment of Directors It will provide senior 
management within the public service with an incentive to perform given the possibility 
of promotion. However, a ore:terred system of meritorious promotion does not preclude 
the President from appointing suitably qualified from outside the public service 
to Director liener,aI positions. training and education of public managers will provide 
a skills pool 
President with more 
management capacity 
which Directors General can be selected and provides the 
choice. Training and education will improve 
public service which is severely lacking and places 
innumerable demands on current Directors General. Thus, the training and education 
public managers will also enable the Director General to become more of a leader than 
man8jgeras the public managers would be more equipped to deal with delegated 
responsibilities. 
The and ap~lolIltment of public lHWllal;"'" to General pmnm)flS are 
equally important. selection and appointment of Directors General is 
clouded secrecy. status quo is not desirable. selection process by a 
ministerial interview panel, consisting ofthree Ministers, should more open 
There should more public "".., .. '1",.,.'" of the sel,ectlon n .. ".,...,.,,.,, 
especially Director General is the Accounting Officer, responsible the 











scrutiny process since the Director '-'...,''''''~, .... is accountable to Parliament for the 
financial management of a department. This committee should ofthe chairs of the 
..., ... .uu.J'u""" Committee ofPu blic (SCOPA), Portfolio and National Council 
Provinces LomDlmees 
party. The COD1ffiIUee 
an 
Public Administration, and a me~mt)er each opposition 
..."£"r,... .. ,,, General should play the ",,,,,1,,,,,,1",,,..-,,, and aplPOlmrnelU 
Once a vacancy for a Director General position is identified, it should openly 
)"'n~rilm"l't of Public advertised. A shortlist of candidates should be 15 .... "' .... LQCL ........ by the 
Service and Administration (DPSA) conjunction with Minister and management 
the department where there is a Director General vacancy. shortlist of candidates 
should evaluated according to criteria such as suitable qualifications, in the 
management and UUUU\.HUl resources, the development of policy, leadership 
... u ....... ,'-'". The criteria should developed in conjunction with the South 
Development InC!lr.hl'r", (SAMDI), Department of Public and 
Administration (DPSA), the Public Commission (PSC) and The 
candidate should be to make presentations to Cabinet as well 
as the The prclcetem:ngs committee should open to the 
and ... "", ....... It is important the public, adequately 
mtt[)mled about the Director General government department. The media could 











most suitable candidate the position of Director '-' ..... Jll~'~. should decide upon 
..,u,"",,,,, The Chair and Deputy Public Service Commission (PSC) should 
attend as n""""' .. '''P1"" .... ' .... u .• ""' the Cabinet for appointment of the Director 
executive arm on',/P1"1nTn.p.nt accountable to and provide a ",,/,,1tPTn of 
... u ... .." .. .., and balances the lnhnp1C'1t of Directors ,-, .. " .. Leu 
The 1T"" .. nrn." ....... , .. ",,'11 and selection process Directors '-' .... ,lU ....... L ... have been 
recommended order to develop leadership in the public service. It is 
Director General who is responsible for the human and financial resources of a 
government department, for transformation of government departments and society, and 
the delivery of services to South Africans. This is a position that deserves and 











Political and Administrative Interface 
"The first method for estimating the I7nn",,"'" of a is to look at the men he has 
around him"- Niccolo Machiavellill 
in previous chapter, 
increased politicisation ofthe nnr,\,u" ""'T"ll1C'P in Africa. I-I",n,,,"',,,,, .. as noted, there 
are strtmgths and veak.m~ss(~s in presidential appointments. It is however recommended 
the presidential power to make appointments retained with addition of certain 
"' .. ' .... ""."" and balances. training and education of public managers will ensure 
meritorious promotion as as the appointment of qualified Directors '-' ...... "'j, ..... The 
selection and appointment process as described earlier will ensure objectivity, 
impartiality transparency in the appointment of qualified UIJ:'ect:ors ........... "'j, ..... 
political-administrative "1'"""*<>,.,,, in South Africa should ideally a n<'l1-tn~'NI''I1n 
between equals should synergy the 0.4 ...... ", ... of policy. 
should ....... ""a ..... the political vision crn'''P1'1rnn,,,. .... t with specific policy priorities to the 
Director '--'''''''''' ...... The Minister should provide political leadership for department 
under portfolio, and should assist Director General the 
political en'{lnmnrlCnll. The ....., .. "''''.'v. General on other should provide 
department with the administrative leadership by facilitating development 
II Machiavelli, N. (1935) ..:..="'-"'-''-'''== 










strategic should be consistent with policy envisaged by 
Minister as well as the departmental statement 
in the .... ...,.""'"'" chapter, the political-administrative interfuce South 
Afiicais ep(maent on personal relationship between 
Ministers. relationship was explained in "strong" or "weak" 
between Ullrector General and Minister. Thus, (1981) typology 
the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats the following 
aGlmnusltratlve 11"'11",,,,"1"1>,,,,., .. IS SUI~ge:ste:d for the South context 
Figure 3: Normative Model of Political-Administrative Interface in South Africa 
Po litical-Administrative Dichotom 
U,,,JU<;:;. ... n""",","V' GenerallWeak Minister 
Then 
The political-administrative QICnOl:0ITIV as 
J1l"P'{"Tr\l" GeneralfWeak Minister 
Then 
by Aberbach et at (1981 :5) 
the relationship between politician and bureaucrat in dichotomous terms where the 
politician formulates-policy and the bureaucrat implements the policy. A qualified 
version political-administrative "dichotomy" would complement the Strong 
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Director-General/Strong 11 ........ ". relationship. The Minister Director General would 
have to understand and respect each other's roles. The Minister would develop spe:CltilC 
policy objectives. The Director General would only provide limited advice in terms of the 











implementation of the policy. This would to a extent avoid conflict situations as 
neither would be encroaching on the other's roles since 
each would have their seU1ara:te domain of influence. The 
roles would distinct. Thus, 
of "fact -interests" is more 
appropriate in addressing the prob lems associated with the Weak: Director General/Strong 
Minister mt(;~rtac:;e According to Aberbach et al (1981 :6-9) the "mct-Int(;'re~~ts" image is 
where both politician and bureaucrat participate in formulation of policy, the 
DUlreaIUCI'ats bring and technical while politicians bring y,"",,,,,,,,_ 
1T'1TPrl"<1T<1 and concerns to formulation of policy. The and 
articulation ofmcts based on knowledge and the Director 
would the dOlnilllan(~e of the Minister in formulation of policy. 
Director General would be empowered by the use of knowledge and facts when making 
submissions to Ministers. Thus, alternative policy options would initiated by the 
Director General based on valid and factual arguments. 
The described by et al (1981) is more 
appropriate for the Strong Director General/Weak: Minister interface. The "energy-
equilibrium" is described as a policy furmulation process involving the bureaucrat and 
politician as bolli are with politics et aI, 1981 :9). is the case in 
the Strong Director General/Weak: Minister relationship where both are involved and 
cognisant of dynamics of the political environment. However, according to Aberbach et 
al (ibid) the distinction is that the politician articulates broad, interests while 
bureaucrat narrow, focused This would the domllnatlce 












can more provide a policy equilibrium understanding the 
po litical dynamics and diverse nfp1"PQ·tQ The Minister on the other could satisfY 
mt(~res:ts and ........ <Uh'Uv in policy, has to diffuse 
policy objective 
Thus, the iU •. U",.", .. also to r .... n, >Ill. a policy """CUHE; political 
int~~rests to Director General who provides more onlCtlCaI input in the formulation 
policy. 
As noted in previous chapter the "pure hybrid image" retlre5:errts the f'n,l'l,\II"ro,:>nc'p 
roles between IJVJ ...... " ..... ., and bureaucrats (Aberbach et al 1981 :16-19). The is a 
bureaucratisation of politics and the politicisation ofthe bureaucracy, an of 
roles between politicians and bureaucrats (ibid). is only relevant when 





Director '-',",ILL,","'" where he or 
complement other's 
may policy 
the Director 'U,,",j'n,,"'''' HLJ.Ul':""'L m or UU,",,",',,VllL. It is 
often the case that Director is weak in policy advice Director 
uelneraJ and senior management ofthe department do not understand the policy direction 
or political dynamics. The Minister should policy 
objectives the General and to political 
environment. This could be achieved a committee of policy formulation where 
politics, policy and options are discussed "''''''h~j&.''''n the Minister, Deputy 










also involve Minister the 
understanding ofthe 7na:mu~s and 




normative model of the political-administrative interfuce, incorporating Aberbach et 
(1981) typology, is to address imbalance results weak and strong 
relationships between Directors General and However, a more ideal political-
nterta(~e is one where is an equal partnership. Minister who is 
mandated Cabinet cognisant of political dynamics, provides the Director General 
with policy direction and leadership. It is the responsibility Director General to 
provide the Minister with practical and specialist advice on administrative, ..... "''''.u''' ... 
financial feasibility of the policy. The Director General in conjunction with the 
department and in consultation with 
policy until it is approved by 
adopt the policy and should held 
management and other role-players develops 
Minister makes final decision to 
....... .aUll'" for the !'Iti" .... t!It'" ofthe butnotthe 
Director ,-,"Ill"""" should be held accountable fOf 
financial feasibility, output Thus, the U]lrector 
General should the right to ..... ",al",J''''''' with the Minister in a constructive and 
IJUJ,,,,,,,,,,lVllal discussion. Director General should able to ........ "'".l".'" the Minister 
should implications policy lead to an .............. "' ... mandate, uOiautholnS(~d 
expenditure or an illegal activity as """"''''1'1''1 by "' ...... v, ... Thus, are checks 
balances in political-administrative mt1~mlce. This would enhance the quality of 
public policy as alternative perspectives would incorporated into the formulation of 











Another and UUJuu,",,, that can u .... ',.uu' ... 
and U,L.,.u.;, ..... is the offive-year contracts and pelrtOlllmmce ajzret~m,ents. All 
Director General appointments should be on five-year contract with an 
Should a Director General's peJITOlrrmmc:e prove to 
to both the Minister President consecutive years, or if a Director '-''''';u ......... 
enjg8.fl:ea in an illegal activity, .... .:"'u ... ,, .. should the power to ",."UHi'''' 
Director or his or her on 
notion is different from three-year contract where 







public in terms and C;:Pl"VU",P 
contract should be ext:en(lea 
~Pl'IPl"'!l1 should serve no 
agreeInelrlt with the 
General to develop long term "....."."&"',,,,,,, 
Director 
be 
TPl'IPT'!:!1 who serves 'VU,I".'" 
to create a UV.'UVJlH or than eight to ten 
Knott and Miller's 987) terminology an "imperial bureaucracy." 
The fixed term contracts should be 
between the Director General and his or 
to the pertormaltlce agrleenlents eltlterea into 
mentioned """, .. 11", .. 
non-performance of a General should warrant a dismissal or request for 
resignation. The annual review of a Director General's performance should be a 











objectives are set with frames achievement, but establishment of objectives 
should be a joint decision process which is mutually agreelJLtl The 
must realistic and achievable, which part long-term "h-<.i"",,,n, and 
complements the departmental mission statement. If the Minister and Director General 
decides that the set objective is development policy, it should follow that positive 
intended outcomes should also form part 
General should develop an equal partnership 
providing and the Minister 
The performance agreement should not 
objectives. Minister Director 
formulating policy with the Director 
the political support for policy. 
in a subservient relationship the 
LVH"H~'L"'" and Director General, but should rather be an instrument that enhances 
performance through a partnership between the Minister Director General each 
knowing their respec;tn'e roles in ensuring achievement ... ",,,,,,,",u policy objectives 
and the departmental mission. 
The achievement of objectives should be rewarded with monetary bonuses or 
through some form of recognition. It is also recommended the remuneration of 
Un'Cctors ..... "',,,..,.,"'. should be improved given the demands placed upon them. However, 
consistent failure over to meet should brought to the of 
President and discussed in Cabinet where a decision should made on the future of 
the Director General. This discussion at Presidential and Cabinet level prohibits arbitrary 
decision lll ....... llJl~ by one Minister or the provides a check and balance for 
the Uuectc)r '"'u'", ....... Furthermore, peItormwoce agI1eenlenrs should be applied to all 











Director General to implement a policy if all management, which is also responsible for 
the implementation of policy, is not held accountable for their performance. Performance 
agl~elments should therefore entered into between a General other 
managers, their performance should be reviewed annually by the Ur"'",U,r General. 
chapter sought to provide some recommendations fur the future role of Directors 
General in South Africa. Directors General face a complex and changing world with 
ever-increasing demands placed upon them. They need to equipped with the 'Skills, 
knowledge and competencies to meet these demands. An essential element oftheirrole is 
leadership in tenns ofthe capacity to meet the demands ofthe environment by 
vision and They should not be relegated to the role of manager, 













. "Would you tell me, please, which way 1 ought to go from here?" 
depends a deal on where you want to get to."- Carroll 12 
Governments are facing increasing pressures to deliver quality public with 
limited resources in an increasingly complex changing environment. Governments 
face increasing pressure Intl~gr.lnr~andcOlnDl~tIn the global market. This 
required governments to change economic social...,v, .. " ... " in order to 
industrialisation, unemployment and poverty investing in education and 
""'...,",,.,.,",, to compete in global market. Governments are also an increasing 
population and urbanisation. This ne(;es:sitsltes an increase the of public 
are challenges such as technological developments and epidemics such as 
and old problems of war social.u", ..... ~" .. all of which Im1=,act upon the 
global ..... ",rirt.t- and require government to solutions. '~'15""15 ro Ie state 
and on modem state prompted many governments to reassess role 
the public service. traditional manner in which the public service functioned was 
Oe(;Oflllmg increasingly ........ ".,.u 












Internationally. many countries have met these '"'u<u."'u"'", ... ., by refonning their public 
Most notable in public sector refonn are the United and Britain 
which have ",v,,,,,, .. 't,,,rI these refonns to many countries. Although public sector refonns 
have been criticised for incorporating private sector principles and the success 
reti[)mlS is difficult to quantify, most would agree that the delivery "' ..... ,,'1' ... ,' in these 
countries improved. 
However, in South Africa the post-apartheid government not only the challenges of 
globalisation, technological developments, popUlation growth, poverty, etc. as 
most countries, the O(''',I",,-nrn,,,n'l" is mced addressing legacy of apartheid. 
i-...,.""'i-r'-.... the exact institutions reS·DOJnSlOle for ans:tonmlIllg South 
Africa from an aernoc:ratlc state. South had to transfonn public 
<:!",TVll"", so that it could inequalities provide ""'1'"'<flP.'~" eJITlClenltlV 
and effectively to South Africans, ...... a'L" ... South Africa to ~~" .. IJ"'.'" in global 
was a public had apartheid ideology 
organisational culture, staff component, procedures and systems of services delivery. 
South Africa's public sector transfonnation process was compounded by 
apartheid 
change in South Africa from apartheid to democracy had an enonnous impact on 











major impact on the the the public itself. The 
transformation process involved 
1. mtionalisation and ,"+.' ... .,.0 ofthe homeland, selt-govl~mmg territories' 
apartheid administmtions into one national public service, 
2. adoption of affirmative action programmes to increase representivity ofthe 
public " ....... "" .. 
attempt to improve institutions and management, 
4. development of human resources through and education, 
An to improve service delivery, 
6. The introduction of a code of ethics to instil professionalism the public service, and 
improvement in labour "", .. u."'JU" and working conditions. 
South African public sector transformation is to a large extent upon reforms in 
Britain and Commonwealth countries. South African transformation is 
problematic, complicated, incoherent lacks implementation. The impact 





to conducted in area. ....... ,>1"."'," has 
ofpubUc <;:p"',,!:lnT<;: the Director Geneml. 
This has attempted to assess the impact of transformation on the role of the 











1. What did Director Geneml play pre-and post-1994 South African 
public service? 
What is the adlnirlistmtive and political interface in Africa? 
What to the administmtive and political interface South Africa? 
li"~'l't~\ .. Geneml in South Africa has two basic roles; one being administrative 
of a government department the other policy advisor to the Minister. South 
Africa" the policy and administrative roles ofthe Director Geneml are interrelated. 
findings of this paper indicate that the basic role ofthe Director Geneml as administmtive 
head of department not changed over the fifteen years. The Director is 
responsible the financial human resources in or her administmtive 
capacity. Legislation, prescribing has not changed fundamentally. Directors 
Geneml both the pre-and post-1994 eras the same problems and issues, the 
management offinancial and human resources. will persist into the future and needs 
to addressed by ITn'r'\rn'\l1n management capacity. 
nu}'''''''.... what demands placed upon Directors General. There is 
more pressure on Directors General to perform through the use ofperfonnance and five-
year contracts, and the Public Financial Management (1999). However, current 
li""l't,n.N! Geneml do not take contmctual agJreements seriously as they are ofa 
political .:> .. uu",. network are aware that they enjoy a relative monopoly of skills a 
.... "1 .... 1'1"" where educationally pn:~sSlJre to nPTfi'u"1rr1 is 











to their Ministers and President rather than fulfilling contractual agreements. 
one could argue that the relationship between Directors General and Ministers are more 
personal than legal. These personal relationships are evident as Directors 
accompany Ministers to new portfolio'S. For example, the Environmental & 
Tourism Minister, Mr. Mohammed Valli Moosa, who was previously the Minister 
Constitutional Development, brought Dr. Chrisp ian Olver to the Department of 
Environmental Affairs to head the department. Welfure Minister Zola Skweyiya 
appointed Ms. (previously Director General the Public Service 
Commission) as his Director General after wc,rkllng together at Department of Public 
...... ·."e· .. & Administration and the Public Service Commission. Moreover, the President 
also plays a role in determining which ...,L.LV,",·LVL General is appointed to key positions 
such as the appointment of Commissioner Selebi to South African Police 
. Services, and Mr. Sipho Pityana to the Department vu",,,,,u Affairs. 
Directors General also fuce pressure from Ministers and public to transform 
del)arl:ments while concurrently delivering services in a complex environment. This 
requires to resource problems, to transform 
and deliver with limited financial resources in a demanding political social 
context. There is also more pressure to consult with stakeholders. General 
1994 are mt~:::ral~tlrlg and CO-ODf~rat:m each other to a gre:at~~r extent. are 
and Directors to meet on a regular in order 











(1999) hn(1m~~s where Pennanent ,","',r"l"Ptl'll"1P(! are co-operating as a senior 
management team breaking down the traditional barriers between departments. 
the changes the part ofthe twenty-first century have resulted a change in 
the of the state and thereby necessitated a change the role of the most senior public 
servant. General are therefore facing more demands although fundamental 
administrative role (management of financial and human resources) not changed. 
.... "UJ .. ·uP.. there is the to restrict Directors General to their management The 
Minister Public Service and Administration, Ms. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi has stated 
that changes in the Director General role are necessary because government needs 
managers more than policy-makers (Financial Mail, 29/10/1999). This would in effect 
result a dichotomy the administrative and policy 
would 
policy advice to a .iT.u'H~'."'.L a 
dominate which would lead to an and 
Minister and Director General. Director would 
of the 
Minister would then 
"""",.1n,,,,,, not be to 
provide a check and balance in fonnulation and implementation of policy. Thus, the 
Director General, as a would be subservient to a Minister, and would merely 
ImliJ1elnelrH policy as ...... "',C!"' .. ih Director 











Director General should be the administrative and the Minister the political 
leader. The General should "' ...... "',,.., the Minister with direction pragmatic 
advice on the administrative feasibility of a policy while Minister the 
Director General with policy direction the political support This 
,",U.,U'VU"AUIJ should encourage open and honest 
professional disagreement. However, 
political leadership is not always equal 
relationship between 
Aberbach et aI's (198 typology 
suggested as a means to the inequalities may exist be1:we:en Director ueJner:at 
and Minister. the ideal political-administrative ,nl,fOrI''''. one 
partnership both MU11<:!t.",t' and .1-''''''''''' .. ,. 
other's roles. The relationship oelCWf:en Minister 
V.L"'.:>.:>LVH';U rather should be 




feasible and the public 
A 1 • ...,."1'1', .. General should a in his or aOllllllllsl:ratlve and policy roles. 
manaJgernerlt and implementation of policy should be A_",~'~'_ to other of 
management. The administrative role Director General is to provide vision, 
direction, and leadership to achieve policy and departmental objectives. In the 
i"'''.'''1',,,1 to some managerial responsibilities to other levels of 
management an 
capacity at all levels. 












However, trend towards Directors General becoming managers and than policy 
advisors may be a reality as Director General's policy is becoming more diffuse in 
Clusters and within the national policy The formulation of policy also 
aJlJ>ears to be more consolidated and top-down with Office of the 
playing a dominant in the formulation of policy. The policy role of 
Directors 
South Africa 
is therefore and becoming more politicised. However, in 
policy role ofthe Director General has always been politicised. 
Politicisation is due to the selection process of Directors General which provides an 
opportunity for who the socio-cultural 
political to et al (1999:7-8) the reCIr1.l1t:mel1t and 
patterns of senior public servants shape the culture public ""''''Vl£,'''' Presidential 
appointments have therefore increased the politicisation of the Director General position, 
which has strengths and weaknesses. However, the appointment of qualified persons to 
Director should not be on or political or 
shared ideology. IS does not allow an equal 
administrative intermce. Moreover, the appointment of Directors General based 'on 
personal connections and loyalty does not allow for dissenting or trouble-shooting policy 
The appointment of Directors General should be a more 
transparent process. 
The selection and appointment offuture Directors General should based on excellence 
the ability to deliver in an environment 











to train, educate, develop, recruit appoint excellence. ofthe 
is "".,..t" .... not an 
and lJ'Vin."",." leadership, the 
one especially with the increasing ,u""'iu"by public 
in the political-administrative the 
tmtlstclrm.atioln South and the changing environment. 
nn'·""T<... future 111"A .... Tnr<:! ...... ~ ........ ought to approach their two basic administrative 
and policy roles, as follows. 
The Directors in their administrative capacity should be ''''''.''''.''''' with the 
to deliver, provide vision, and meet challenges within a global environment. 
should departments and management on performance achievement of 
policy objectives. Directors should a participative approach, internally and 
towards the should be 
em~Ol.llra,;~ea to rI.,.",.,. • ..,,, .... for innovative service deJivery it is 
within department, with external su,.keholders or other governmental institutions. In 
terms of the policy role, should on the outcomes of policy, the administrative 
feasibility ofa and attempt to understand the political direction of the Minister arid 
the political environment. 
South is transforming its institutions consolidating its democracy. It is still 
attempting to claritY constitutional 
executive, legislature, judiciary and/or 
institutional arrangements whether between 
the executive branch of government. 
Within executive branch of government an the IJV' .. n,IUi-











playing a dominant role in this relationship. This supports the argument that is an 
.... "u,,,, convergence between politics and administration with the role ofsenior public 
servants becoming more politicised and the political gaining more influence 
the formulation ofpoIicy. This trend is consistent with the international identified 
by Page Wright (1999). r.. ....... "lHU to and Wright (1999:278) there is an 
political over which occurs more often 
during transitions in government. PoHticians to shape to a greater extent 
relationship between politicians and the public service in favour ofthe politicians, 
changes the public are inevitably linked to much political (page 
Wright, 1999:269-270). However, South Africa needs a more sustainable solution to 
the political-administrative interface in order to develop effective policies and transform 
1I0'ver:rnnent , ... "' .. , ..... , .. """",, so that it can COlTIOete in an increasingly changing complex 
world. survival of the ultimately 
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&-th1iOO 61aliotlill) 1~ D'. G. 'II1n N. V'JJ:Ien Ilr. P.li. Ml!YCr 
1m Or. G.. 'Ia" N. \I1j(IM Oi p, S, MlIf'jIr 
,1'~ r.-'t~. F.W. de I0!rk R.H. VIlIIIIIr 
~I'I~ Mr-:-f.W. de: ~Ik ".K \l'l!nll!r 
~BBG ",.F.W . .:e~fI. RH.. V'lId"r 
it!!!:' .Mr. F.W. I!e Kim lUi. Vt:nlllr 
i9(1~ Mr. F. W di Kiert ~H. Venll:r 
1BI.fi.I ~r. F'w . • I<Ier .. ~.G . G(I,1.I$1l 
~!I!llI "'r.E.WJW ~.e. GliltlelS 
1991 MI. l,-I., P~IIRr W,e. Glllbln; 
11i82 MI. LlL "~II.r_ f!,.G.;~rbm 
ljjQ3 Mr.P.B.~:; iJ.BL UIIIf 
1'384 Mr. S. D"IDJ DI. N.C. Piell~.."i 
1005 .Mr. a..Bc~ • Dr. N.c. Pi~n{lllnrt I 
191M) rAtS. Be .... "'.! Dr. N.C 'b1nOAII'J1 
1927 fAr. S. Ellngu _D!- N.C. Mm!l~~_ 
~ I. !J.i. S. HRnaL! Dr_ N.c. MoIIII.!!!">' ,. ,r.lr. 'K ,,~.- ~mi USAI,:\u 
IDEPAR'1l1AEN1J YEAR MlNIS'!R I De 
lEnyiIO(IIY'(l/ii 11182 "'-. SAIL HlIY'~ Mr. J.f. Otlo 
1963 "" . SA A. Ho1~~r. J.F. OtIa 
:a!lll' .. tr.s.AA_~ :Ai J,F. Ollo 
111ft!i "'r. J.W.E. WJI!V :kJ.I".OUu -
'1iD1i Mr. J.W.E. Wle'! ~r. J.F. 0110 
t- le7 Mr. QJ. Kalzle' rir. \\I.r. \I~j(, 
1gee - Mr. Q.J. Kr.lN:' ~. W.F. V1SDl1~ 
190& 'tAr. G.J. Ki;Iz(/ 1"", W,f· V~AD~ 




"'r. V/.F, VlWllk: 
1992 ''wr. "U!nlllf' ~'r. II/.F VirdiOifl 
',003 M". Plenllllr Dr. c..M. CliIrif!lon 
19~ Df. Z. p, Jl)rdM Dr. CJ"'~ 
1!195 Dr. Z. P. JI1IIlhlll Di. CM.~(>:'! 
1896 Ilr. Z. P. Jnnlnn Cr.CM.~ 
188)' IDr, Z. P. JO(d(lfl 01'. C ..... ClI!I'rIrDn 
1HB Dr. Z. P. Jllnlan r.tr. P. Fllzlllll'illcl 
,9$$ tAf. M .. \i'. tAOOSll ~r. P. F~llcmlcl 












~A~EN11 YEAR MINISTI!R DB -Fi:llll111e1 1952 ~.<>.P·f= I-bwJal Cr· J,If, d$ L«K 
1'DS3 Of. J.lI. dll Loor 
1'954 ,Dr. J.H. ,:In l,oQ( 
- - 1986 rAr. u,J. du ,pjez.l: ;Dr. ,1.If. {)~ J..oor 
1~ fIor. B.J. du).'f". Dr. c.. L. SlDt; 
.. 
1!!!67 tAr 8 .J. du Ph'~5 Dr. C. I.. SI91& 
- 19i58 !.fr. B.J. dLi PI~s. Dr. C. L ~iI!s 
100!, Mr. B.J. ckl F'I$6lIi:s Dr. C. L. Blill:; 
1!l!lD Mr. O.J. OJ Flews. ,.. G.,P. Croe!e'." 
1991 Mr. B.J. cio PlA&fIi!< r-Ir. G.P. CI'OellC( 
!l&g;! Mr.-o.1. I<,,~ ~r. E. CoiIil,-
r-- ~!lDl ' .. , •• C. UI!ber;bI!lR Pir.f, ¢NiU t!91)4 Mr. C. Lll'<b;rllJttg '.fl. e. Co:IllIz -; 
~_89~ "", C. L~be.1R lo!r. E. C(ll~<L 
f-
1!1!)! ~'Il'. C. LIetlCnI:r.III Mtt. M..c.N.C.~ 
HUri' ~t:'. T. rhlnll91 tAt:.. M.c.N.c. ~
19;)9 .... T. rianuel MS.. MCNC.RImos 
1!mo M-. T. MAnur:] tAt<. M.C.file.. R.:mor; . .. 
DEPARTMENn Y!AIt I"". I DG 
fa71!liIin ~II!: 1'M2 
1~ 
~" R.F. BDlIIlI Dr. B.G.. Fowle: 
r. RF. 60111& M,. J, -nil DaI~1I 
,11/.;4 , il. R.F. BDIM M; . .J. ,,.~n OIllsen 
1'98!i ~r. R.F. BDlIiEl Mr. R. Kilen 
1D!18 Pli. ItF. B(IIIIII Mr. R. Killin 
lIilfl lilt. R.F. BDlha Mr. R. Kilen 
1D!J.9 rk. R.F. BnlhD Mr. N,I', 'I/.An~ 
1991) rh. R.F. BOlllii Mr. N.P. v~n~ 
.19;'J i'k. R.F. BDlhD Mr. N.P. ""Dn~ 
UIl1 M", R.F, Boiiifi),k N.P .... 81'1 tWeodoll -
1992 - \t'. R.F. BDlhll Mr. L.H. Ev-lms 
1D93 M". R.F. BDlhD fAr. L.H. e .. ol'llO ' -
1994 \t-.A. thn Mr. L.U. Ev1lm 
" B!J~ "';'. A.tNzo -,..r. L.H. e'-Dre; ~lIti !r.\", " . '''lh ~Af, LH. evtlne 
1 997 ~kA. tUo ~r.LH. EvDIIS-
~BDD Ur . .A. Nzo ,..r. J. Ik!Inbi 
l1l1!1D Dr, N. Zu'YISo JAr, $. P~anB 
DI!PAATM!NJ , YEAft MINr$TfR DC 
Hl!illh & Wl!Hal1! !1J05Z ra"r. C. VII1 Rr rlJl!f'N!! __ Cr. F.P. 'Re".Jet 
If(l~.h '" 1lir."Affi 1~ ~. C, -"A'llfcr ro\cN,lc Cr. F.P. RP.1~ 
IlIlIab 6 'IIlIlrlllll 1f104 fir. e. VII'! oJlI' Ml9we Dr. F.P.R"'~ 
~I!DIh & Pap. OeveID:l 19a5 pro iii." ........ Nelocrt Cr. F.P. Rl!liCf-
~.iI~ ~ Pup. o..,l1!lull 1_ Dr. '10 •. 'It'M N.Mtt Dt.F,P.IM;r,t 
~~ilr.-.& PDp. ~DP 1~ :Or. W.II. 'W;n N~1ocrt Cr. C.F. I'IktJbcr 
~cRI1!I & Pllp. DcvGlnll 1'O!18 Dr. W.A. "'~"I NIlIoc:it Cr. C.F, SI.r'-tIiI( 
Jf.a~n & PUl'. OweIu!1 HJMI .g.r. E.H. ~~r --~:...e.F. ::il:Cbl:r 
!f.CIII2I.& "op. O::f'CIDP 11!J90 Or. I!!.H. '/aller 0.:: C.F. 81~ 
~lIllh & Pop. I k'o'dnp 1001 1Dr. E.H. IAYJRr Dr. C.F. Slo'!bBr 
!$ellh ~ Po~. DlWtlul! 1  ~Q2 Dr.E.H.~ Or. C.F. !;I~.L 
4e:rnh & PDp. D~~~~ Dr.E.H.~ ~~:F:SI~ 
~Allh ~1I94 D(, N.C. ZII"I'IA Or. C.F. $11'I~r 
!lellllh --It..BB.L Dr. N.c" Zu;m Dr. O . .shl~nil 
~nh ~!I!);O Dr. N.C. Zwna ~. O .o;!hlsAnA 
",,,,AliI) ~1I97 DI. N .C . Zn:'rr& ~" ()' ~li~l!iI __ 
~Hh p!l!lB Cr. N.c. Zumll . A. NlsaIIJb;1 












PEPAA1Mmn YEAR I MINISTER I DG 
~lIl1oJ1'dl5 1!!6:Z Mr. J.C. HeulIlI Mr. S.S.lI:l1l dc:f"MQrvoR 
1~~ Mr. J.e. Hl!un~ Mr. S,B, 'v.fJ'J ~, Mer_ 
1&114 "'r. J.C.C eolhe ·M,. S.~. "'~ ~er Mefwe 
I-I-u-m-lI-p.-~-lIn- 1!lB5 MI. J,C.~.OlJlhll Mr. a.BS ... "n
19&8 Mr. J.C,G., enlhA Mi. ~.B.$. nn O!>JI 
1-____ ,.1"::5;::U:,-7 Mr. J,e,G. BolIlIl tIIr. G.S's" viln Z)'I 
1!1BB ~.,. J,e.a Balhll ,Mr. G.B 8. \IAn ly'--
1-_ _ _ -+ • ...::9..:.8.:..9 __ Mr. E. Louw I"'i. P..l CoIY.1 
1B!lD "'r, E. L<I'.IW Mr. P.J7, ,",,C<JI,.;;IF~'''' _ _ ----I 
lilA' "'r, E. l.<xNI ~'r. P.J. Cclm 
1--___ -",1~91/2:.::· ':,.. Mr. LA. Pienlllo8f t.1ro P,J. CoIm _ 
,un w. D.P A. &;/nt.':e Mr. P ,J~.-iCCl:---7'!/D'-__ -i 
'1{I9-4 Or. M.G. 5IIlhekal Mr. P..I. Culm 
1-___ -:-'1.=9~ Or. 'AoG eulJl(lkW !4-. P,J. C4l1~n _ 
1!1!)8 Or. M.&.BuUtele!zl ~. P.J. Cj]I~ 
_____ '_11..,..117;,-_ Or. M.G.SUlhnkl11 M'.A.s. Plohoena 
1--___ -"'~9M Or. tA.G. 8IIUIII~1 tat".,\'s" MalOocn=':::"~-1 
1!l1X) !)T. tII.a SUllrl!k:IIl ~1I11111o'tl81J18 
DEPAR11ENI' 'tEAR IItINI&TER Del: 
~lli":IIl!l!. & CM~ ();oyekpi~nt .11!92 -Pbr.llij)) 3. ClJn!ll De'.lebpmil!nl !",,!?8~!~I--_____ _ 
P~nl~ 6. Canst. [kIJr.klpn~'ll 1184 
PloI1nlra &'1:nn~ ~y(tbp!:'I!n1 ~&O!i 
PIlif'"iiIQ &. ClJn!lt. peyl!lopr..:=nt4-=:s~!gB!l;::..+ _____ _ 
F'~nl~ 6. COnsl. CCYn~fJI UI(lj' 
~-nl~ & CORSI.. DitYlllilI:rnllnt :fUUD I 
~_ '" CUII!ll OI!YI:IC~ent iif ;;9B:-:Drll----------,:-:-=-:--___ - - -
Pmv A1fllrts I. N~ill iIt>J(4i1l1L I I/9iJ I~r. H .. !I. KIt!!1 Mr. e.G-ae Beer _ 
P..·lh·Atflllol;i;.& NH:'oolilHolJ!:lIna 1!l91 lu. L . .. ~_ Mr. E.G;. da BM!' 
~Q~lll H:lI'l.I5t:(1 111'Q2 '''r. $.J. d. Beer "'r, E.G de 0 __ 
1Jx;11 0IM & 'H!iU;~ 1m ·Mr. L SIll. Mr. L. . Koch 
Hnlllit'9 1w.4 'PAt. J. Slo¥u Mr. "'.J, ~::C:-::Il:------i 
-
~~ 1m M~5. "'IIr!!mlk~n~. lit-. W.J.~n 
~~t".t! 1'996 Us. 8, 'Alh.m~lIn~1I ~. III.J. CdlIlftn 
~".o. 1W1 M!i. S. MIlrIlI"'ll>MzIIlln~1l M:. W.J. CcIlbrIl 
~a 18 M~ 8. M1h1!mlj-Mti/leRreI(I Ms ..... NJIIiI!l;1ID·NhIDJ)O 
fiidnn 11995 kU. 8. M.trtmti~lrlln'~., 1'0'5. M. NGJIlb1I!I-Nhl,.;;;-
DEPIUl:I MPoi Y!AR I MINISTER ~ .. .'.DO 
JU9Iie:e '11 ,-~o.: Mr. H.J. Cal!lsu Mr, J P,.), C\\(ttt.ti 
~ ·tAr. HJ. CO$l6ee S,s. v3!!.dI!C'MI!IWI! 
1~ Mr. H.J. Cal!l5H 8.5. UAn dr:r Mora(l 
1-----+1=':Gr:i=- - ·Mr. H.J. CnlrtsilA $$. yel'l.-iltt., MIilIWIlI 
'!:188 Mr ....... Call1!;11!! IS.5. ulln d~ "'0""0 
I--___ -+l:..:~=-· r:-i __ Mr. H.J. Cal!lsee IMv .• 1 J. ~Ih 
1!!1!8 Mr. H J, CO$Is.. !.MY. J..J. IIb!III 
1989 Mr. kJ. Cal!\!;II!l! :1411. J .J. r.b:lh 
1-----I·,~E5~D~---'Mr. H Jo Cn~(I />Ity. J.J, NI:~lh 
1!:'91 Mr. H J . CI)$WI. MY. J .J. N<i1!!1II 
1~2 Mr. kJ. Cal!\!;II!l: ~Y. J .J. NAlt':!lh 
1--_ __ 1&93 Mr. HJ. Cnlrtstln Atlv. J.J. Nee'" 
1li!14 MI. A.M. ():ns- ~v. J.I. Neelh 
1-___ -+1:::&$=S::-__ -:Mr. ".M. ~iII" 1:\1. J J . N'oelh--
1S91l Mr. A.M, Q'M' ~Y. J.J. r."U~1h 
1!1ll? Mr. ".M. Omr /MY. J.J. ,?Clh 
1--____ I"'I1ie.=.c"'O Mr. A.M. 0miIt !My. U . t-iotdl 












Ql:PNn'MENT I 'lEAR I MINI&TER DG 









lS1i1 ~r J. oJw .... 110:r.; "'r. C. G, (11:1 'v'Iril:'15 
1'.i!i2 ·'Ar. J. de Villcr.; "r. C.t:;. cb \IIII~"!. 
I-- 1~~ I M-. C.G. de \II~ 
iJ.a;d ",1fAI!r. 1&&4 PAr. D. It.. H'lnllk.cm ~. C.~. de VilI=B 
~!I!l5 Mr. Do A. HAn""om ~ -e.G. ~ \/11m 
I- ~e~ Mr. I). A. Hlln~m 'IT. G.'.I. BIr,lIendilr 
11!,1 Mr. D. /t. HDn:kDm ~. G.'''. Dudlen:l~ 
,111Q8 IMr. D. A. HII/ltikOIll ifr.a.M. BUcf'cn:l", 
~gdllllllu~ lI/iJ3 "'15. r . Q\Jiu ,..s;. 8. MOI.t&-M"'~1 .-
EPARTMEN1 'tEAR. 1 MlNISTlR I DB 
MIII~f lWl! Mr. S.P. BollIa Ipr.p.J . ... .3I der '.ldllMl 
1583 Dr.P.J. "49' def "".I¥liI 
193'i Dr.P .J. v;:n dcr '.lCfWe 
1111G~ Mr. P.T..c.~PIO!Islr. Dr.P .J. 'o'o3t dcr r.lCIWC -
1SI!G Mr. P. T.C. Ii. f"~ Dr.P.J. wnliwl Yo:l'I\~ 
1~7 MI. P.T.(;..wPlw~~ Dr.P.J. y;:n dllr 'kfwe 
1~ Mr. E. '~an d!:I" M. Louw Mr. J.D. Flllifin --- 1'ge!J ·Mr. E. \IAn ~ M,~ .... Mt. J.D. Fuu.ie 
1~ Mr. I!. vln ~ M. Louw Mr. J.D. Feud!! 
1199i Mr. E. ~an 6:i" .... t.ow.v Mr. J.P. F(luj\e 
1'\lGQ .Ar P.G. "WJ)~ Mr. J.D. 1!l:urlo: 
1-MIG Mr. L V.'e'5se1s Mr. J.D. Food!! 
DID..r 191M 'Ar. l 'N6$&el& Mr. S.M. fi.!:tlll~ 
1~ Mr. '1.1'. 'A~Ti Mr. 5.M. P.l'ianOi -
--- 1~ Mr. T.T. MbIr".~ Mr. S.M. P~IIM 
1'3!i7 ',Ai'TT. ,~t>(r"o~ Mr. S.M. P~IIR11 
1~ Mr. 1.T. ''''''flnn Mr. S.M. Plyan;! - -
1'369 Mr. M.M.S. MdI;dIDna Ur. S.M. P!tA"A 
DEPARTMEJIR' YEAR MINIa'TER I :DG 
~nnrAl & EnRII) 1"2 Mf. f.w.~KlIIlIt Mr. G.J:? du P~" 
1~3 1M~, f(JP. 4u P~iii 
1~ ;tAr. L /t1bet1r. __ 
1985 .~r. l).W. SJe~ ,Mr. L ~I!IMI; 
-- '!iBG Mr. 0. W, ~"r:! Mr. L /t1ller1~ 
1H? M •• D.W. SJ.o:W>I ,Mr. LN'.J~ ~clbll!dli 
1966 .Mr. DoW. 81er:! Ur. l.~, J. ~lb"cIll 
1!iI!l Mr, D. W ~le~TI Mr. LH.J. ~Ibll!litil 
1$$0 Dr. J. dl! 'Aller.; ;Mi. P.J.HLq) __ 
1(;(11 Dr. J. dc '.IIller.; 'Ar. P.J.H~ 
11!1!12 Mr. Q,~ . 5efIJell Mr. P.J. t hoo 
1993 Mf. t:;.S. E!;sltlo:H _~r. P.J.H~ 
15111. Mr. R.F. ac.hil ,Mr. P.J. tI~-:--
19!1S Mr. Rf. n.out .. Dr. G.P.N. veoo:r 
1&$6 Mr. P. MIKlInl pr. G.P.N. ~-,--
~5!Ji Mr. P. U~ICI\\ ~. $, I'>;;.yxi-;;r. 
1~6 Mr. P. Ma:tlJ"l.1 rI. S. Nc(JlIN 












b!PAAt;~ 'VVIR MINSTER I OOMMISSIONER 
~ 1181lZ ,n, L. LII Gr.L~ ~M.c..w.Ge~ 
r.~81 "1r. L. L.c Gr.an;)8 =<-r.r.c-'III. Cr.~"I~'lS 
19S. ~. L. ~. <3r~\l1: Gen. P.J (;:oEU1l1l 
11JD5 ~, L. I.e GrolllRc -~fl. P"J. Coetzee 
1DSa l'b. L.1.C: GJ3111l11 Gen. P.J. CCAlI:?:$9 
- )1i1S7 iWr. l. l.e Gr.mAc Gnn. r -I. C~1ZIee -19!6 ',ff.AJ.~k <3'11. H.G. ~ .... '1 
1- ' 
1060 'r.cr. A.J. ~oll ~cn. H.B. f!8 .... ~I 
~9IitI 'PAr. AJ. "'ak 10,1'1 . .1. Ylln der Mc_ 
1!H11 Mr ...... J. 'IIInk lSen. J. IIlIn <SA! ... ,_ 
1982 - Mr. K.I. KrieI ~cn. J. yjln dtor M.,;,oooo 3893 a.'f. H.J. Knet PM J. Villi def' tkt'..o -
;f!l!W a.'r. F.a "'lIfAmedi :Gen. J. VlIII dct.\~ 
- 19~ _ iW. FS. PAufllmll:ll .MII;4/1n, G. n .. .n 
1996 ~,".S. Mu1amlld" .. 'I!t.~"II. G. Fr~.n 
-
- 1W1 'II. F.B .... urAtMtf . ~:..aen. a. F;4" 
- l19S1a ~( F.S. Mu1Inn:d '.-¢(lfl. G.. rl'lilZ 
19'919 '''' •. So. 'lsthi1!\c M-. .J. Se~ 
-
: DEPARTMENT YEAR MINIIrreR COMIIIIBBIDNER _ 
f'riIOMj; (JllSli09't 1982 PAr. I1.J. CDlrlD!e L·QJ.F.OI.l.o 
~ [Justlcel 1"3 Mr. ".J. ClIflIlee 
PI"'= fJlMOIiC(I} 1&011 IMr, tf.J. CII ... IU ,L·G W. H. Wilnm~ 
~{,JII8I~. 1!i85 IMr. II.Jc ClJ:!'.:zce 1".0 W. H. \VJI.III~ 
~lillCJl'W (JustICe. 1888 Mr. H.J. eDWRR L-GoW.Ji. Wllcmsc _ 
~(JIMOIU.) '&07 Mf, H.J. Cu=txllil L·GW. H . W11"~ 
f'JI-" ~,II4I~! 1!111 Ilk B.J. Coetzcc 11".0 W . H. WlIIlIll:e 
P-!-~ r"'.sllclIl f889 Ur.H.J.~R(I (L-G W. PI. \YJIIMnH: 
~d1nn"l S(I'viOH e..- 6 !Jtdc~ t!l!lD "~.A...r. \/bk I".G 'III. H. \VlIBrllM 
('or •• WulIlIl SlIrvl!;6 ~ & O'dIU) '1991 ~'t'. A.J. \/kIIC 1,,-';;' W. H. WJlsmc 
~-",anlil Sr.rvll'lQ (UIw& Ord~ ~~112 ",. >\J . Vkk L-G W. H. WJkn'oI;R 
~I'AiOflfl'lSIlIYi~fJ,..!M'601d~ ,fDD3 "''" . ..... .1. \/kIIC ~I:n. H.J eMfl 
~anOlfscNI!!j!5; IfllJ4 . ~.B.Mlim8_ !GIIII ... ...I.BMn_ 
~ln)Cjinnrl S(lfYD!!I 1!1!lS po. $.t.~m.1a laen. H..1 BIVIn 
O«t=li1l11S SrlYk;e:; '19~ po. S. iMzlmcla Dr: K. Situ" _ 
l.alRCtJDnoi SIw icM 19iJ7 p..B.~im" p;.IU;/lale 
olY'CdiMSl $tc-v~!I 19'1.\a Dr. S. l\"lmtola p:.K.8I1nl;c 
o«~illnaJ :;trNICI:~ 1 _ ""r. ,aM. 81oQj;ana ~ T. M!I@hdJl --
IlEPA'RTMENT YEAR MINIIrTEIl DB 
Plitlic Efllj)rr.ri~ 1te2' I 
--- 1'~ -- -----
11)S4 
1~ 





- - ~ 9" ~!I!)2 I 
9~ "'r. D.J. dIf Vili"rv "'1. J.1.D. l'IiWMIIJ..'l 
~!I!14 Ms. s. srnc:u Dr. E.P. v.:n Eden 
lUIS a.'I&.. S.~aC8 .. D •. E.P. vlf\'l Edel'l 
IH9!5 Mr. J. iRacIetle IF!"'. S.R._~~ --- !I!J1 t.'Ir. J. 'Radcbe Pmf. B.R. !NbAlliA 
1898 Ilk J. RIId!Ibe Prul. :;Jt (;mt)allill 
188'·1993 Mr.J.R~ Ms. N .• • l.\::QC:l~ 










































Ir~.&. Indust 1~ 
- - 1983 
1~ 
19~ 
I ","IDENT DG 
.'Ar. P.W. BRlhD Dr. J.E I1u P~~ 
'Ai. P.W. B(JUIII Dr. JP. II: Raux 
~r. P.W. BDlhll Or. J.P. Ie Rmllt 
r. P. W. BRlhlil Dr, J,P Ie flolllt 
... r. P. 'N. Ellllhll Dr. J.P. Ie Raux 
Mr. P.W. BDihOi Dr. J.P. In ROII'l-
Ur. F.W. lte'lQel1l Dr. J.P_I!! Rulllt 
" "r,. f? IfI. dBilCJerk Dr. J.P. II! RaulC 
"'r. ".W. de:J(leltt .~-Dr. J.P Ie Rowe 
'Jr , F."'. dB ~hlrk "r. J.P. Ie Raux 
'Ar. F."'. de 1<Ierk Mr. D.'II. 8tr:w1il?t 
·Mr. R.N. Iot;nrlelD Prnr,~J.~~ 
"'r . R,N. lItS1dl!b !"aI. 6..1. Ga"Nel 
'I.r. R,N. tAzrldel:l Pr.D1.eJ.~ 
!ur. R.N. t.1Jndeifl PIilr. G.J. ~ 
'Hi. ' U>I. Menlll!b PrIll. 5..1. Gaw~ 
I 'if. T. Mbell Rrt.'F, i;:h1-<@fl(t _ .. - , ..... 
,PAr. OJ, Oa VlllI!ts p;-. T.II. du Ph:!PJ1!i 
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Interview Date PlaceN enue ---------------- -------------------
Time -----------------------
A. Personal Details 
1. Surname Name ----------------------- ---------------------
2. Department Years as DG ---------------------- ----------------
3. Date of Birth 4. Place of Birth ----------------- -------------------
5. Religion _______________ ___ 6. Home Language __________ __ 
B. Education 
1.SecondarySchool ____ ______________________________________ _ 
2. Matriculation Su bjects __________________________________________ _ 
3. Achievements at school ----------------------------------------
4. Tertiary Education: 
4.1. Undergraduate Degree ________________________ 4.1.2. Years _______ _ 
4.1.3. Undergraduate Institution. __________________________ ________ _ 
4.1.4. Major courses _ _______________________________________ _ 
4.1.5. Achievements - -----------------------------------------
4.2. Secondary undergraduate degree __________ 4.2.1.Institution _______ __ 






















23. Did your Department ever undertake a strategic management exercise? Describe the 
process? 
24. How fre uentl 
Hardly ever 
25. Which countries did you most frequently travel to and what was the purpose of the 
trips? 
26. How frequently did you voluntarily cooperate with other Director Generals? 
I Frequently I Every once in a while Hardly Ever Never 
27. Describe an incident where you and one or more Directors General voluntarily 
cooperated and what was the outcome? 
28 . Were you ever told or forced to cooperate with one or more Director Generals? 
29. Were there formal lines of communication between Directors General, for example a 
weekly scheduled meeting? If so, describe the aim and process of the interaction. 
30. Did you ever socialize or interact beyond the office with one or more Directors 
General? 
31 . Which Director General did you regard as an ally or friend? 
32. Did Directors General ever go on a retreat? 
33. What is your opinion of performance contracts? 
34. What did you think of Directors General being placed on fixed term contracts? 
35. Describe an incident where you and the Minister strongly disagreed about an issue 
and what was the outcome? 
36. Did you and the Minister disagree 
Frequently Every once in a while l Hardly ever Never 
37. Describe an inc ident that is prominent for you, where you and Minister cooperated 
and what was the outcome? 
38. Did you and the Minister cooperate 
Frequently Every once in a while Hardly ever Never 
39. How would you describe the Minister on a professional level? 
40. What do you think the nature ofthe relationship should be between Director General 
and Minister? 
41. Do you support or oppose the President appointing Directors General at national 
level? Why? 
42. What did you think of President (name of President under who Director General 
served) management style? 
------- --- ------- -- --- -------- -- ---.- ------------. -. ----. --------.- ----- - -.-.- ---- -- -. - ----- ----. ----- ----- ----- --
:- -- ----- --. ----- -. -. - --- - - --. ---- --. -. - - - -.-
! 1. Sex I 
'-----1 __ ---.l 
--------. ---------
M F 2. Race ------
! 3. Office 
! 4. Comments 
' ___ - --- ---- ---. - ---- -- ---. ---
------------- --------. ------------- ------ -----
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .1 
If the questionnaire was po d t 
questionnaire would b:eCha~ ag:~rtoretnht Director General the 
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